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Abstract
Three Essays on Trading by Members of Congress
Serkan Karadas
My dissertation examines the information content of stock trades by members of Congress
(politicians) in three separate essays. In my first essay, based on approximately 62,000 com-
mon stock transactions over the 2004-2010 period, I present evidence that past firm-level
trading activity by politicians predicts future firm-level stock returns, and this prediction
is stronger for the pre-recession period and for small firms. By constructing buy-minus-
sell transactions-based portfolios, I document that the portfolios of Republicans outperform
those of Democrats. Also, being a powerful member of Congress is associated with sub-
stantially higher abnormal returns for Republicans, but not for Democrats. Among powerful
Republicans, the portfolios of unsophisticated traders perform significantly better than those
of sophisticated ones with abnormal returns exceeding 34% on annual basis under one-week
holding period. The abnormal returns in general disappear beyond three-month holding
period suggesting that politicians trade on time-sensitive value-relevant information. This
study contributes to the literature showing that power, party membership, and investor
sophistication are important determinants of the abnormal returns in congressional stock
portfolios.
In my second essay, I , for the first time in the literature, separately examine the per-
formance of common stock transactions of politicians and their family members (spouses
and dependent children). I document that the transactions by both politicians and spouses
contain value-relevant information, but the content of information is less time-sensitive for
spouses. On the other hand, the transactions in the accounts of the dependent children
perform very poorly. I also present evidence that the transactions in tax-deferred accounts
such as 401(k)s contain less information than those in taxable trading accounts for both
politicians and their spouses. I finally show that the portfolios of the powerful politicians’
spouses outperform those of the non-powerful politicians’ spouses. These results suggest
that members of Congress take advantage of their informational advantage trading through
the accounts of their spouses.
My third essay examines the properties of aggregate congressional trading. I investigate
the ability of aggregate trading activity by members of Congress to predict stock market
returns using 77,663 stock transactions over the 2004-2010 period. I find that aggregate
congressional trading predicts excess market returns 2 to 3 months in advance. These find-
ings imply that politicians, similar to corporate insiders, trade on information containing
macroeconomic components.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Members of Congress (politicians) have been required to report their financial transactions
since the late 1970s. This requirement was put in place in order to rebuild public confidence
in Congress following the Watergate era scandals.1 Ziobrowski et al. (2004; 2011) conducted
two influential studies examining the performance of common stock investments by members
of Congress over the 1985-2001 period. They revealed that the portfolios of Senators and
Representatives outperformed the market during their sample period. These interesting
findings have fueled a debate on whether members of Congress should be allowed to trade
stocks, and if they are allowed, what limits and rules they should be subject to. Congress
passed the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act (STOCK) of 2012 to increase
transparency on congressional stock trades and to clearly forbid members of Congress from
trading on inside information. Eroding public trust in Congress was a key factor in passing
the STOCK Act after it was first proposed by Representatives Brian Baird and Louise M.
Slaughter in 2006.2
In the signing ceremony of the STOCK Act, President Obama hailed the STOCK Act
as the right step to repair a deficit of trust between Congress and the public. 3 Prior to the
STOCK Act, members of Congress were required to submit financial disclosure reports once
1http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/watergate/legacy.htm
2http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/politics/insider-trading-ban-for-lawmakers-clears-
congress.html? r=0
3http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/04/politics/stock-act-signing/
1
a year on the financial transactions that they undertook in the previous year. The STOCK
Act required that members of Congress post their trades online within 2 to 3 months of the
transaction date to enhance transparency. Nevertheless, Congress amended the STOCK Act
in 2013 by abandoning online posting requirement due to national security and identity theft
concerns following a study by the National Academy of Public Administration.4
There is now an ongoing debate on the way that members of Congress trade stocks.
Nevertheless, the information content of congressional stock trades is not well-known. We
hope to shed light on this issue by studying different aspects of congressional trading. In the
first essay (Chapter 2 of this dissertation), we investigate the information content of con-
gressional trading at the firm- and portfolio-level, and find that the past firm-level trading
activity by politicians predicts future firm-level stock returns. Also, the portfolios of Republi-
cans earn short-term abnormal returns while there is almost no evidence of informed trading
for Democrats. The second essay separately examines the presence of informed trading for
politicians and their family members. We present evidence that the spouses of politicians are
also informed traders. Furthermore, the portfolios of powerful politicians’ spouses outper-
form those of non-powerful politicians’ spouses. In the third essay, we analyze the aggregate
properties of congressional trading, and document that aggregate congressional trading pre-
dicts stock market returns suggesting that there is also a macroeconomic component in
congressional stock trades.
The findings in this dissertation suggest that members of Congress are informed traders,
and they share private political information with their spouses. Also, members of Congress
trade on both firm-specific and macroeconomic information. The information in congres-
sional stock trades has a very time-sensitive nature, only capable of predicting stock returns
and generating abnormal returns in the short-time periods (up to three months).
4http://www.napawash.org/2013/1453-stock-act-impact-of-providing-personally-identifiable-financial-
information-online.html
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Chapter 2
Informed Trading at Capitol Hill:
Evidence from Congressional Trading
2.1 Introduction
Alleged insider trading by members of Congress (politicians) caused mounting public pres-
sure, which was a catalyst for change in the passage of the Stop Trading On Congressional
Knowledge (STOCK) Act of 2012.1 This act banned trading using congressional knowledge
on pending legislation and mandated congressional stock trades to be available online within
two months of the transaction date by changing the annual paper-based filing requirement.
One year later, Congress, with unanimous approval and in just 24 seconds, amended the
STOCK Act by making online disclosure requirements for members of Congress and the Ex-
ecutive Branch optional and by striking down the section of the law that allowed the public
to search, sort, and download the data in these electronic reports because of “ identity theft
and national security concerns”.2 Such a hasty change raised questions whether Congress
used allegations of national security and identity theft concerns to impede the effectiveness
1For example, see the articles available at http://www.economist.com/node/21541434 and
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560 162-57323527/congress-trading-stock-on-inside-information/
2http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/04/18/stock-act-strikeout-visualized/ and
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/12/net-us-usa-congress-security-idUSBRE93B0ZJ20130412
3
of the STOCK Act.3 These recent changes suggest that there still could be a wealth of
information embedded in recent congressional stock trades despite a new study that finds
no evidence of informed trading in Congress (Eggers and Hainmueller, 2013a).
Politicians differ from retail traders and corporate insiders in that they generate or have
access to private political information. The use of such information can be quite profitable
not only for politicians but also other traders. For example, the Washington Post reports that
there was unusual trading activity in the options of Humana, a health insurer, after a staffer
on the Senate Finance Committee, talked about the prospects of a critical Medicare bill in a
conference call organized by Capitol Street, a consulting firm, on March 18, 2013. On April 2,
2013, the government officially announced a rate increase for Medicare-participating insurers,
which generated 500% or more returns on the options bought right after the conference
call.4 The Wall Street Journal reveals that there was also a widespread spike in health-
care stocks just before the markets closed on April 1, 2013. This spike was triggered by
a tip from a congressional staffer-turned-lobbyist who used to work at the Senate Finance
Committee.5 One unidentified trader purchased 2,200 call options worth $368,025 scoring
approximately $1.6 million in profits when the official announcement came out the following
day. These events even triggered a SEC investigation due to possibility of leaking and trading
on nonpublic and material information.6 These scandals are examples of how information
from a powerful committee like the Senate Finance Committee can move the stock prices.
This paper investigates whether politicians are informed traders by using panel (pooled)
regressions and calendar-time portfolios. We document that firm-level trading activity by
politicians in the previous three months predicts future firm-level stock returns. The pre-
3http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2013/04/21/did-obama-and-congress-use-national-security-
fears-to-gut-the-stock-act/
4http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-05-06/business/39066133 1z investors-conference-call-staff-
member
5http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324345804578427102504475618.html
6http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324582004578459714133929632.html
4
dictive ability is stronger for smaller firms and for the pre-recession period. We also find
that the portfolios of Republicans earn short-term abnormal returns exceeding 16% on an
annual basis under the one-week holding period whereas there is almost no evidence of in-
formed trading in the portfolio returns of Democrats. The abnormal returns are greater on
the portfolios of powerful Republicans compared to non-powerful ones, but there does not
appear to be a difference between the portfolio performance of powerful and non-powerful
Democrats. These results imply that power is a determinant of abnormal returns only when
it interacts with party membership. Sorting powerful Republicans into sophisticated and
unsophisticated investor classes reveals that the portfolios of the unsophisticated investors
outperform those of the sophisticated ones with abnormal returns exceeding 34% on annual
basis under one-week holding period. Overall, we present evidence that there is nontrivial
private political information in congressional stock trades that generates abnormal returns
in the short-term, and unsophisticated powerful Republicans are the most informed traders
of all.
Our study contributes to the literature the following ways. First, it is unique in docu-
menting that past firm-level trading activity by politicians predicts future firm-level stock
returns, and politicians are alike corporate insiders in that they also predict the returns
of small companies better. Second, we provide the most consistent evidence in the litera-
ture that there is a substantial difference in the portfolio performance of Republicans and
Democrats. Third, our paper is the first study investigating the joint effect of power and
party membership on congressional stock returns. Fourth, we document that information in
congressional stock trades has a very time-sensitive nature. Fifth, we show that there is a
negative relationship between investor sophistication and degree of informed trading among
politicians. Finally, our results contribute to the market efficiency literature by showing that
markets are not strong-form efficient.
5
The results of this study complement those in Karadas (2013c) showing that politicians
trade on firm-specific information in addition to macroeconomic information. Our paper dif-
fers from the first studies on congressional trading (Ziobrowski et al., 2004; Ziobrowski et al.,
2011) in that we use a more refined approach into separating informed and uninformed politi-
cians based on the power structure of congressional committees and investor sophistication
rather than the seniority of the politicians. Furthermore, our study measures the abnormal
returns in a dynamic setup with holding periods ranging from one week to one year. We also
employ panel estimation methods to analyze the predictive ability of congressional trading
for different sizes of firms. Moreover, using more recent data (2004-2010) helps us examine
the information content of congressional trading around the Great Recession. Finally, the
recent data presents us with the opportunity to reveal the consequences of the Republican
dominance, especially in the US House, following the 1994 US midterm elections.
Our analysis provides insights that are not documented by the recent studies on the
performance of common stock investments by politicians (Eggers and Hainmueller, 2013a;
2013b). These studies do not document widespread abnormal returns using data from the
2004-2008 period. Nevertheless, they find 3% abnormal returns on an annual basis in the
local investments of politicians, but these investments do not generate short-term abnormal
returns. The magnitude and time dimension of abnormal returns in these recent studies
suggest that we are looking at different aspects of congressional trading.
Our study has some limitations. First, we do not test whether politicians trade on
information related to specific legislation they work on or companies that their committees
regulate. Second, it is possible that politicians use a mosaic of nonpublic information mixed
with public information instead of specific tips. The use of such information falls under
the mosaic theory, which is often brought up by the defense attorneys at the recent insider
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trading cases such as Raj Rajaratnam and Rajat Gupta.7 We do not distinguish between
these different uses and acquisitions of information in our paper. Third, we do not measure
the impact of the STOCK Act on the trading behavior of politicians due to lack of data.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review
on the intersection of politics and finance, and on trading by retail traders and corporate
insiders. Section 3 develops the testable hypotheses. Section 4 introduces the transactions
and committee assignment data. Section 5 and 6 outline the empirical methods and present
the results of the empirical analysis. Section 7 separately examines the portfolio perfor-
mance of skill-driven and information-driven trades. Section 8 summarizes the result of net
worth-based portfolio analysis. Section 9 is on the relationship between power and portfolio
performance. Section 10 provides a rigorous analysis of party membership and the extent
of informed trading. Section 11 is on the source of private information that members of
Congress trade on. Section 12 concludes the paper.
2.2 Literature Review
The question whether politicians are trading on private political information in their common
stock investments has attracted a great deal of attention in the last two decades. The
first comprehensive study answering this question is conducted by Ziobrowski et al.(2004).
By constructing transactions-based calendar-time portfolios (i.e., synthetic portfolios), they
find that U.S. Senators’ common stock portfolios outperform the market over the 1993-1998
period. When they measure the performance of buy-minus-sell portfolios (portfolios that
long the buy transactions and short the sell transactions) at the party level, they find very
weak evidence of abnormal returns for Democrats and no evidence of abnormal returns for
Republicans with the difference being statistically insignificant. In a related study in 2011,
7http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/just-tidbits-or-material-facts-for-insider-trading/ and
http://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2012/05/22/rajat-gupta-trial-will-be-governments-test-of-
mosaic-theory/
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they find abnormal portfolio performance for the U.S. House of Representatives over the
1985-2001 period. However, they document that Democrats perform better than Republicans
subject to how the portfolio returns are weighted. In both studies, they use the seniority of
politicians as a proxy for power, but document that junior politicians perform better than
senior ones in their common stock investments. Their results are not very surprising given
that the importance of seniority declined after the 1995 Republican takeover of the U.S.
House (Stewart III, 2012).
In our paper, we use a ranking of congressional committees based on their power struc-
ture in Congress and thus rely on a more consistent measure of power. We also measure the
magnitude of abnormal returns in a dynamic fashion under holding periods ranging from
one week to one year while Ziobrowski et al. (2004; 2011) use only one-year holding period.
The dynamic holding periods shed light on whether politicians trade on time-sensitive infor-
mation. Also, the sample period in these previous studies refer to a period when the balance
of power started shifting towards Republicans following the 1994 midterm elections. There-
fore, this sample period does not give us a clear picture on the relationship between party
membership and informed trading. The Republican Party brought in sweeping changes to
Congress following their midterm election success and significantly altered the power struc-
ture in the House of Representatives (Stewart III, 2012) since then. Republicans controlled
the US House from 1995 until today with the exception of the 2007-2010 period. The Re-
publicans were also in control of the Senate in 10 out of 16 years between 1995 and 2010.
These long periods of (mostly) uninterrupted majority control suggest that the Republican
Party stayed in power long enough to permanently alter the balance of power in Congress.
As a result, using recent data after the change in the power dynamics stabilized presents us
with the opportunity to examine how the Republican takeover of Congress in the mid-90s
had an impact on the portfolio performance of Republicans and Democrats.
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Karadas (2014c) documents a systematic component in congressional trades such that
aggregate congressional trading predicts future stock market returns over the 2004-2010
period. This finding implies that congressional stock trades are also driven by economy-
wide information. Eggers and Hainmueller (EH hereafter, 2013a) conduct an examination
of congressional stock returns over the 2004-2008 period. They investigate the presence
of abnormal return using politicians’ portfolio holdings based on various criteria such as
politicians’ power, net worth, seniority, and party membership, and fail to find any abnormal
returns. On the contrary, we document short-term abnormal returns for Republicans and
higher short-term abnormal returns for powerful Republicans by using a transacted-based
portfolio-based approach.
Our study differs from the EH (2013a) paper in the following ways. First, by only focusing
on the stocks that politicians hold, they drop the sell transactions from their analysis. We
later document that there is non-negligible private information in the sell transactions of
powerful Republicans. Second, when EH (2013a) group transactions and politicians in the
powerful and non-powerful samples, they assume that if a politician serves on a powerful
committee at some point during the sample period, all of his transactions should be classified
in the powerful transactions’ sample. We however show that the abnormal returns for the
same politicians change considerably between the time that they are powerful and that they
are non-powerful. Also, the authors do not look at the joint impact of party membership
and power on congressional stock returns. Third, the holdings-based approach does not
distinguish between short-term and long-term abnormal returns. As they explain in their
subsequent paper (EH, 2013b), the presence of long-term abnormal returns implies that
members of Congress trade in a similar fashion to retail traders investing in local stocks: the
source of information is more about using their extensive network and general knowledge
rather than trading on time-sensitive information. It is critical that we determine whether
private political information comes from politicians’ in-depth knowledge of companies (long-
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term) or their current activities (short-term).
The fourth difference between our study and EH (2013a) is that they include every
congressperson who owned a stock during the 2004-2008 period in their portfolio analysis
even though some of them did not place a single trade during the entire sample period. For
example, in their full sample, they use portfolio returns from 422 members of Congress, but
only 348 of them traded stocks during the 2004-2008 period according to our analysis. It is
likely that these buy-and-hold type investors do not trade based on private information, and
they are more likely to have average market returns. Fifth, instead of relying on seniority,
we use a measure of investor sophistication to separate skill-driven trades from information-
driven trades. Fifth, we construct portfolios based on the ratio of transaction values to
politicians’ net worth to screen for high information-content trades instead of focusing only
on net worth. Finally, EH (2013a) use estimates for transaction and asset values for the
majority of the sample, which may confound the portfolio performance of politicians. We
provide a more in-depth analysis of this estimation issue in the empirical analysis section.
Eggers and Hainmueller (2013b) sort politicians’ transactions into connected and un-
connected portfolios based on firms’ proximity to a politician’s district, campaign contribu-
tions, and lobbying activities targeting a politician’s committee. They find that politicians
have strong preferences to invest in companies headquartered in their districts, and these
investments generate 3% annualized abnormal returns. Nevertheless, they don’t find any
short-term abnormal returns in these connected portfolios (location, lobbying and campaign
contribution) based on the transactions-based calendar-time portfolios (i.e., synthetic portfo-
lios), and they argue that politicians invest in local stocks based on their general knowledge
of the local management, but not on time-sensitive information. They additionally show
that this local premium does not depend on whether traders are powerful politicians or not.
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Our study complements the research on how politics affects the value and decisions of
firms. By focusing on the most powerful 20 committees in Congress (10 from each cham-
ber), Cohen et al . (2011) find that when a politician becomes the chairman of a powerful
committee, the federal spending in his or her state increases, which in return crowds out
corporate investment and employment. Tahoun and Van Lent (2010) document that politi-
cians are more likely to bail out a firm if they hold its stock. Furthermore, the chance of a
bail-out is higher for firms with investors from powerful committees. Cooper et al. (2010)
present evidence that there is a positive relationship between the number of candidates a
firm supports during an election and its subsequent abnormal returns. Kim et al. (2012)
construct a political alignment index (PAI) between a state’s politicians and the President,
and show that there is a positive relationship between PAI and stock returns. They argue
that the higher alignment is associated with higher chances of legislative change, and thus
higher political risk. Belo et al. (2013) find that firms with higher levels of exposure to
government spending perform better (worse) than those with lower levels of exposure when
the president is a Democrat (Republican).
Our paper is closely related to the stream of studies on the investment performance of
retail traders and corporate insiders. Odean (1999) investigates whether retail investors
are overconfident in their trading decisions. He constructs calendar-time portfolios for buy
and sell transactions and finds that the intercept (alpha) on the buy-minus-sell portfolio
is significantly negative. His analysis implies that investors misinterpret information about
stocks and that they have poor skills in projecting which stocks will rise and which stocks will
fall in value. Seasholes and Zhu (2010) examine the investment skills of individual traders by
looking at their local (stocks) holdings and transactions. By constructing holdings-based and
transactions-based calendar-time portfolios, they document that individual traders do not
earn abnormal returns on their holdings, and their transactions do not contain value-relevant
information.
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This paper is also linked to the studies on corporate insider trading and market efficiency.
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) present evidence that corporate insiders are able to predict
market and cross-sectional stock returns. They show that the source of predictive ability
comes from insiders in smaller firms and buy transactions. Jeng et al. (2003) document that
buy transactions by corporate insiders outperform the market exceeding 6% a year while sell
transactions do not have any abnormal performance. Cohen et al. (2012) filter out routine
trades by corporate insiders and document abnormal returns around 10% a year for the rest
of the transactions.
2.3 Hypotheses
2.3.1 Predictive Ability
We are primarily interested in uncovering the information content of congressional stock
trades. If politicians are informed traders using value-relevant information, we should see a
relationship between the direction of their past trades and future stock prices. Buy (sell)
transactions should be followed with higher (lower) stock prices. Based on this expectation,
we formulate our first hypothesis the following way:
• H1: There is a relationship between firm-level trading activity by politicians and stock
returns such that past firm-level trading activity predicts future firm-level stock returns.
The insider trading literature shows that corporate insiders from smaller companies are
better at predicting their firms’ stock returns than those from larger companies (Lakonishok
and Lee, 2001). The main argument in these studies is that there is more information asym-
metry between public and management in smaller companies, and thus corporate insiders
have an edge over outsiders. We argue that politicians also have a better chance of predicting
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the returns of smaller companies due to higher levels of information asymmetry about these
companies. As a result, we formulate the second hypothesis as:
• H2: The predictive ability of firm-level trading activity is stronger for smaller compa-
nies.
2.3.2 Abnormal Returns
Finding a strong positive relationship between past trading activity and future stock re-
turns is a critical step towards establishing that politicians are informed traders, and there
is value-relevant information embedded in congressional stock trades. If this information
is valuable enough, then we should see positive abnormal returns on a portfolio that buys
what politicians buy and sells what they sell (i.e., buy-minus-sell, hedged, long/short port-
folio). Such a relationship does not necessarily establish that politicians reap all of these
abnormal returns since we use hypothetical holding periods and take into consideration the
losses avoided by selling at the right time. Nevertheless, this methodology presents evidence
whether the value in the congressional stock trades is material enough to generate abnormal
returns. As a result, our third hypothesis is:
• H3: Politicians trade on value-relevant information such that their trades generate
abnormal returns.
We anticipate that the members of the Republican Party trade on more value-relevant
information than those of the Democratic Party for the following reasons. The Republican
takeover of Congress ensuring the 1994 elections (so-called Republican Revolution) changed
the power balance in Congress in favor of the Republican Party. Republicans controlled
the US House between 1995 and 2006, and the US Senate between 1995 and 2006 with
the exception of the 2000-2001 period, which gave them the opportunity to implement the
changes they pioneered.8 Stewart III (2012) documents that the transition in the power from
8http://cstl-cla.semo.edu/renka/ui320-75/presandcongress.asp
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Democrats to Republicans had an especially significant effect in the House of Representatives,
which represents approximately 75% of all transactions and traders.
The Republican Revolution was followed by the K Street Project, which was aimed at
aligning the influence of lobbyists with the Republican Party by encouraging lobbying firms
to hire Republicans in exchange for preferential access to powerful politicians.9 Republicans
promoted this project to reduce the Democratic influence in the lobbying industry due to
the long-held Democratic majority in Congress.10 According to the government watchdog
POLITICO, Republicans still dominate the K Street despite losing control of the House
for the 2007-2010 period and being the minority party in the Senate since 2007.11 The K
Street Project cemented the ties between the Republican Party and the business community
in addition to leading to increased campaign contributions to Republican candidates from
lobbyists.12 We argue that the change in the power structure in Congress and the dominance
in the lobbying industry, which is sometimes deemed as the fourth branch of the government13
enhanced the access to private political information by the members of the Republican Party.
As a result, we expect that the members of the Republican Party are more informed than
those of the Democratic Party, and set our fourth hypothesis as follows:
• H4: Abnormal returns on the portfolios of Republicans exceed those on the portfolios
of Democrats.
Politicians widely differ with respect to how much power they have. We argue that
powerful politicians in general possess more value-relevant information than other politicians
because they are in positions to acquire more information and to be more influential in
decisions that may affect stock prices. As a result, we anticipate that:
9http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5148982
10http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/rick-santorum-and-the-k-street-project-fact-
checker-biography/2012/01/05/gIQAbqwgjP blog.html
11http://www.politico.com/story/2013/03/lobbying-republicans-keep-grip-on-k-street-89007.html
12http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/05/rick-santorum-lobbyists-k-street-project n 1186606.html
13http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id1¯517964
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• H5: Abnormal returns on the portfolios of powerful politicians are higher than those
on the portfolios of non-powerful politicians.
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Transactions Data
We obtain raw daily transactions data for the 2004-2010 period from the Center for Respon-
sive Politics (www.opensecrets.org). This study covers the period preceding the STOCK Act
of 2012. Prior to the STOCK Act, politicians were required to file annual financial disclosure
reports (FDR) by May 15th of every calendar year for their own and their family members’
transactions exceeding $1,000 that take place during the previous calendar year.
The raw data do not come with security identifiers. As a result, we match the raw
dataset with the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data by using company
names. We ensure that each asset has a permanent identifier (PERMNO) in the matched
sample. Following Ziobrowski et al.(2004), we only keep transactions on U.S. common stocks
(CRSP share code 10 or 11) trading on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. We also eliminate
transactions if there is no transaction date, no transaction amount, or the transaction amount
is less than $100.
We refine our sample further by following Ziobrowski et al. (2011) and eliminate trans-
actions if there are not any stock returns within -/+ 15 days of the transaction date to
possibly drop the transactions involving initial public offerings (IPOs). The FDRs do not
always indicate the precise dollar amount of transactions. Many transaction amounts are
provided within intervals such as between $1,001-$15,000. As in Ziobrowski et al. (2004),
we use the midpoint of such intervals as the dollar amount of transactions. Our final sample
has 61,998 transactions and 2671 unique stocks. 49.76%, 46.72%, and 3.52% of the stocks
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are listed on NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX, respectively. Out of 61,998 transactions, 30,785
and 31,213 of them are buy and sell transactions, respectively, and there are a total of 403
politicians in the sample.
2.4.2 Committee Data
We obtain the committee assignment data from Stewart III and Woon (2011).14 We merge
the transaction data with the committee assignments by precisely matching the transaction
dates and the period of committee membership. Let’s suppose that politician A served on the
Senate Appropriations Committee in 2007 and 2008, but he had common stock transactions
during, before, and after his service period. We ensure that only the transactions that
politician A carried out in 2007 and 2008 are associated with the Senate Appropriations
Committee.
Similar to Cohen et al. (2011), we focus on the most powerful 20 committees (top 20),
10 from each chamber. We follow a more recent ranking produced by Charles Stewart III
(Stewart III, 2012) while Cohen et al. (2011) employ an earlier version of the committee
rankings that have less overlap with our sample period (Edwards and Stewart III, 2006).
Stewart III (2012) uses an econometric technique,Grosewart method, based on the revealed
preferences of politicians. For example, if a politician gives up his seat on the House Foreign
Affairs committee to serve on the House Rules Committee, the value from serving on Rules
exceeds the value from serving on Foreign Affairs. Here value refers to the set of monetary
and non-monetary benefits politicians can extract from serving on a committee. For example,
landing a private sector job after leaving Congress or accomplishing key legislative changes
could be the benefits a politician attaches to serving on a given committee. The Grosewart
method yields cardinal values for each congressional committee that are later used to rank
14We are thankful to Charles Stewart for making committee assignment data available to public at
http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data page.html. See www.opensecrets.org for the descriptions of congres-
sional committees.
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congressional committees.
The powerful committees in order of importance are Ways &Means, Energy & Commerce,
Appropriations, Rules, Foreign Affairs, Financial Services, Armed Services, Judiciary, House
Administration, and Budget in the House.15 In the Senate, these committees in order of im-
portance are Finance, Appropriations, Rules & Administration, Armed Services, Commerce,
Governmental Affairs, Health, Judiciary, Budget, and Veteran Affairs. 16
2.5 Firm-Level Analysis: Panel Data Approach
We employ two different approaches to measure the value-relevance of congressional stock
trades. First, we investigate whether past firm-level trading activity by politicians predicts
future firm-level stock returns in a panel data framework. This approach helps us determine
whether there is nontrivial value-relevant information on the common stock investments of
politicians. Second, we construct transactions-based calendar-time portfolios and measure
the abnormal returns at different holding periods ranging from 5 to 252 trading days (i.e.,
one week to one year).
Politicians traded 2,671 different common stocks during our sample period. It is critical
to determine whether they have private political information in just a handful of companies
or in a large majority of them. If politicians have information about a stock, the way that
they traded this particular stock should correlate with its future returns. For example, if
15We do not have any transactions associated with Ethics Committee, which ranks #9 in the House. We
instead use the next committee, House Administration, for which we have available data.
16We also use the power committees in EH (2013a). EH (2013a) focuses on the most powerful 7 committees
(top 7), 4 from the House and 3 from the Senate based on Stewart III (2012). Nevertheless, they elevate
the ranking of the Senate Commerce Committee possibly because of the extremely rapid rise in its power in
the last two decades and the declining popularity of some congressional committees such as Armed Services
(Stewart III, 2012). Overall, EH (2013a) classify Rules, Appropriations, Ways & Means, and Commerce in
the House; Appropriations, Finance, and Commerce in the Senate as the powerful committees. Using top 7
instead of top 20 committees improves the short-term abnormal returns. The results are available from the
author upon request.
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politicians place 100 buys and 10 sells in a stock in a given month, we should anticipate
appreciation of the stock price in the subsequent month if their trades contain value-relevant
information. The main objective of our paper is to find out whether members of Congress
are informed traders in general. In other words, we are interested in documenting whether
their informational advantage extends beyond a handful of companies. If this is the case, we
should see a statistically significant relationship between politicians’ past trading activity
and future stock returns using a panel framework.
The firm-level trading analysis presents us the opportunity to investigate the time-
sensitivity of congressional stock trades. The number of months over which we measure the
trading activity tells us about the time dimension over which information is value-relevant.
Thanks to a large number of observations in the panel regressions, the firm-level analysis is
also helpful for examining the presence of informed trading for short time intervals such as
the post-recession period.
2.5.1 Setup
We measure firm-level trading activity based on the net number of transactions from the
previous three months:
net3tradei,t =
∑3
j=1NBuysi,t−j −
∑3
j=1NSellsi,t−j∑3
j=1NBuysi,t−j +
∑3
j=1NSellsi,t−j
(2.1)
where NBuysi and NSellsi are the number of buy and sell transactions that all politicians
make in firmi a given month. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) also employ a similar approach
to measure insider trading activity by including the transactions stretching back to more
than one month in order to have more firm-years in the sample and to capture the broader
patterns in the data.
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As in Cohen et al. (2012), we estimate a panel regression (standard errors are clustered
at the firm level) with and without month fixed effects and employ past one month stock
returns, past 12 month stock returns, market capitalization, and book-to-market ratio as the
additional control variables. As a result, we estimate the following equation:
rreti,t = αi+β1net3tradei,t+β2ri,t−1+β3ri,(t−2,t−12)+β4log(size)i,t+β5log(bm)i,t+εi,t (2.2)
where the dependent variable, rreti,t, is the raw stock return of firm i in percentages in
month t. ri,t−1 is the past month raw return of firm i, and ri,(t−2,t−12) is the cumulative
continuously compounded returns of firm i from month t−12 to t−2. log(size) is the log of
market capitalization (in millions) measured in June of each calendar year T , and log(bm)
is the log of book-to-market ratio with book equity measured in December of calendar year
T − 1 for all fiscal years ending in calendar year T − 1. Both log(size) and log(bm) are
attached to stock returns from July of year T to June of year T +1 (Fama and French, 1992;
Fama and French, 2008). We provide the summary statistics and correlations (Pearson’s)
of the regression variables in Table 2.1. The average returns are positive during the sample
period. There is a statistically significant correlation between all variables except for rret
and log(size). However, the magnitude of the statistically significant correlation coefficients
does not appear to be large enough to be the source of the multicollinearity problem.
[Table 2.1 About Here]
Eq. (1) generates many missing values since politicians trade some stocks very infre-
quently. We adopt two strategies to handle these missing observations. First, it could be
that politicians did not have any information during these periods and hence they did not
trade. In this case, we simply ignore those missing observations as in Eq. (2). It is also
possible that politicians had some neutral information (neither bad nor good) about those
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firm-months and simply avoided trading. If this scenario is the case, dropping the missing
observations may give us an incomplete picture about the predictive ability of congressional
trading. In order to account for this possibility, we also estimate Eq. (2) with full3trade
instead of net3trade, which replaces the missing index values with zeros.
2.5.2 Main Results
Columns 1-2 in Panels A and B of Table 2.2 present the main results of the panel regressions.
net3trade predicts the future stock returns even after controlling for month fixed-effects
implying that there is value-relevant information embedded in congressional stock trades.
Also, full3trade has a predictive ability, which suggests that the periods of no-trade still
contains valuable information with politicians avoiding trading stocks as a result of neutral
information. Overall, these results support Hypothesis 1.
[Table 2.2 About Here]
2.5.3 Longer Time Horizon
We do a robustness check by constructing another trading index, net6trade, based on the
previous six months of congressional trading activity:
net6tradei,t =
∑6
j=1NBuysi,t−j −
∑6
j=1NSellsi,t−j∑6
j=1NBuysi,t−j +
∑6
j=1NSellsi,t−j
(2.3)
where NBuysi and NSellsi are the number of buy and sell transactions that all politicians
make in firmi a given month.
Columns 1-2 of Panel C of Table 2.2 show that the information of content of firm-level
trading activity degenerates once we extend it to include the transactions in the previous six
months. These results suggest that politicians tend to trade on time-sensitive information
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whose content loses its value-relevance as more time passes subsequent to the transaction
date.
2.5.4 Is Information Related to Firm Size?
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) document that corporate insiders in small firms are better at
predicting their companies’ stock returns than those in large firms. Motivated by this finding,
we carry out firm-level estimations for both small and big market capitalization firms using
net3trade, full3trade, and net6trade as the predictors. We use the median market value
of NYSE listed firms to sort the stocks into small and big groups. It is essential to bear in
mind that a politician may have investments in both small and big companies.
Columns 3-6 of Table 2.2 show that the transactions by politicians predict the returns of
small companies even after controlling for month fixed effects, which is in agreement with
Hypothesis 2. The predictability of the returns of big companies disappears after controlling
for month fixed effects. On the other hand, the predictive ability for small firms disappears
when we use net6trade as the predictor. These results suggest that politicians, like corporate
insiders, predict the returns of small market capitalization companies better than those of big
market capitalization companies, but this prediction is based on time-sensitive information.
2.5.5 Subperiod Analysis around the Great Recession
We repeat our analysis for three different sub-periods: pre-recession, recession, and post-
recession based on the recession indicators from St Louis Federal Reserve.17 Such an analysis
sheds light on the issue whether politicians systematically used political private information
in their common stock trades, especially during the financial crisis as speculated in the
media.18 The results in Table 2.3 indicate that the most of the informed trading took place
17These indicators are available as a dummy variable at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/USREC
18http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-06-24/politics/35459172 1 portfolios-boehner-financial-crisis
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prior to the recession, and the information in congressional stock trades ceased to be value-
relevant in the post-recession period.
[Table 2.3 About Here]
2.5.6 Trades in Illiquid Stocks
We have assumed that each trade by politicians reveals private political information. There
is however the possibility that politicians can buy or sell a stock in sequence of orders without
revealing any new information if this stock is relatively illiquid. In other words, politicians
may be concerned about price fluctuations when they trade illiquid stocks. If politicians
act in this way, eliminating multiple transactions (combining them into a single trade) in
relatively illiquid stocks should increase the predictive ability of net3trade since we will be
discarding uninformative trades.
By following Amihud (2002), we construct an annual firm-level illiquidity index. We first
obtain all available stock returns from WRDS over the 2003-2009 period. Next, we only
keep observations with valid returns and volume data. We also require being a US domestic
stock and being listed on major US stock exchanges to stay in the sample. Having filtered
our data, we calculate our illiquidity measure following Eq. (4):
Illiquidityit =
1
NAvat,i
NAvat,i∑
k=1
|Returnit,k|
Dvolit,k
(2.4)
where Illiquidityit is the annual illiquidity index for firm (stock) i in year t, NAvat,i is the
number of days over which we have valid data for firm i in year t, Returnit,k is stock i’s
return in day k and year t, and Dvolit,k is stock i’s dollar trading volume in millions in day k
and year t. A higher index value implies wider fluctuations in stock price for a given change
in daily trading volume, and thus is an indicator of illiquidity.
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[Table 2.4 About Here]
Based on our annual illiquidity measure, we sort stocks into quintiles for each year from
2003 to 2009 such that the most liquid stocks go into the lowest quintile. We merge the
illiquidity quintile in year t with the congressional transactions data in year t+1 so that the
trades by the politicians do not confound our illiquidity measure. 86.10% of the transactions
in our dataset fall under the lowest illiquidity quintile whereas only 0.20% of them fall under
the highest illiquidity quintile. If a stock is in Quintile 1 (lowest illiquidity), we do not
eliminate any transactions. For the stocks in the other four quintiles, if there are multiple
buy (sell) trades in a given month, we combine them into a single buy (sell) trade. We
present the illiquidity-filtered results in Table 2.4. The predictive ability of congressional
trading improves at the margins after filtering transactions based on illiquidity.
2.5.7 Limitations
The firm-level trading index, net3trade, may suffer from insufficient cross-sectional variation.
Out of 49,081 valid observations, 10.35%, 31.48%, and 32.92% of them are 0, 1, and -1,
respectively. As a result, we use the calendar-time portfolio approach to complement the
results of the firm-level analysis. The portfolio analysis also enables us to measure the trading
performance of the politicians in terms of abnormal returns.
2.6 Calendar-Time Portfolio Analysis
2.6.1 Empirical Motivation
When there is cross-sectional dependence in the abnormal returns, the test statistic based
on the cumulative abnormal returns is inflated, and it over-rejects the null of no abnor-
mal returns (Lyon et al., 1999). Therefore, Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000)
strongly favor the use of the calendar-time portfolio approach that solves the problem of
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cross-sectional dependence in the data. Our data has overlapping return windows and event
clustering that plague the event study-based inferences. Furthermore, politicians sometimes
invest in the same stocks over similar time periods generating correlations between their
portfolios. The construction of calendar-time portfolios yields a single time series of returns,
which eliminates the problem of cross-sectional dependence (Seasholes and Zhu, 2010).
The calendar-time portfolio approach has some drawbacks. Mitchell and Stafford (2010)
list some of the issues that may plague the calendar-time portfolio approach. First, standard
asset pricing regressions assume constant coefficients on asset pricing factors, but the number
and type of firms in the monthly calendar-time portfolios change, which may cause estimates
to be biased. Second, the changing portfolio composition could also be at odds with the
homoskedasticity assumption, and this issue is also raised by Fama (1998). Third, Loughran
and Ritter (2000) point out that this approach treats each month identically with equal
weights and ignore the possibility of some months having different abnormal return patterns
than others. Finally, Fama (1998) argues that the bad model problem (CAPM, Three-Factor
Model, etc.) can generate anomalies that do not exist in reality.
In dealing with the heteroskedasticity problem, we follow Seasholes and Zhu (2010) and
estimate the asset pricing equations with Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
robust standard errors. We attempt to alleviate the bad model problem by estimating four
different models (CAPM, three-factor, four-factor, and five-factor models). The firm-level
analysis in Section 1.5.5 shows that most of the value-relevant information comes from the
transactions from the pre-recession period, and there is almost no value-relevant information
in the post-recession period. As a result, assigning equal weights to each month would make it
easier to fail to reject the null of no abnormal returns. We argue that the remaining problem,
the constant coefficient assumption, is less of a concern than the problems associated with
the event analysis approach given that we have a short-time series data.
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2.6.2 Two Choices for Calendar-Time Portfolios
There are two different calendar-time portfolios: holdings-based and transactions-based
calendar-time portfolios, and this study is based on the latter. The former is simply the
actual portfolios held by politicians. On the other hand, the transactions-based approach
creates synthetic portfolios based on what politicians buy and what they sell under different
holding periods. The main focus in these synthetic portfolios is the long/short (buy-minus-
sell) portfolio that longs the buy transactions and shorts the sell transactions. We prefer the
transactions-based approach to the holdings-based approach for the following reasons:
• Time-sensitivity of information (dynamic view): The transactions-based approach al-
lows us to measure abnormal returns under different holding periods (1 week, 1 month,
etc.) and to investigate whether there is any time-sensitive information in stock trades.
If politicians trade on time-sensitive information, then we should expect abnormal re-
turns on the long/short portfolio under the shorter holding time periods. On the other
hand, if politicians invest in stocks based on long-term information, then we should
expect abnormal returns on the same portfolio under the longer holding time periods.
It is not possible to make such a distinction in the holdings-based approach.
It is critical to establish the dynamic structure of the private information used in con-
gressional stock trades. The presence of abnormal returns over the long-term holding
periods (one year or more) implies that politicians possess the skills to extract infor-
mation that has value-relevance beyond short-term trading windows. Therefore, their
trading decisions are mostly independent of the current bills or projects that they work
on. Similar to retail traders who collect and process local information at an advantage
(Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 2005), they are uniquely positioned to exploit congressional
knowledge. On the other hand, the presence of short-term abnormal returns sug-
gests that politicians trade on information that is related to their current activities
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in Congress since such information is more likely to have a time-sensitive nature. In
this regard, the use of time-sensitive information raises more red flags than the use of
long-term information.
• Sub-portfolios : The transactions-based analysis enables us to separate the transactions
in the same stock by the same politician even on the same trading day into different
portfolios based on an appropriate criterion. For example, in our study, we place the
transactions by the unsophisticated powerful Republicans into three different portfolios
based on the ratio of the transaction values to their net worth. EH (2013a; 2013b)
use politicians’ stock holdings at the end of a given calendar year, and work their way
backward to calculate daily portfolio returns based on the transactions that politicians
make during that calendar year. For example, a politician reports owning $20,000
worth of GE shares at the end of 2010. He also reports two buy transactions on May
1st, 2010. EH (2013a; 2013b) update the daily value of GE holdings from December
31st to May 1st. Next, they subtract the value of these two buy transactions and
update the daily portfolio value for the period between January 1st and April 30th.
If one buy transaction represents 1% of the politician’s net worth while the other one
represents 0.001%, their methodology fails to present the information content of each
trade separately due to aggregating them under one single portfolio.
• Insufficient data: EH (2013a; 2013b) construct politicians’ daily portfolio returns based
on their holdings at the end of the year and transactions during the year as we exem-
plified in the previous section. Politicians do not always report the exact transaction
amounts and asset values. EH (2013a; 2013b) report that they have exact amounts
for 25% of the transactions and 8% of the end-of-year holdings. For the same sample
period, we find that only 45 out of 348 politicians report exact transaction amounts.
When the exact values are not stated, politicians report their transactions and asset
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holdings with large intervals such as between $250,000 and $500,000. For politicians
who reported exact transaction and asset amounts, EH (2013a; 2013b) impute the
transaction and asset values for the rest of their transactions and assets based on
the exact amounts reported by fitting a distribution. Next, they assume that these
imputed values should be the same for the rest of the politicians (the ones who did
not report the exact transaction and asset amounts) as long as we look at the same
intervals. Let’s assume that EH (2013a) come up with $345,000 imputed value for
the $250,000-$500,000 interval for the politicians who reported some exact transaction
amounts. They use this imputed value for every transaction between this interval for
the politicians who did not report any transaction values. Even though their method-
ology is empirically appealing, it is not clear how much they improve upon simply
taking the midpoint of intervals as in Ziobrowski et al. (2004; 2011). In both methods,
the transactions by the politicians who do not report exact amounts are assigned a
fixed number depending on the interval that they report.
Given that we do not know the exact transaction and asset amounts for most of
the politicians and transactions, we argue that daily portfolio values in EH (2013a;
2013b) do not reflect the actual holding returns contrary to what they claim. In the
transactions-based analysis, we only rely on the midpoint method to determine the
transaction amounts when an interval is reported. Even though we use an estimate
too, we do not use another estimate such as end-of-year values to determine the perfor-
mance of this transaction. Suppose that politician A reported buying shares of ABC
company for the first time on February 15, 2008 and provided a $50,000-$100,000 in-
terval for the transaction amount. He also reported that the value of his ABC holdings
was between $50,000-$100,000 at the end of 2008. EH (2013a; 2013b) would first es-
timate the value of ABC stock at the end of 2008, then determine the value of this
holding from December 31, 2008 to February 15, 2008 using daily returns, subtract
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the estimated transaction amount on February 14, 2008, and continue computing the
portfolio value until January 1, 2008. As a result, the difference between the portfolio
values in January 1 and December 31 becomes very sensitive to the estimated values.
In our transactions-based analysis, we simply track the subsequent performance of this
transaction from the day it was executed, which depends on its future performance,
not some estimated future value. The holdings-based approach would be appealing to
us if there was data on the number of shares that members of Congress traded and
held at some point in time. This way we could approximately pinpoint the value of
their transactions and assets. Nevertheless, the number of shares is not available for
transactions and asset holdings.
• Losses avoided : We are interested in determining whether politicians are informed
traders. Informed trading is not only about buying but also about selling at the
right time. By constructing long/short portfolios, the transactions-based approach
takes both buy and sell transactions into consideration. Nevertheless, the holdings-
based approach only focuses on the existing stocks in a portfolio and discards useful
information from sell transactions. For example, a politician owning a single stock with
an average performance learns that the company will face lawsuits from the government
in the coming weeks and immediately sells all of his holdings. The actual holdings-based
analysis will show that the politician did not beat the market because the stock had
an average performance during the actual holding period. However, the transactions-
based analysis will help us answer whether there were any losses that the politician
managed to avoid shortly after the transaction date. Such a finding is critical for an
SEC investigation because the SEC is concerned about not only illegal profits acquired
but also losses avoided based on non-public material information.19
19For example, on March 29, 2013 the SEC brought charges against Michael Steinberg at Sigma
Capital who traded stocks of Dell and Nvidia Corp in advance knowledge of their quarterly earn-
ings with his inside trades generating substantial profits and avoiding large losses for their firm (see
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2013/2013-49.htm) Under the Insider Trading Sanctions Act (ITSA) of
1984, the SEC can seek civil penalties up to three times the profit acquired or loss avoided in an insider
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• Delays in reversing a position: It is possible that a politician times his buy transaction
well, but may delay reversing his buy position to a sell for a variety of reasons (e.g.,
avoid suspicion). In such cases, information-based trading will be watered down by
regular trading. Suppose that a politician places a trade that has information-benefit
for 5 days. If the politician sells this stock 5 days after he bought it, the transactions-
based calendar-time portfolio under the 5-day holding period and the holdings-based
calendar-time portfolio can both reveal these abnormal returns. However, if the politi-
cian sold this stock 10 days later, the 5-days of non-abnormal returns can cloud the
5-day of abnormal returns with the entire analysis yielding statistically insignificant
abnormal returns under the holdings-based approach. The politician was an informed
trader in this example, but he could not profit on his information. Nevertheless, the
SEC still files criminal charges if a trader uses non-public material information even if
he or she acquires no profits or avoids no losses. For example, in SEC vs. Rosenthal,
the insiders got charged with criminal penalties, not civil penalties, for trading ahead
of two expected mergers that never took place.20
2.6.3 Setup
Ziobrowski et al. (2004; 2011) use calendar-time portfolio approach in capturing the long-
run abnormal returns following Fama’s (1998) recommendation. They assume a fixed one-
year holding period and calculate portfolio returns for each calendar day by including all
transactions that take place within the prior year. We follow their approach, but construct
the portfolios assuming 1/4-,1-, 2-, 3-, 6-, and 12-month holding periods to capture the time-
sensitivity of information embedded in the transactions. We use the following formula to
derive daily portfolio returns:
trading case in addition to seeking criminal penalties.
20http://www.law.du.edu/index.php/corporate-governance/sec-and-governance/sec-v.-rosenthal
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Rport,t =
∑J
j=1 compjtRjt∑J
j=1 compjt
(2.5)
where Rport,t represents the return on the calendar-time portfolio on trading day t, compjt
the compound value of transaction j from transaction date until trading day t − 1. The
denominator in Eq. (5) is the sum of the compounded value of each transaction at the
beginning of trading day t. The numerator is the sum of the dollar returns on each transaction
based on the compound value of the transaction at the beginning of trading day t. Suppose
that the entire portfolio is composed of two transactions involving stock A ($1,000 purchase)
and stock B ($5,000 purchase). On day 0 (transaction date), stock A appreciated 10%, but
stock B lost 5%. On day 1, stock A and stock B went up by 20% and 10%, respectively. The
denominator for day 1 portfolio return is $1, 000x1.10 = $1, 100 plus $5, 000x(0.95) = $4, 750,
which is $5,850. In other words, we start day 1 with $5,850 wealth. The numerator for day
1 return is $1, 100x0.20 = $220 plus $4, 750x0.10 = $475, which is $695. In other words, on
day 1, we earned $695 on an initial investment of $5,850: $695
$5,850
= 11.88% return.
The setup above generates daily returns, and we compound these daily portfolio returns
to generate monthly returns as in Ziobrowski et al. (2004; 2011). We first calculate portfolio
returns on buy and sell transactions, and then calculate the long/short portfolio returns
as the difference between the buy and sell portfolio returns. Our interest primarily lies in
the alphas (abnormal returns) on the long/short portfolios (Odean, 1999). Ziobrowski et
al. (2004; 2011) compute both equal-weighted portfolio returns assuming $1 initial value
for each transaction and trade-weighted or value-weighted portfolio returns using original
transaction amounts. They also average returns across politicians on each calendar day as a
robustness check. We follow their approach, but weight politician (or member)-level returns
both equally and by their portfolio size (the sum of the compounded value of all positions)
on a given trading day. In other words, we adopt a two-stage weighting scheme. In the first
stage, we weight each transaction either equally or by its original transaction amount. In
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the second stage, we weight politician-level returns either equally or by portfolio size. As a
result, we use four different weighting schemes to calculate the returns. Figure 1 presents an
overview of these weighting schemes.
[Figure 1 About Here]
The original transaction data cover the 2004-2010 period, but we have the monthly
returns up to December of 2011 because the calendar-time portfolio approach allows us to
keep any transaction in the sample as long as it takes place within the holding period. For
example, Senator A buys a stock of Company XYZ on March 9, 2010. If we want to calculate
the portfolio returns on January 9, 2011 based on the one-year holding period, this stock will
be part of the portfolio on this day because there are fewer than 252 trading days between
the transaction date and January 9, 2011.
2.6.4 Measuring Abnormal Returns
We measure the abnormal returns using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), Fama-
French Three-Factor Model, Carhart Four-Factor Model, and Five-Factor Model. We esti-
mate the following time series models using monthly data:
rp,t = αi + βp(rm,t − rf,t) + εp,t (2.6)
where rp,t is the return on the long/short portfolio (buy-minus-sell), rm,t is the CRSP value-
weighted index return, and rf,t is the interest rate on the one month treasury bill, which
represents the risk-free rate. Next, we add SMB and HML (three-factor model), UMD
(four-factor model), and finally LIQUID (five-factor model) to this CAPM equation. SMB,
small-minus-big, is the Fama-French size factor constructed by longing a portfolio of small
firms and shorting a portfolio of big firms. HML, high-minus-low, is the Fama-French value
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factor constructed by longing a portfolio of high value firms and shorting a portfolio of
low value firms (Fama and French, 1993). UMD, up-minus-down, is the momentum factor
constructed by subtracting the returns of a portfolio of losing stocks from the returns of a
portfolio of winning stocks, and LIQUID is the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor
that is equal to the return difference between the most and least liquid beta portfolios. We
collect all of these series from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).
The crux of our empirical strategy is to investigate whether α is statistically significant.
The null hypothesis is that α is not statistically different from zero, which implies an average
investment performance and lack of value-relevant information. The alternative hypothesis
is that α is statistically significantly different from zero, which implies either below or above-
market performance.
2.6.5 Main Results
We present the main results of the calendar-time portfolio analysis in Table 2.5. There are
abnormal returns on the common stock transactions of politicians. The abnormal returns
are the highest for the shortest holding period. When the holding period is assumed to
be one week (1/4 of a month), the abnormal returns range from 10.34% to 19.12% on an
annual basis, but they mostly disappear after the first three months ensuing the transaction
date (i.e., holding periods exceeding three months). Both raw and abnormal returns are
higher in Panels A and C than those in other panels. It appears that the magnitude of the
abnormal returns depends more on the way that we weight returns across members than
across transactions since in Panel A and C, the transactions are weighted differently (equal
and by transaction size, respectively), but politician (or member)-level returns are equally
weighted.
[Table 2.5 About Here]
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The raw and abnormal returns are lower and less significant when we weight politician-
level returns by their portfolio size as reported in Panel B and D suggesting that there are
politicians with losses on large portfolios bringing down the average returns. Furthermore,
the results in Panel D are marginally significant only at one-week holding period where we
weight transaction by their original amounts. In Panel D, large portfolios can be acquired
with frequent trading and large trades, but in Panel B, the size of the transactions does not
matter for the size of the portfolios since each transaction is assumed to be $1. As a result,
the poorer performance in Panel D should be at least partially caused by politicians with
losses on large portfolios to which their large transactions have heavily contributed. These
results overall suggest that (i) politicians trade on time-sensitive value-relevant information,
(ii) there are politicians with substantially large portfolios and large losses, and as long as
we weight member-level returns equally, these losses do not impact the results, and (iii) there
is an empirical support for Hypothesis 3.
2.6.6 Party Memberships
In this section we investigate whether there are any information asymmetries between the
members of the Democratic and Republican Parties. Under Hypothesis 4, we anticipate
that the common stock portfolios of Republicans outperform those of Democrats. Panel
A of Table 2.6 demonstrates the breakdown of the congressional trading data in terms of
number of traders (politicians) and transactions. The number of Republicans outweighs that
of Democrats by 64. Republicans also place more trades than Democrats on average.
[Table 2.6 About Here]
The results in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 present evidence in favor of Hypothesis 4 that the
portfolio performance of Republicans is superior to that of Democrats with abnormal returns
ranging from 16.57% to 28.25% under the one-week holding period. There is almost no
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evidence of informed trading for Democrats with mostly statistically insignificant abnormal
returns.
[Table 2.7 About Here]
[Table 2.8 About Here]
2.6.7 Powerful Politicians
Hypothesis 5 predicts that the common stock portfolios of powerful politicians have higher
abnormal returns than those of non-powerful politicians. We anticipate that the portfo-
lios of powerful Republicans (Democrats) outperform those of non-powerful Republicans
(Democrats). We provide the number of traders and transactions on the basis of party and
power committee membership in Panel B and C of Table 2.6. The number of Republicans
exceeds that of Democrats in both powerful and non-powerful samples. Furthermore, Re-
publicans have more common stock transactions on average and in absolute number than
Democrats.
We present the results in Table 2.9 and 2.10 only for powerful Republicans and Democrats,
respectively. There is very weak evidence of informed trading for non-powerful Republicans
and Democrats. While the portfolio performance of Republicans significantly improves when
we go from non-powerful Republicans to powerful Republicans, there is almost no difference
in the portfolio performance of powerful and non-powerful Democrats. These results suggest
that being powerful enhances the portfolio performance of Republicans, but it has limited
or no effect on Democrats.
[Table 2.9 About Here]
[Table 2.10 About Here]
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It is now evident that power is a determinant of the abnormal returns only when it
interacts with the membership in the Republican Party.
2.7 Information versus Skill
We document that there are short-term abnormal returns on the congressional stock trades,
and most of these returns are driven by powerful Republicans. Nevertheless, it is not conclu-
sive yet whether powerful politicians get these abnormal returns thanks to their stock-picking
skills or the use of private political information. Our results indicate that the nature of in-
formation in congressional stock trades is highly time-sensitive, but such a result still does
not help us establish whether it is the skill or private political information generating the
abnormal returns. In order to establish whether it is information or skill driving the ab-
normal returns, we need to separate politicians who are more experienced in trading stocks
than other politicians. Seru et al. (RFS 2009) separate sophisticated retail traders from the
rest based on whether a trader used options or not. They argue that “investors who trade
options are likely to be more familiar with financial markets”. We follow their approach and
identify the powerful politicians who used options and/or short-selling in their trades, and
call them sophisticated politicians.
Using the history of option trading/short-selling in identifying information- and skill-
driven common stock trades has the following downside. It is possible that sophisticated
traders exploit their informational advantage by trading through options, not common stocks.
In case there are no or smaller abnormal returns on the portfolios of sophisticated traders,
this weak performance can be explained by (relatively) weak trading skills or selective use
of private information in option trades instead of regular common stock trades. Despite
this downside, this methodology still allows us to separate information-driven common stock
trades from regular common stock trades. If there are abnormal returns on the transac-
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tions by the sophisticated politicians, we can say that stock-picking skills contribute to these
returns in addition to private political information. On the other hand, if it is the unsophisti-
cated powerful politicians capturing the abnormal returns, then private political information
is the main contributor to the abnormal returns for the unsophisticated politicians because
they are more likely to resort to such information due to their lack of experience trading
stocks.
There are 10,232 and 17,660 transactions in the sophisticated and unsophisticated sam-
ple, respectively. The number of sophisticated politicians is only 17 while the number of
unsophisticated politicians is 146, which suggests that the sophisticated traders account for
a large part of the full sample of the transactions despite representing less than 5% of all
politicians in the sample. The results from Table 2.11 and 2.12 show that it is the powerful
Republicans with less trading experience (i.e., unsophisticated) capturing most of the ab-
normal returns ranging from 34.68% to 47.23% on the annual basis under one-week holding
period while the sophisticated ones have much weaker investment performance. Similar to
the previous results, the abnormal returns disappear for holding periods exceeding three
months.
[Table 2.11 About Here]
[Table 2.12 About Here]
Overall, there is evidence in favor of private political information embedded in congres-
sional stock trades. It appears that additional trading for (perceived) skill-related reasons
or the use of options in exploiting private information may have depressed the abnormal
returns on the common stock investments of the sophisticated politicians. This result may
not be surprising given that it is generally difficult to outperform the market by skill as in
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the case of mutual fund managers.21 However, it is possible to beat the market by using
private information as in the case of corporate insiders (Jeng et al., 2003).
2.8 Transaction Size Relative to Net Worth
Our analysis presents evidence that unsophisticated powerful members of the Republican
Party are the most informed traders of all in our sample. For this group of politicians, we
now employ an additional layer of filter to separate high-information-content trades from
low-information-content ones by scaling each trade with the inverse of politicians’ net worth.
We anticipate that the transactions that represent higher fraction of politicians’ net worth
contain more value-relevant information as politicians are more likely to play big when they
have high quality information.
We obtain the net worth data from Center for Responsive Politics over the 2004-2010
period. We match a politician’s net worth from the previous calendar year to her transactions
in the current year so that current trading performance does not impact the level of net
worth. As a result, we lose the transactions that members of Congress placed in year 2004
and end up with 13,941 transactions down from 17,660. Furthermore, we eliminate the
trades from the politicians with negative net worth and the trades with extremely high ratio
of transaction values (TV) to politicians’ net worth (NW). We use 0.5 as a cut-off value to
eliminate outliers. There are 296 transactions corresponding to the politicians with negative
net worth and only three transactions with TV to NW ratio great or equal to 0.5.
[Table 2.13 About Here]
The remaining number of transactions is 13,642, which we place in three terciles based
21http://business.time.com/2009/04/20/breaking-news-mutual-fund-managers-keep-failing-to-beat-the-
market/
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on the TV/NW ratio. Next, we construct calendar-time portfolios for each tercile of the
transactions. We report the estimation results in Table 2.13. To save space, we only report
the abnormal returns based on the EW-MEW weighting scheme (transactions and returns
are weighted equally) as the results based on the remaining weighting schemes are very
similar. There seems to be an inverse U-shaped relationship between the TV/NW ratio and
abnormal returns. The abnormal returns are the highest for the middle TV/NW tercile. We
already anticipated lower abnormal returns for the bottom TV/NW tercile, but the weak
abnormal returns for the top TV/NW tercile are surprising. It is possible that the top tercile
has transactions that politicians carry out as a result of irregular cash-flows such as buying
a house or receiving an inheritance.
2.9 Is It Really Power?
In this section, we identify 50 powerful members of the Republican Party whose status shifted
between powerful and non-powerful. These politicians have transactions from the periods
that they were powerful and non-powerful. The comparison of their portfolio performances
from these two distinct periods have the potential to illuminate the exact role of power in
determining access to value-relevant information. EH (2013a) do not provide us with such
insight since they assign all of a politician’s transactions to the powerful sample as long as
he serves on a powerful committee at some point during their sample period.
[Table 2.14 About Here]
These 50 politicians have a total of 20,799 and 4,233 transactions in the power and pre-
post power periods. The very same politicians traded almost five times more when they
were powerful compared to the periods they were not powerful. We report the result of our
power-based analysis in Table 2.14. There is a drastic change in the portfolio performance
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of the same politicians between the time they were in power and the time they were not.
The abnormal returns in the power period exceed 30% under the one-week holding period
while there is actually some evidence of underperformance in the non-power period.
2.10 Is It Really Party Membership?
Our main hypothesis anticipates that the members of the Republican Party are more in-
formed than those of the Democratic Party. This hypothesis rests on the argument that the
so-called Republican Revolution in the mid-90s changed the balance of power in Congress in
favor of Republicans and encouraged closer ties with the business and lobbying community.
It is possible that Republicans did not change the structure of Congress in such a way that
they would be empowered with more value-relevant information than Democrats all the time.
There could be time periods in which Democrats are also informed traders.
The informational advantage that Republicans enjoy could be restricted to the opportu-
nities arising from being the majority party either in the House or the Senate. Separating
the transactions into the periods based on which party controlled the House or the Sen-
ate has the potential to reveal whether the portfolios of Democrats outperform the market
when the Democratic Party is the majority party. If being the majority party drives the
superior trading performance, we will also expect that the portfolios of Republicans perform
poorly when the Republican Party is not the majority party. Our sample period (2004-2010)
presents us with clear-cut subsample periods to test this hypothesis. Republicans controlled
the House and Senate for the 2004-2006 period while Democrats controlled these two cham-
bers for the rest of the sample period. We call the 2004-2006 and the 2007-2010 intervals
“Republican Majority” and “Democratic Majority” periods, respectively. We compare the
portfolio performance of both powerful Republicans and Democrats in these two different
periods.
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[Table 2.15 About Here]
We present the results of the party membership-majority control analysis in Table 2.15.
In both Republican Majority and Democratic Majority samples, the portfolios of Republi-
cans outperform those of Democrats. Despite the Democratic majority in both the House
and Senate over the 2007-2010 period, Republicans continued making informed trades. On
the other hand, there is no evidence of informed trading for Democrats even when they
controlled both of the chambers. There is however weak evidence in favor of superior trad-
ing performance for Democrats during the Republican Majority period. Our paper is the
first study in documenting that Republicans’ informational advantage is not related to them
being the majority party.
It is now clear that being the majority party does not explain the presence (lack of)
of abnormal returns for Republicans (Democrats). Another possibility behind why we do
not observe abnormal returns for the members of the Democratic Party could be related to
the political alignment with the President’s party (i.e., being from the same party). If the
political alignment with the President explains the abnormal returns on congressional stock
returns, we should observe that the portfolios of Democrats (Republicans) outperform the
market during the Obama (Bush) presidency. In order to test this hypothesis, we compare the
portfolio performance of powerful Republicans and Democrats during the Bush presidency
(2004-2008) and the Obama presidency (2009-2010).
[Table 2.16 About Here]
The results in Table 2.16 show that Republicans do better when Bush was the presi-
dent. On the contrary, the portfolios of Democrats do not outperform the market during the
40
Obama presidency. There is actually some evidence that the portfolios of Republicans earn
abnormal returns during the Obama presidency. These results suggest that Republicans
benefit from having a Republican president in the White House while Democrats do not
experience any meaningful change when the president is a Democrats in terms of their port-
folios’ performance. There is a similarity between the effect of power and that of presidential
alignment on the portfolio performance of politicians: Power and presidential alignment both
enhances only the portfolio returns of Republicans. Overall, these results support our earlier
finding that the degree and presence of informed trading is an economically and statistically
significant different between Republicans and Democrats.
Ziobrowski et al. (2011) show that for the 1985-2001 period, the portfolios of Democrats
outperformed those of Republicans in the House of Representatives. They argue that
“...when Republicans finally took control [of the House] in 1995, they arguably had far less
experience at handling the reins of power and may therefore have been unable to immediately
enjoy all its perquisites.” Our results suggest that in the post-2001 period, Republicans fi-
nally reaped the benefits of the drastic changes that they implemented in Congress following
the so-called Republican Revolution.
2.11 Is It Really Private Political Information?
Our analysis of congressional stock portfolios finds that most of the abnormal returns are
driven by private information as in the case of unsophisticated powerful Republicans. The
implicit assumption behind this analysis is that private information in congressional stock
trades has a political component. Nevertheless, it is possible that members of Congress may
receive tips from various interest groups in exchange for political favors. The presence of
such a relationship would suggest that members of Congress trade on private information,
but this information is not generated by political decisions.
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Determining whether politicians trade on private political information requires the sep-
aration of congressional stock trades based on the likelihood of some trades being driven
information that does not have political component. In order to make this distinction, we
focus on the relationship the members of Congress and financial institutions that members
of Congress use to trade stocks or that advise members of Congress on investing. We argue
that financial institutions that work closely with politicians could share private information
to make friends with politicians in anticipation of future favors. In other words, transac-
tions that are associated with these financial institutions are more likely to contain private
information with no political components whereas those that are not associated with any
financial institution are more likely to contain private political information.
We identify the financial institutions that work closely with politicians based on whether
politicians mention their names in their financial disclosure reports. Politicians must use
financial institutions to trade stocks such as brokerage and investment firms, but only in
some cases, they report the names of these financial institutions. The selective reporting of
the names suggests that these institutions work closely with members of Congress when it
comes to making trading decisions or filing financial disclosure reports.22 This is an imperfect
measure of closeness as sometimes politicians make all of their investment decisions on their
own even if they mention the name of a brokerage firm.
[Table 2.17 About Here]
We sort the transactions by the unsophisticated powerful Republicans into two portfolios
based on our closeness indicator (connected and non-connected portfolios). We use 4,024
22Eggers and Hainmueller (2013a) state that when members of Congress mention the name of a financial
institution, relevant transactions are directly reported by these financial institutions in the disclosure process.
We could not independently verify this information. We only assume that these institutions help members
of Congress in the disclosure and/or trading process to some extent.
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(13,636) transactions in the construction of the connected (non-connected) portfolio. The
results in Table 2.17 show that politicians are informed traders even when they do not work
closely with a financial institution, which implies that at least some of congressional stock
trades are driven by private political information.
2.12 Conclusion
We provide evidence that politicians trade on time-sensitive value-relevant information that
is capable of predicting stock returns and generating abnormal returns in the short-term. The
best performing group is the powerful politicians from the Republican Party with less trading
experience (i.e., unsophisticated powerful Republicans) with abnormal returns exceeding 34%
under the one-week holding period. It is not feasible to construct trading strategies based
on congressional trading due to substantial lags between when these transactions take place
and when the public become aware of them (5 to 17 months). The 2013 amendment of the
STOCK Act prevents this valuable information from being incorporated into stock prices.
It is important to bear in mind that the use of private political information does not
necessarily imply any illegal activity. It appears that politicians make informed bets thanks
to their proximity to the decision making circles in Congress. It is possible that they predict
the future direction of legislation better than outsiders thanks to their deeper understanding
of the political system and a rich network of connections. The fact that their transactions
can predict the future stock returns even after three months following the transaction date
suggests that politicians’ informational advantage could be similar to that of corporate in-
siders who have a competitive edge over outsiders in putting the pieces together with the
same amount of publicly available information (Seyhun, 2000).
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
This table presents the descriptive statistics of variables used in this analysis. The depen-
dent variable, rret, is the firm-level monthly raw stock return in percentages. net3trade
is the firm level trading index based on the congressional trading in the previous 3 months
constructed according to Eq.(1). ret
−1 is the past month raw stock return, and ret−2,−12
is the cumulative continuously compounded returns from month t − 12 to t − 2 (both
are in percentages). log(size) is the log of market capitalization (in millions) measured
in June of each calendar year T , and log(bm) is the log of book-equity measured in De-
cember of calendar year T − 1 for all fiscal years ending in calendar year T − 1. Both
log(size) and log(bm) are attached to stock returns from July of year T to June of year
T + 1. The transactions data is from Center for Responsive Politics, returns are from
CRSP, and accounting data are from Compustat. We only keep the US domestic stocks
(CRSP share code 10/11) listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. *, **, *** denote the
10, 5, and 1 % significance levels.
Univariate Analysis
Variables Mean Median St Dev Min Max
rret 0.432 0.630 11.351 -86.865 259.657
net3trade -0.017 0.000 0.832 -1.000 1.000
rret
−1 0.657 0.724 11.716 -86.865 259.657
rret
−2,−12 8.677 10.821 41.207 -411.825 350.765
log(size) 15.40 15.410 11.662 8.224 19.974
log(bm) -0.963 -0.937 0.796 -8.924 2.821
Correlation Analysis
Variables rret net3trade rret
−1 rret−2,−12 log(size) log(bm)
rret 1.0000
net3trade 0.024*** 1.0000
rret
−1 0.054*** 0.028*** 1.0000
rret
−2,−12 -0.010** 0.054*** -0.016*** 1.0000
log(size) -0.006 -0.037*** -0.024*** -0.056*** 1.0000
log(bm) 0.019*** -0.015*** 0.025*** 0.025*** -0.125*** 1.0000
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Table 2.2: Firm-Level Prediction
This table presents the pooled regression results using all congressional stock trades over 2004M02-
2011M01 for all, small mcap, and big mcap companies. Dependent variable, rret, is raw stock returns in
%. net3trade (net6trade) is firm-level trading index based on the congressional trading in the previous
3 (6) months (Eq. 1). full3trade is the same as net3trade, but replaces the missing index values with
zeros. ret
−1 is the past month raw return and ret−2,−12 is the cumulative continuously compounded
returns from month t−12 to t−2. log(size) is the log of market capitalization (in millions) measured in
June of each calendar year T , and log(bm) is the log of book-equity measured in December of calendar
year T − 1 for all fiscal years ending in calendar year T − 1. log(size) and log(bm) are attached to stock
returns from July of year T to June of year T + 1. The transactions data is from Center for Responsive
Politics, returns from CRSP, and accounting data from Compustat. We only keep the US domestic
stocks (CRSP share code 10/11) listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. *, **, *** are the 10, 5, and 1
% significance levels. Results with month-fixed effects (FEs) are reported in even numbered columns.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level (t-statistics in parenthesis). Intercepts are not presented.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Vars / Sample All All Small Small Big Big
Panel A: net3trade
net3trade 0.322*** 0.169*** 0.416*** 0.315** 0.271*** 0.099
(5.06) (2.89) (3.17) (2.54) (3.91) (1.59)
r
−1 0.051*** -0.001 0.013 -0.011 0.078*** 0.010
(5.85) (-0.09) (0.93) (-0.84) (7.21) (0.80)
r
−2,−12 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.006
(-1.25) (-1.20) (-0.61) (-0.23) (-1.30) (-1.37)
log(size) -0.019 -0.028 -0.314* -0.014 -0.135*** -0.077*
(-0.54) (-0.83) (-1.79) (-0.08) (-2.90) (-1.74)
log(bm) 0.255*** 0.088 0.373** 0.203 0.193*** 0.032
(3.61) (1.29) (2.08) (1.19) (2.85) (0.47)
Obs. 49,081 49,081 13,214 13,214 35,867 35,867
Panel B: full3trade
full3trade 0.341*** 0.139** 0.446*** 0.337*** 0.281*** 0.087
(5.37) (2.39) (3.45) (2.78) (4.09) (1.42)
r
−1 0.040*** -0.006 0.030*** -0.010* 0.077*** 0.006
(8.69) (-1.35) (5.65) (-1.92) (11.77) (0.91)
r
−2,−12 -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.014*** -0.015***
(-9.44) (-7.82) (-6.94) (-5.51) (-7.45) (-5.76)
log(size) -0.204*** -0.186*** -0.466*** -0.319*** -0.290*** -0.154***
(-8.91) (-8.36) (-7.28) (-5.09) (-8.73) (-4.87)
log(bm) 0.341*** 0.104** 0.334*** 0.085 0.253*** 0.042
(7.01) (2.18) (4.70) (1.22) (4.97) (0.84)
Obs. 177,091 177,091 105,086 105,086 72,005 72,005
Panel C: net6trade
net6trade 0.298*** 0.085 0.313*** 0.120 0.273*** 0.065
(4.87) (1.54) (2.81) (1.16) (3.92) (1.05)
r
−1 0.048*** 0.001 0.016 -0.005 0.079*** 0.010
(7.05) (0.10) (1.47) (-0.53) (9.20) (1.03)
r
−2,−12 -0.006*** -0.005** -0.002 -0.000 -0.009*** -0.010***
(-2.91) (-2.23) (-0.53) (-0.02) (-3.54) (-2.97)
log(size) -0.036 -0.025 -0.174 0.120 -0.204*** -0.114***
(-1.21) (-0.86) (-1.38) (0.95) (-4.94) (-2.89)
log(bm) 0.277*** 0.089 0.296** 0.105 0.251*** 0.072
(4.49) (1.49) (2.07) (0.77) (3.98) (1.17)
Obs. 67,369 67,369 21,815 21,815 45,554 45,554
FEs (all panels) No Yes No Yes No Yes
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Table 2.3: Firm-Level Prediction: Sub-Period Analysis
This table presents the pooled regression results using all congressional stock trades over 2004M02-
2011M01 for all, small mcap, and big mcap companies for three different subperiods. Dependent variable,
rret, is raw stock returns in percentages. net3trade is firm-level trading index based on the congressional
trading in the previous 3 months (Eq. 1). ret
−1 is the past month raw return and ret−2,−12 is the
cumulative continuously compounded returns from month t− 12 to t− 2. log(size) is the log of market
capitalization (in millions) measured in June of each calendar year T , and log(bm) is the log of book-
equity measured in December of calendar year T − 1 for all fiscal years ending in calendar year T − 1.
log(size) and log(bm) are attached to stock returns from July of year T to June of year T + 1. The
transactions data is from Center for Responsive Politics, returns from CRSP, and accounting data from
Compustat. We only keep the US domestic stocks (CRSP share code 10/11) listed on NYSE, AMEX, or
NASDAQ. *, **, *** are the 10, 5, and 1 % significance levels. Results with month-fixed effects (FEs)
are reported in even numbered columns. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level (t-statistics in
parenthesis). Intercepts are not presented.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Vars / Sample All All Small Small Big Big
Panel A: Pre-Recession Period
net3trade 0.242*** 0.172*** 0.281** 0.280** 0.226*** 0.118*
(3.72) (2.75) (2.12) (2.20) (3.34) (1.82)
r
−1 0.010 0.004 -0.016 -0.023* 0.038*** 0.033***
(1.25) (0.44) (-1.27) (-1.81) (4.11) (3.64)
r
−2,−12 -0.005* 0.005* -0.008* 0.001 -0.002 0.009***
(-1.84) (1.83) (-1.90) (0.36) (-0.79) (2.78)
log(size) 0.026 0.033 -0.275 -0.014 -0.009 0.009
(0.69) (0.92) (-1.58) (-0.08) (-0.18) (0.20)
log(bm) 0.137* 0.145* 0.231 0.213 0.082 0.109
(1.67) (1.85) (1.15) (1.15) (1.03) (1.44)
Obs. 30,517 30,517 9,077 9,077 21,440 21,440
Panel B: Recessionary Period
net3trade 0.796*** 0.340* 0.597 0.523 0.876*** 0.262
(3.77) (1.69) (1.30) (1.19) (3.78) (1.19)
r
−1 0.090*** 0.014 0.062* 0.025 0.106*** 0.011
(5.15) (0.71) (1.90) (0.74) (5.15) (0.48)
r
−2,−12 -0.035*** -0.014** -0.021** -0.004 -0.042*** -0.019**
(-5.85) (-2.20) (-2.20) (-0.46) (-5.34) (-2.17)
log(size) 0.173 0.042 0.339 0.102 0.302** 0.133
(1.59) (0.40) (0.48) (0.16) (2.23) (1.09)
log(bm) -0.787*** -0.491** -0.598 -0.279 -0.832*** -0.580***
(-3.61) (-2.47) (-0.99) (-0.48) (-3.69) (-2.91)
Obs. 9,508 9,508 2,347 2,347 7,161 7,161
Panel C: Post-Recession Period
net3trade 0.011 -0.005 0.140 0.214 -0.030 -0.061
(0.08) (-0.04) (0.35) (0.60) (-0.22) (-0.50)
r
−1 -0.090*** -0.061*** -0.082*** -0.052* -0.098*** -0.068***
(-5.96) (-3.15) (-2.86) (-1.68) (-5.53) (-2.74)
r
−2,−12 -0.023*** -0.009 -0.013* -0.004 -0.032*** -0.015
(-4.05) (-1.40) (-1.75) (-0.47) (-4.17) (-1.57)
log(size) -0.266*** -0.326*** 0.268 -0.212 -0.472*** -0.474***
(-3.08) (-3.99) (0.58) (-0.49) (-4.94) (-5.19)
log(bm) 0.003 0.272* 0.493 0.571 -0.188 0.116
(0.02) (1.68) (1.24) (1.47) (-0.99) (0.70)
Obs. 9,056 9,056 1,790 1,790 7,266 7,266
FEs (all panels) No Yes No Yes No Yes
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Table 2.4: Firm-Level Prediction: Illiquidity Filtered
This table presents the pooled regression results using all congressional stock trades over 2004M02-
2011M01 for all, small, and big mcap companies. Dependent variable, rret, is raw stock returns in %.
net3trade (net6trade) is firm-level trading index based on the congressional trading in the previous 3
(6) months (Eq. 1). full3trade replaces the missing value of net3trade with zeros. We combine multiple
trades in a month into a single trade in relatively illiquid firms. ret
−1 is the past month raw return and
ret
−2,−12 is the cumulative continuously compounded returns from month t−12 to t−2. log(size) is the
log of market capitalization (in millions) measured in June of each calendar year T , and log(bm) is the
log of book-equity measured in December of calendar year T − 1 for all fiscal years ending in calendar
year T − 1. log(size) and log(bm) are attached to stock returns from July of year T to June of year
T +1. The transactions data is from Center for Responsive Politics, returns from CRSP, and accounting
data from Compustat. We only keep the domestic NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks. *, **, *** are 10,
5, and 1 % significance levels. Results with month-fixed effects (FEs) are reported in even numbered
columns. SEs are clustered at the firm-level (t-statistics in parenthesis). Intercepts are not presented.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Vars / Sample All All Small Small Big Big
Panel A: net3trade
net3trade 0.326*** 0.172*** 0.421*** 0.318** 0.274*** 0.101
(5.13) (2.94) (3.21) (2.56) (3.95) (1.63)
r
−1 0.051*** -0.001 0.013 -0.011 0.078*** 0.010
(5.85) (-0.10) (0.93) (-0.84) (7.21) (0.80)
r
−2,−12 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.006
(-1.25) (-1.20) (-0.60) (-0.22) (-1.29) (-1.38)
log(size) -0.019 -0.028 -0.313* -0.014 -0.135*** -0.077*
(-0.53) (-0.82) (-1.78) (-0.08) (-2.90) (-1.74)
log(bm) 0.256*** 0.088 0.372** 0.203 0.195*** 0.033
(3.63) (1.29) (2.07) (1.18) (2.88) (0.48)
Obs. 49,075 49,075 13,212 13,212 35,863 35,863
Panel B: full3trade
full3trade 0.344*** 0.141** 0.450*** 0.341*** 0.284*** 0.089
(5.43) (2.43) (3.48) (2.82) (4.13) (1.45)
r
−1 0.040*** -0.006 0.030*** -0.010* 0.077*** 0.006
(8.67) (-1.37) (5.62) (-1.94) (11.77) (0.91)
r
−2,−12 -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.014*** -0.015***
(-9.41) (-7.78) (-6.90) (-5.48) (-7.45) (-5.76)
log(size) -0.204*** -0.186*** -0.466*** -0.319*** -0.290*** -0.154***
(-8.90) (-8.35) (-7.28) (-5.09) (-8.73) (-4.87)
log(bm) 0.339*** 0.102** 0.330*** 0.083 0.253*** 0.042
(6.97) (2.15) (4.64) (1.18) (4.97) (0.84)
Obs. 177,022 177,022 105,017 105,017 72,005 72,005
Panel C: net6trade
net6trade 0.302*** 0.090 0.317*** 0.129 0.276*** 0.067
(4.91) (1.62) (2.84) (1.24) (3.96) (1.09)
r
−1 0.048*** 0.001 0.016 -0.005 0.079*** 0.010
(7.05) (0.10) (1.47) (-0.53) (9.20) (1.03)
r
−2,−12 -0.006*** -0.005** -0.002 -0.000 -0.009*** -0.010***
(-2.91) (-2.23) (-0.52) (-0.02) (-3.54) (-2.98)
log(size) -0.036 -0.025 -0.174 0.120 -0.204*** -0.114***
(-1.20) (-0.86) (-1.38) (0.95) (-4.94) (-2.89)
log(bm) 0.278*** 0.089 0.296** 0.105 0.252*** 0.073
(4.50) (1.50) (2.07) (0.77) (4.00) (1.17)
Obs. 63,364 63,364 21,814 21,814 45,550 45,550
FEs (all panels) No Yes No Yes No Yes
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Figure 2.1: Calendar Time Portfolio Chart
This chart presents the four different weighting schemes used to calculate the calendar-time portfolio returns.
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Table 2.5: Alphas on Long/Short (Buy-Minus-Sell) Portfolio: Full Sample
This table presents average monthly raw and risk-adjusted returns (alphas) in percentages over
2004M01-2011M12 period on the long/short (buy-minus-sell) portfolios from the transactions in
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks by members of Congress. Transactions data is from Center for Re-
sponsive Politics, stock returns from CRSP, and five factors and risk-free rate from WRDS. Daily port-
folio returns are calculated using four different weighting schemes under holding periods from 1 week
to 12 months and compounded to monthly returns. Newey-West robust t-statistics (three lags) are in
parenthesis. *, **, *** denote the 10, 5, and 1 % significance levels.
Holding Period (Months): 1/4 1 2 3 6 12
Panel A: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MEW)
Avg. Return 1.423*** 0.305 0.364* 0.246 -0.011 -0.039
(3.38) (1.44) (1.85) (1.41) (-0.07) (-0.32)
CAPM Alpha 1.538*** 0.365** 0.398** 0.277* 0.004 -0.020
(4.33) (2.18) (2.40) (1.75) (0.03) (-0.18)
FF Alpha 1.511*** 0.356* 0.427*** 0.329** 0.042 -0.007
(4.27) (1.87) (2.82) (2.36) (0.34) (-0.07)
Carhart Alpha 1.508*** 0.352* 0.418*** 0.321** 0.035 -0.008
(4.15) (1.92) (2.76) (2.21) (0.30) (-0.09)
5-Factor Alpha 1.474*** 0.310 0.408** 0.334** 0.034 -0.009
(3.64) (1.58) (2.56) (2.24) (0.28) (-0.10)
Panel B: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MVW)
Avg. Return 0.832** 0.270** 0.258** 0.210** 0.118 0.024
(2.50) (2.15) (2.45) (2.13) (1.34) (0.35)
CAPM Alpha 0.860*** 0.294** 0.282*** 0.232** 0.139 0.034
(2.64) (2.43) (2.88) (2.59) (1.60) (0.52)
FF Alpha 0.838** 0.284** 0.283*** 0.230*** 0.131 0.029
(2.63) (2.56) (3.15) (2.75) (1.65) (0.52)
Carhart Alpha 0.838** 0.285** 0.278*** 0.220** 0.120* 0.023
(2.60) (2.57) (2.96) (2.51) (1.70) (0.47)
5-Factor Alpha 0.876** 0.286** 0.273*** 0.229** 0.098 -0.005
(2.35) (2.43) (2.84) (2.52) (1.47) (-0.12)
Panel C: Value-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MEW)
Avg. Return 1.466*** 0.310 0.317 0.221 -0.028 -0.052
(3.28) (1.46) (1.61) (1.28) (-0.19) (-0.42)
CAPM Alpha 1.593*** 0.364** 0.342** 0.241 -0.023 -0.042
(4.04) (2.04) (2.06) (1.50) (-0.15) (-0.36)
FF Alpha 1.567*** 0.355* 0.371** 0.289** 0.012 -0.029
(3.99) (1.78) (2.46) (2.01) (0.10) (-0.27)
Carhart Alpha 1.565*** 0.352* 0.361** 0.281* 0.008 -0.028
(3.92) (1.81) (2.42) (1.92) (0.07) (-0.26)
5-Factor Alpha 1.513*** 0.325 0.374** 0.315** 0.036 -0.014
(3.48) (1.58) (2.44) (2.09) (0.30) (-0.13)
Panel D: Value-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MVW)
Avg. Return 0.826* 0.277 0.147 0.147 0.045 -0.010
(1.77) (1.25) (0.72) (0.85) (0.34) (-0.10)
CAPM Alpha 0.862* 0.272 0.140 0.144 0.053 -0.008
(1.95) (1.35) (0.75) (0.75) (0.35) (-0.08)
FF Alpha 0.900* 0.285 0.152 0.140 0.048 -0.009
(1.98) (1.42) (0.87) (0.73) (0.32) (-0.10)
Carhart Alpha 0.891* 0.280 0.145 0.132 0.044 -0.011
(1.89) (1.42) (0.83) (0.71) (0.29) (-0.13)
5-Factor Alpha 0.931* 0.268 0.115 0.098 0.011 -0.044
(1.84) (1.21) (0.59) (0.48) (0.07) (-0.48)
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Table 2.6: Number of Transactions and Traders
This table presents the breakdown of the transactions and traders on the basis of party
and powerful committee membership.
Party Politicians Transactions
Panel A: Full Sample
Republicans 232 39,538
Democrats 168 22,373
Panel B: Powerful Politicians
Republicans 163 27,892
Democrats 127 18,438
Panel C: Non-Powerful Politicians
Republicans 119 11,646
Democrats 96 3,935
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Table 2.7: Republicans
This table presents average monthly raw and risk-adjusted returns (alphas) in percentages over 2004M01-
2011M12 on the long/short (buy-minus-sell) portfolios based on the transactions by the members of the
Republican Party involving only US common stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. Transactions
data is from Center for Responsive Politics, stock returns from CRSP, and five factors and risk-free rate
from WRDS. Daily portfolio returns are calculated using four different weighting schemes under holding
periods from 1 week to 12 months and compounded to monthly returns. Newey-West robust t-statistics
(three lags) are in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote the 10, 5, and 1 % significance levels.
Holding Period (Months): 1/4 1 2 3 6 12
Panel A: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MEW)
Avg. Return 2.242*** 0.856*** 0.744*** 0.542** 0.097 -0.046
(4.71) (3.09) (2.99) (2.44) (0.57) (-0.29)
CAPM Alpha 2.354*** 0.941*** 0.831*** 0.630*** 0.137 -0.019
(5.29) (4.32) (4.26) (3.08) (0.87) (-0.14)
FF Alpha 2.348*** 0.910*** 0.841*** 0.657*** 0.159 -0.009
(5.32) (4.32) (4.31) (3.08) (1.02) (-0.06)
Carhart Alpha 2.347*** 0.906*** 0.835*** 0.648*** 0.148 -0.017
(5.27) (4.14) (4.20) (2.93) (0.96) (-0.13)
5-Factor Alpha 2.261*** 0.865*** 0.798*** 0.687*** 0.206 0.013
(4.69) (3.53) (3.66) (3.13) (1.38) (0.11)
Panel B: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MVW)
Avg. Return 1.428*** 0.253 0.292** 0.221** 0.090 0.031
(3.75) (1.49) (2.58) (2.04) (0.94) (0.40)
CAPM Alpha 1.420*** 0.260* 0.305*** 0.240*** 0.116 0.038
(3.67) (1.79) (3.64) (2.78) (1.30) (0.50)
FF Alpha 1.416*** 0.245* 0.310*** 0.238*** 0.106 0.031
(3.78) (1.74) (3.80) (2.84) (1.23) (0.44)
Carhart Alpha 1.417*** 0.244* 0.303*** 0.229** 0.095 0.023
(3.77) (1.69) (3.26) (2.38) (1.18) (0.38)
5-Factor Alpha 1.449*** 0.309** 0.330*** 0.268*** 0.081 -0.005
(3.74) (2.07) (3.19) (2.71) (1.07) (-0.09)
Panel C: Value-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MEW)
Avg. Return 2.203*** 0.855*** 0.712*** 0.497** 0.094 -0.063
(4.41) (3.05) (2.83) (2.25) (0.57) (-0.41)
CAPM Alpha 2.333*** 0.939*** 0.796*** 0.580*** 0.122 -0.045
(5.12) (4.17) (3.97) (2.86) (0.78) (-0.33)
FF Alpha 2.331*** 0.913*** 0.805*** 0.605*** 0.140 -0.036
(5.13) (4.20) (4.06) (2.85) (0.88) (-0.26)
Carhart Alpha 2.328*** 0.909*** 0.798*** 0.596*** 0.132 -0.041
(5.03) (4.05) (3.94) (2.72) (0.83) (-0.31)
5-Factor Alpha 2.229*** 0.871*** 0.773*** 0.643*** 0.196 -0.003
(4.49) (3.50) (3.50) (2.97) (1.22) (-0.03)
Panel D: Value-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MVW)
Avg. Return 1.364*** 0.340 0.305 0.119 -0.097 -0.025
(2.80) (1.30) (1.23) (0.52) (-0.51) (-0.19)
CAPM Alpha 1.381*** 0.352 0.319 0.149 -0.064 -0.018
(3.09) (1.46) (1.31) (0.63) (-0.29) (-0.15)
FF Alpha 1.399*** 0.357 0.329 0.164 -0.072 -0.025
(2.94) (1.52) (1.39) (0.71) (-0.34) (-0.21)
Carhart Alpha 1.386*** 0.346 0.313 0.145 -0.085 -0.032
(2.74) (1.36) (1.22) (0.61) (-0.40) (-0.28)
5-Factor Alpha 1.566*** 0.425 0.299 0.108 -0.147 -0.103
(2.99) (1.56) (1.15) (0.47) (-0.72) (-0.97)
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Table 2.8: Democrats
This table presents average monthly raw and risk-adjusted returns (alphas) in percentages over 2004M01-
2011M12 on the long/short (buy-minus-sell) portfolios based on the transactions by the members of the
Democratic Party involving only US common stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. Transactions
data is from Center for Responsive Politics, stock returns from CRSP, and five factors and risk-free rate
from WRDS. Daily portfolio returns are calculated using four different weighting schemes under holding
periods from 1 week to 12 months and compounded to monthly returns. Newey-West robust t-statistics
(three lags) are in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote the 10, 5, and 1 % significance levels.
Holding Period (Months): 1/4 1 2 3 6 12
Panel A: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MEW)
Avg. Return 0.315 -0.206 -0.004 -0.042 -0.112 -0.024
(0.49) (-0.64) (-0.01) (-0.15) (-0.47) (-0.13)
CAPM Alpha 0.382 -0.172 -0.036 -0.079 -0.125 -0.015
(0.65) (-0.60) (-0.13) (-0.28) (-0.53) (-0.08)
FF Alpha 0.309 -0.171 0.006 -0.005 -0.067 0.004
(0.55) (-0.58) (0.02) (-0.02) (-0.34) (0.02)
Carhart Alpha 0.321 -0.170 -0.006 -0.013 -0.070 0.009
(0.61) (-0.57) (-0.02) (-0.06) (-0.36) (0.06)
5-Factor Alpha 0.471 -0.201 0.015 -0.031 -0.133 -0.029
(0.80) (-0.66) (0.06) (-0.14) (-0.68) (-0.18)
Panel B: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MVW)
Avg. Return 0.103 0.154 0.149 0.164 0.201* 0.052
(0.21) (0.76) (0.80) (1.19) (1.93) (0.61)
CAPM Alpha 0.122 0.184 0.170 0.177 0.203** 0.060
(0.29) (1.29) (1.04) (1.38) (2.16) (0.77)
FF Alpha 0.110 0.195 0.175 0.177 0.206** 0.064
(0.26) (1.36) (1.09) (1.33) (2.22) (0.86)
Carhart Alpha 0.118 0.198 0.174 0.165 0.197** 0.060
(0.29) (1.42) (1.09) (1.37) (2.39) (0.84)
5-Factor Alpha 0.253 0.147 0.163 0.182 0.225** 0.069
(0.54) (0.82) (0.93) (1.31) (2.60) (0.88)
Panel C: Value-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MEW)
Avg. Return 0.438 -0.207 -0.067 -0.063 -0.173 -0.045
(0.67) (-0.63) (-0.21) (-0.23) (-0.74) (-0.23)
CAPM Alpha 0.507 -0.184 -0.111 -0.116 -0.191 -0.045
(0.80) (-0.63) (-0.40) (-0.43) (-0.87) (-0.24)
FF Alpha 0.430 -0.192 -0.068 -0.047 -0.135 -0.027
(0.71) (-0.64) (-0.27) (-0.21) (-0.71) (-0.16)
Carhart Alpha 0.447 -0.190 -0.080 -0.053 -0.135 -0.019
(0.80) (-0.62) (-0.33) (-0.24) (-0.71) (-0.12)
5-Factor Alpha 0.591 -0.200 -0.038 -0.043 -0.148 -0.035
(0.96) (-0.66) (-0.16) (-0.19) (-0.77) (-0.21)
Panel D: Value-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MVW)
Avg. Return 0.817 0.039 -0.076 -0.011 0.191 0.004
(1.19) (0.11) (-0.25) (-0.04) (1.17) (0.03)
CAPM Alpha 0.820 0.033 -0.103 -0.038 0.186 0.007
(1.14) (0.11) (-0.37) (-0.16) (1.22) (0.06)
FF Alpha 0.928 0.084 -0.062 -0.036 0.203 0.026
(1.30) (0.27) (-0.23) (-0.15) (1.30) (0.22)
Carhart Alpha 0.950 0.086 -0.061 -0.034 0.206 0.028
(1.44) (0.27) (-0.22) (-0.15) (1.30) (0.23)
5-Factor Alpha 0.973 0.004 -0.078 -0.007 0.251 0.050
(1.32) (0.01) (-0.27) (-0.03) (1.53) (0.41)
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Table 2.9: Powerful Republicans
This table presents average monthly raw and risk-adjusted returns (alphas) in percentages over 2004M01-
2011M12 on the buy-minus-sell portfolios from the transactions in NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ common
stocks by the members of the Republican Party serving on the top 20 powerful committees. Transactions
data is from Center for Responsive Politics, stock returns from CRSP, and five factors and risk-free rate
from WRDS. Daily portfolio returns are calculated using four different weighting schemes under holding
periods from 1 week to 12 months and compounded to monthly returns. Newey-West robust t-statistics
(three lags) are in parenthesis.*, **, *** denote 10, 5, and 1 % significance levels.
Holding Period (Months): 1/4 1 2 3 6 12
Panel A: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MEW)
Avg. Return 2.887*** 1.017** 0.778** 0.572** 0.005 -0.290
(5.01) (2.53) (2.63) (2.23) (0.03) (-1.53)
CAPM Alpha 3.010*** 1.163*** 0.900*** 0.694*** 0.054 -0.261
(5.46) (3.94) (3.81) (3.10) (0.31) (-1.40)
FF Alpha 2.961*** 1.116*** 0.909*** 0.706*** 0.071 -0.252
(5.33) (4.24) (4.01) (3.20) (0.42) (-1.34)
Carhart Alpha 2.963*** 1.114*** 0.899*** 0.693*** 0.054 -0.260
(5.35) (4.14) (3.85) (3.03) (0.35) (-1.44)
5-Factor Alpha 2.696*** 0.932*** 0.815*** 0.669*** 0.103 -0.250
(4.62) (3.01) (3.17) (2.87) (0.65) (-1.32)
Panel B: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MVW)
Avg. Return 2.295*** 0.513** 0.445*** 0.297** 0.098 -0.060
(5.20) (2.37) (3.07) (2.30) (0.87) (-0.50)
CAPM Alpha 2.280*** 0.538*** 0.458*** 0.316*** 0.124 -0.054
(4.38) (2.87) (4.18) (3.01) (1.17) (-0.43)
FF Alpha 2.271*** 0.530*** 0.458*** 0.310*** 0.108 -0.065
(4.61) (3.08) (4.31) (3.06) (1.03) (-0.54)
Carhart Alpha 2.276*** 0.531*** 0.451*** 0.301*** 0.095 -0.074
(4.65) (3.07) (3.89) (2.70) (0.93) (-0.63)
5-Factor Alpha 2.153*** 0.443** 0.441*** 0.327*** 0.077 -0.136
(4.48) (2.57) (3.47) (2.82) (0.78) (-1.07)
Panel C: Value-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MEW)
Avg. Return 2.868*** 1.096** 0.756** 0.509* -0.019 -0.302
(4.61) (2.52) (2.44) (1.93) (-0.10) (-1.64)
CAPM Alpha 3.016*** 1.247*** 0.881*** 0.632*** 0.019 -0.281
(5.19) (3.82) (3.52) (2.74) (0.12) (-1.47)
FF Alpha 2.967*** 1.207*** 0.889*** 0.637*** 0.032 -0.274
(5.10) (4.24) (3.82) (2.78) (0.19) (-1.42)
Carhart Alpha 2.965*** 1.206*** 0.879*** 0.623*** 0.017 -0.279
(5.04) (4.19) (3.64) (2.66) (0.11) (-1.47)
5-Factor Alpha 2.671*** 0.989*** 0.792*** 0.610** 0.075 -0.261
(4.37) (3.06) (3.01) (2.56) (0.45) (-1.31)
Panel D: Value-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MVW)
Avg. Return 2.084*** 0.650* 0.415 0.159 -0.110 -0.056
(3.68) (1.94) (1.43) (0.64) (-0.52) (-0.34)
CAPM Alpha 2.082*** 0.679** 0.430 0.192 -0.069 -0.046
(3.20) (2.17) (1.55) (0.74) (-0.30) (-0.31)
FF Alpha 2.074*** 0.704** 0.445* 0.211 -0.085 -0.056
(3.22) (2.56) (1.69) (0.84) (-0.36) (-0.37)
Carhart Alpha 2.061*** 0.692** 0.427 0.189 -0.099 -0.064
(3.05) (2.29) (1.48) (0.72) (-0.43) (-0.43)
5-Factor Alpha 2.165*** 0.607** 0.390 0.148 -0.159 -0.162
(3.08) (2.16) (1.36) (0.58) (-0.70) (-1.10)
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Table 2.10: Powerful Democrats
This table presents average monthly raw and risk-adjusted returns (alphas) in percentages over 2004M01-
2011M12 on the buy-minus-sell portfolios from the transactions in NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ common
stocks by the members of the Democratic Party serving on the top 20 powerful committees. Transactions
data is from Center for Responsive Politics, stock returns from CRSP, and five factors and risk-free rate
from WRDS. Daily portfolio returns are calculated using four different weighting schemes under holding
periods from 1 week to 12 months and compounded to monthly returns. Newey-West robust t-statistics
(three lags) are in parenthesis.*, **, *** denote 10, 5, and 1 % significance levels.
Holding Period (Months): 1/4 1 2 3 6 12
Panel A: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MEW)
Avg. Return 0.617 -0.203 -0.144 -0.092 -0.057 -0.039
(0.92) (-0.52) (-0.39) (-0.31) (-0.21) (-0.17)
CAPM Alpha 0.659 -0.176 -0.179 -0.149 -0.094 -0.043
(1.08) (-0.51) (-0.62) (-0.58) (-0.39) (-0.21)
FF Alpha 0.625 -0.165 -0.118 -0.068 -0.018 -0.018
(1.03) (-0.46) (-0.41) (-0.29) (-0.09) (-0.09)
Carhart Alpha 0.640 -0.164 -0.131 -0.076 -0.014 -0.011
(1.13) (-0.45) (-0.48) (-0.34) (-0.07) (-0.06)
5-Factor Alpha 0.769 -0.092 0.000 -0.007 -0.037 -0.052
(1.13) (-0.26) (0.00) (-0.03) (-0.16) (-0.27)
Panel B: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MVW)
Avg. Return 0.700 0.053 0.091 0.095 0.185 0.085
(1.25) (0.24) (0.46) (0.59) (1.48) (0.81)
CAPM Alpha 0.696 0.090 0.119 0.112 0.186* 0.096
(1.34) (0.57) (0.69) (0.73) (1.70) (1.01)
FF Alpha 0.691 0.102 0.145 0.121 0.203* 0.108
(1.33) (0.61) (0.80) (0.80) (1.85) (1.15)
Carhart Alpha 0.706 0.104 0.141 0.108 0.197* 0.105
(1.50) (0.62) (0.79) (0.80) (1.91) (1.16)
5-Factor Alpha 0.876 0.025 0.133 0.123 0.217* 0.115
(1.48) (0.13) (0.69) (0.83) (1.90) (1.15)
Panel C: Value-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MEW)
Avg. Return 0.828 -0.158 -0.192 -0.112 -0.083 -0.042
(1.21) (-0.41) (-0.52) (-0.37) (-0.29) (-0.17)
CAPM Alpha 0.884 -0.137 -0.233 -0.184 -0.125 -0.054
(1.35) (-0.42) (-0.82) (-0.71) (-0.51) (-0.24)
FF Alpha 0.852 -0.125 -0.168 -0.109 -0.053 -0.028
(1.29) (-0.37) (-0.60) (-0.45) (-0.24) (-0.14)
Carhart Alpha 0.873 -0.121 -0.179 -0.114 -0.044 -0.020
(1.46) (-0.35) (-0.68) (-0.48) (-0.20) (-0.10)
5-Factor Alpha 0.981 -0.072 -0.057 -0.027 -0.022 -0.048
(1.39) (-0.21) (-0.22) (-0.11) (-0.09) (-0.23)
Panel D: Value-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MVW)
Avg. Return 1.223* 0.066 -0.100 -0.052 0.189 0.022
(1.67) (0.19) (-0.32) (-0.21) (0.99) (0.14)
CAPM Alpha 1.244 0.045 -0.130 -0.073 0.189 0.030
(1.42) (0.15) (-0.46) (-0.31) (0.99) (0.20)
FF Alpha 1.352 0.104 -0.085 -0.074 0.207 0.051
(1.60) (0.35) (-0.32) (-0.32) (1.11) (0.35)
Carhart Alpha 1.388* 0.105 -0.086 -0.074 0.210 0.053
(1.86) (0.35) (-0.32) (-0.32) (1.11) (0.36)
5-Factor Alpha 1.410* -0.020 -0.108 -0.031 0.275 0.097
(1.67) (-0.06) (-0.36) (-0.12) (1.33) (0.60)
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Table 2.11: Sophisticated Powerful Republicans
This table presents average monthly raw and risk-adjusted returns (alphas) in percentages over 2004M01-
2011M12 on buy-minus-sell portfolios from the transactions in NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ common stocks
by sophisticated (option trader/short-seller) Republicans on the top 20 powerful committees in Congress.
Transactions data is from Center for Responsive Politics, stock returns from CRSP, and five factors and
risk-free rate from WRDS. Daily portfolio returns are calculated using four different weighting schemes
under holding periods from 1 week to 12 months and compounded to monthly returns. Newey-West
robust t-statistics (three lags) are in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote 10, 5, and 1 % significance levels.
Holding Period (Months): 1/4 1 2 3 6 12
Panel A: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MEW)
Avg. Return 1.650* 0.248 0.104 0.038 0.294 -0.229
(1.73) (0.27) (0.14) (0.06) (0.55) (-0.61)
CAPM Alpha 1.693* 0.495 0.394 0.295 0.423 -0.172
(1.81) (0.62) (0.72) (0.75) (0.89) (-0.56)
FF Alpha 1.767** 0.550 0.457 0.304 0.424 -0.187
(1.99) (0.77) (0.92) (0.86) (1.00) (-0.69)
Carhart Alpha 1.761* 0.531 0.433 0.272 0.389 -0.204
(1.94) (0.71) (0.81) (0.74) (0.91) (-0.79)
5-Factor Alpha 1.786* 0.398 0.404 0.242 0.417 -0.208
(1.78) (0.49) (0.75) (0.65) (0.90) (-0.72)
Panel B: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MVW)
Avg. Return 1.278 0.574 0.191 0.172 0.056 0.025
(1.48) (1.19) (0.56) (0.62) (0.21) (0.10)
CAPM Alpha 1.127 0.551 0.168 0.151 0.037 0.002
(1.45) (1.46) (0.63) (0.76) (0.18) (0.01)
FF Alpha 1.156 0.548 0.160 0.127 -0.023 -0.040
(1.52) (1.60) (0.61) (0.67) (-0.13) (-0.25)
Carhart Alpha 1.160 0.545 0.153 0.112 -0.044 -0.052
(1.54) (1.57) (0.56) (0.55) (-0.24) (-0.34)
5-Factor Alpha 1.396 0.622 0.313 0.284 0.039 -0.035
(1.56) (1.56) (1.02) (1.20) (0.20) (-0.19)
Panel C: Value-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MEW)
Avg. Return 1.461 0.143 -0.029 -0.163 0.154 -0.276
(1.49) (0.16) (-0.04) (-0.26) (0.28) (-0.79)
CAPM Alpha 1.517 0.407 0.281 0.095 0.269 -0.234
(1.65) (0.51) (0.47) (0.22) (0.55) (-0.81)
FF Alpha 1.584* 0.480 0.350 0.112 0.267 -0.261
(1.81) (0.69) (0.68) (0.31) (0.61) (-1.02)
Carhart Alpha 1.574* 0.457 0.327 0.079 0.234 -0.270
(1.74) (0.62) (0.59) (0.21) (0.54) (-1.08)
5-Factor Alpha 1.508 0.260 0.199 0.003 0.231 -0.241
(1.50) (0.33) (0.36) (0.01) (0.49) (-0.90)
Panel D: Value-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MVW)
Avg. Return 1.893** 0.871 0.252 -0.086 -0.256 -0.232
(2.19) (1.51) (0.56) (-0.22) (-0.75) (-0.80)
CAPM Alpha 1.820** 0.925 0.295 -0.035 -0.228 -0.230
(2.37) (1.61) (0.90) (-0.12) (-0.79) (-1.06)
FF Alpha 1.855** 0.947* 0.304 -0.021 -0.259 -0.245
(2.42) (1.90) (1.01) (-0.08) (-0.93) (-1.22)
Carhart Alpha 1.845** 0.922* 0.275 -0.064 -0.285 -0.259
(2.32) (1.72) (0.79) (-0.23) (-1.04) (-1.38)
5-Factor Alpha 1.993** 0.860* 0.372 0.031 -0.233 -0.287
(2.26) (1.71) (1.00) (0.10) (-0.83) (-1.43)
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Table 2.12: Unsophisticated Powerful Republicans
This table presents average monthly raw and risk-adjusted returns (alphas) in percentages over 2004M01-
2011M12 on buy-minus-sell portfolios from the transactions in NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ common stocks
by unsophisticated (not option trader/short-seller) Republicans on the top 20 powerful committees in
Congress. Transactions data is from Center for Responsive Politics, stock returns from CRSP, and five
factors and risk-free rate fromWRDS. Daily portfolio returns are calculated using four different weighting
schemes under holding periods from 1 week to 12 months and compounded to monthly returns. Newey-
West t-statistics (three lags) are in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote 10, 5, and 1 % significance levels.
Holding Period (Months): 1/4 1 2 3 6 12
Panel A: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MEW)
Avg. Return 3.332*** 1.367*** 1.035*** 0.718*** -0.084 -0.207
(4.01) (2.86) (3.36) (2.83) (-0.49) (-1.20)
CAPM Alpha 3.430*** 1.475*** 1.111*** 0.804*** -0.059 -0.185
(5.07) (3.55) (4.09) (3.09) (-0.36) (-1.30)
FF Alpha 3.304*** 1.387*** 1.101*** 0.822*** -0.045 -0.170
(4.59) (3.67) (4.12) (3.10) (-0.26) (-1.21)
Carhart Alpha 3.306*** 1.394*** 1.097*** 0.818*** -0.056 -0.178
(4.61) (3.76) (4.07) (3.04) (-0.34) (-1.34)
5-Factor Alpha 2.890*** 1.191*** 1.027*** 0.800*** -0.006 -0.129
(3.18) (2.74) (3.39) (2.75) (-0.04) (-1.02)
Panel B: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MVW)
Avg. Return 3.860*** 1.039*** 0.706*** 0.530*** 0.167 -0.003
(4.98) (3.26) (3.14) (2.79) (1.17) (-0.03)
CAPM Alpha 3.936*** 1.086*** 0.739*** 0.570*** 0.213* 0.016
(5.40) (4.22) (4.18) (3.62) (1.70) (0.15)
FF Alpha 3.837*** 1.052*** 0.718*** 0.548*** 0.201 0.011
(5.69) (4.47) (4.25) (3.70) (1.59) (0.09)
Carhart Alpha 3.841*** 1.054*** 0.709*** 0.541*** 0.189 0.002
(5.71) (4.48) (4.21) (3.45) (1.59) (0.02)
5-Factor Alpha 3.259*** 0.862*** 0.602*** 0.481*** 0.138 -0.024
(4.78) (3.35) (3.22) (2.79) (1.14) (-0.23)
Panel C: Value-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MEW)
Avg. Return 3.451*** 1.459*** 1.029*** 0.669** -0.057 -0.209
(3.92) (2.86) (3.31) (2.62) (-0.33) (-1.21)
CAPM Alpha 3.571*** 1.572*** 1.105*** 0.757*** -0.041 -0.196
(5.06) (3.53) (3.90) (2.88) (-0.25) (-1.30)
FF Alpha 3.435*** 1.487*** 1.093*** 0.764*** -0.032 -0.181
(4.59) (3.72) (4.01) (2.86) (-0.18) (-1.23)
Carhart Alpha 3.437*** 1.497*** 1.090*** 0.761*** -0.040 -0.187
(4.61) (3.88) (3.96) (2.82) (-0.23) (-1.29)
5-Factor Alpha 3.004*** 1.262*** 1.031*** 0.765*** 0.029 -0.131
(3.20) (2.81) (3.37) (2.65) (0.16) (-0.98)
Panel D: Value-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MVW)
Avg. Return 3.322*** 1.095*** 0.488 0.385 0.032 0.023
(4.83) (2.68) (1.31) (1.13) (0.13) (0.14)
CAPM Alpha 3.361*** 1.098*** 0.479 0.406 0.074 0.035
(4.51) (2.89) (1.36) (1.12) (0.28) (0.23)
FF Alpha 3.269*** 1.051*** 0.447 0.376 0.045 0.014
(4.74) (2.89) (1.20) (0.99) (0.16) (0.09)
Carhart Alpha 3.266*** 1.063*** 0.451 0.380 0.038 0.010
(4.69) (3.17) (1.23) (1.02) (0.14) (0.06)
5-Factor Alpha 3.074*** 0.915** 0.259 0.197 -0.064 -0.048
(4.12) (2.49) (0.75) (0.56) (-0.24) (-0.31)
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Table 2.13: Unsophisticated Powerful Republicans: Tercile Analysis
This table presents average monthly raw and risk-adjusted returns (alphas) in percentages over 2004M01-
2011M12 on buy-minus-sell portfolios from the transactions in NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ common stocks
by unsophisticated (not option trader/short-seller) Republicans on the top 20 powerful committees in
Congress. We first create three terciles of transactions based on the ratio of the transaction value (TV)
to the net worth (NW) of the politicians. We then construct calendar-time portfolios for each tercile
of transactions. Transactions data is from Center for Responsive Politics, stock returns from CRSP,
and five factors and risk-free rate from WRDS. Daily portfolio returns are calculated using four different
weighting schemes under holding periods from 1 week to 12 months and compounded to monthly returns.
Here we only report the results based on the EW-MEW weighting scheme (equal-weighted transactions
and equal-weighted portfolios). Newey-West t-statistics (three lags) are in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote
10, 5, and 1 % significance levels.
Holding Period (Months): 1/4 1 2 3 6 12
Panel A: Top Tercile
Avg. Return 3.370* 1.093 0.823** 0.649* -0.038 -0.283
(1.68) (1.41) (2.22) (1.83) (-0.15) (-1.00)
CAPM Alpha 3.216** 1.113 0.860** 0.681 -0.059 -0.291
(2.10) (1.62) (2.32) (1.66) (-0.21) (-1.00)
FF Alpha 2.880 0.975 0.824** 0.655 -0.054 -0.269
(1.60) (1.38) (2.25) (1.64) (-0.19) (-0.97)
Carhart Alpha 2.887 0.984 0.833** 0.662* -0.045 -0.267
(1.60) (1.40) (2.31) (1.71) (-0.16) (-0.98)
5-Factor Alpha 2.192 0.726 0.809** 0.731* 0.088 -0.189
(1.00) (0.85) (2.02) (1.76) (0.32) (-0.68)
Panel B: Middle Tercile
Avg. Return 4.061*** 1.572** 1.665*** 0.739 0.026 -0.248
(3.17) (2.25) (3.26) (1.66) (0.08) (-0.88)
CAPM Alpha 4.249*** 1.678*** 1.733*** 0.812* 0.073 -0.212
(4.04) (2.86) (3.86) (1.98) (0.23) (-0.71)
FF Alpha 4.222*** 1.603*** 1.718*** 0.828** 0.057 -0.214
(4.42) (3.22) (3.89) (2.07) (0.19) (-0.72)
Carhart Alpha 4.228*** 1.602*** 1.706*** 0.807** 0.042 -0.218
(4.62) (3.18) (3.82) (2.13) (0.14) (-0.75)
5-Factor Alpha 3.577*** 1.385*** 1.525*** 0.656* -0.035 -0.295
(4.24) (3.24) (3.60) (1.76) (-0.12) (-1.03)
Panel C: Bottom Tercile
Avg. Return 2.640 0.421 0.587 0.616 -0.884* -0.414
(1.59) (0.56) (0.88) (1.13) (-1.91) (-1.30)
CAPM Alpha 2.591 0.446 0.709 0.686 -0.797* -0.383
(1.47) (0.79) (1.36) (1.43) (-1.97) (-1.19)
FF Alpha 2.595 0.426 0.653 0.678 -0.795** -0.406
(1.63) (0.73) (1.26) (1.31) (-2.02) (-1.44)
Carhart Alpha 2.664* 0.435 0.651 0.686 -0.820** -0.416
(1.71) (0.74) (1.25) (1.38) (-2.18) (-1.52)
5-Factor Alpha 2.637* 0.636 0.403 0.603 -0.933** -0.433
(1.69) (0.95) (0.70) (1.19) (-2.17) (-1.53)
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Table 2.14: Powerful Republicans: Power and Pre/Post-Power Years
This table presents both average monthly raw returns and risk-adjusted returns (alphas) over the
2004M01-2011M12 period on the long/short portfolios constructed based on the transactions by the
members of the Republican party serving on the top 20 powerful committees. We identify 50 power-
ful members of the Republican Party, and measure their portfolio performance between the time that
they were powerful (Panel A) and the time that they were not powerful (Panel B). We include only
US common stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. The transactions data is from Center for
Responsive Politics, the stock returns from CRSP, and the five factors (market, size, value, momentum,
and liquidity) along with the risk-free rate from WRDS. Daily portfolio returns are calculated based
on four different weighting schemes summarized in Figure 1 under six different holding periods ranging
from one week to 12 months and then compounded to monthly returns. In the table below, we only
report the results based on the EW-MEW weighting scheme (equally weighted transactions & equally
weighted returns across traders). t-statistics are provided in parenthesis that are calculated with Newey-
West robust standard errors using three lags. *, **, *** denote the 10, 5, and 1 % significance levels,
respectively. All returns are in percentages.
Holding Period (Months): 1/4 1 2 3 6 12
Panel A: Power Years
Avg. Return 2.851*** 0.990** 0.675** 0.604** 0.126 -0.160
(4.22) (2.26) (2.12) (2.12) (0.50) (-0.66)
CAPM Alpha 2.881*** 1.081*** 0.758*** 0.690*** 0.184 -0.139
(4.50) (2.91) (2.87) (2.71) (0.80) (-0.66)
FF Alpha 2.813*** 1.002*** 0.769*** 0.687*** 0.183 -0.144
(4.56) (3.24) (3.10) (2.89) (0.83) (-0.63)
Carhart Alpha 2.814*** 1.005*** 0.762*** 0.672*** 0.173 -0.152
(4.53) (3.31) (3.03) (2.87) (0.79) (-0.68)
5-Factor Alpha 2.536*** 0.780** 0.579** 0.446** 0.044 -0.324
(4.11) (2.51) (2.42) (2.15) (0.19) (-1.49)
Panel B: Pre-Power & Post-Power Years
Avg. Return -0.095 -0.249 -0.483 -0.510 -1.046* 0.580
(-0.08) (-0.23) (-0.51) (-0.71) (-1.80) (1.17)
CAPM Alpha -0.261 -0.393 -0.774 -0.557 -1.083* 0.585
(-0.28) (-0.37) (-0.86) (-0.80) (-1.80) (1.00)
FF Alpha -0.254 -0.537 -0.891 -0.319 -1.071* 0.645
(-0.32) (-0.57) (-1.00) (-0.45) (-1.87) (1.07)
Carhart Alpha -0.289 -0.560 -0.752 -0.335 -1.075* 0.655
(-0.35) (-0.59) (-0.89) (-0.47) (-1.88) (1.08)
5-Factor Alpha -0.466 -0.288 -0.690 0.007 -0.923 0.780
(-0.43) (-0.26) (-0.69) (0.01) (-1.58) (1.30)
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Table 2.15: Majority Control, Party Membership, and Portfolio Performance
This table presents average monthly raw and risk-adjusted returns (alphas) in percentages on buy-
minus-sell portfolios from the transactions in NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ common stocks by the powerful
members of Congress. Transactions data is from Center for Responsive Politics, stock returns from
CRSP, and five factors and risk-free rate from WRDS. Daily portfolio returns are calculated using four
different weighting schemes under holding periods from 1 week to 12 months and compounded to monthly
returns. We report the results based on equal-weighted transactions and portfolios (EW-MEW). Newey-
West t-statistics (three lags) are in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote 10, 5, and 1 % significance levels.
Holding Period (Months): 1/4 1 2 3 6 12
Panel A: Republicans During Republican Majority Period (2004-2006)
Avg. Return 2.116*** 0.641** 0.748*** 0.170 0.424 -0.188
(4.97) (2.47) (2.87) (0.58) (1.24) (-1.08)
CAPM Alpha 1.825*** 0.651*** 0.722*** 0.170 0.498 -0.219
(4.18) (3.58) (2.77) (0.60) (1.10) (-1.47)
FF Alpha 1.413*** 0.461* 0.574** -0.047 0.703 -0.204
(3.08) (1.93) (2.20) (-0.15) (1.02) (-1.45)
Carhart Alpha 1.457*** 0.440* 0.526* -0.081 0.753 -0.126
(2.94) (1.84) (1.92) (-0.21) (1.08) (-0.86)
5-Factor Alpha 1.458*** 0.444* 0.547* -0.033 0.739 -0.007
(2.99) (1.86) (1.96) (-0.10) (1.22) (-0.04)
Panel B: Democrats During Republican Majority Period (2004-2006)
Avg. Return 1.098 0.457 0.377 -0.012 0.031 -0.388
(1.36) (0.81) (0.87) (-0.03) (0.08) (-1.22)
CAPM Alpha 1.203 0.623 0.256 -0.028 0.059 -0.409
(1.67) (1.43) (0.70) (-0.08) (0.18) (-1.16)
FF Alpha 1.476* 0.830 0.557 0.006 0.170 -0.507
(1.71) (1.36) (1.44) (0.02) (0.54) (-1.27)
Carhart Alpha 1.645* 0.787 0.523 0.090 0.194 -0.321
(1.92) (1.34) (1.23) (0.28) (0.62) (-1.10)
5-Factor Alpha 1.631** 0.776 0.478 0.051 0.103 -0.501
(2.05) (1.33) (1.02) (0.16) (0.26) (-1.25)
Panel C: Republicans During Democratic Majority Period (2007-2010)
Avg. Return 3.403*** 1.296* 0.862* 0.740* -0.090 -0.329
(3.62) (1.94) (1.81) (1.82) (-0.31) (-1.13)
CAPM Alpha 3.457*** 1.354*** 0.931*** 0.809** -0.061 -0.319
(4.15) (3.09) (2.72) (2.56) (-0.24) (-1.09)
FF Alpha 3.156*** 1.058** 0.778** 0.766** -0.151 -0.369
(3.68) (2.31) (2.19) (2.39) (-0.68) (-1.28)
Carhart Alpha 3.114*** 1.062** 0.796** 0.787** -0.107 -0.336
(3.71) (2.26) (2.17) (2.37) (-0.49) (-1.17)
5-Factor Alpha 2.983*** 0.975* 0.761* 0.769** -0.085 -0.336
(3.48) (1.99) (2.01) (2.31) (-0.40) (-1.16)
Panel D: Democrats During Democratic Majority Period (2007-2010)
Avg. Return 0.269 -0.613 -0.346 0.025 -0.069 0.058
(0.27) (-1.15) (-0.63) (0.06) (-0.19) (0.19)
CAPM Alpha 0.285 -0.605 -0.361 -0.007 -0.090 0.056
(0.29) (-1.39) (-0.93) (-0.02) (-0.31) (0.20)
FF Alpha 0.240 -0.671 -0.363 0.012 -0.117 -0.005
(0.24) (-1.60) (-0.99) (0.04) (-0.47) (-0.02)
Carhart Alpha 0.140 -0.663 -0.317 0.032 -0.133 -0.035
(0.16) (-1.65) (-0.91) (0.12) (-0.52) (-0.14)
5-Factor Alpha 0.263 -0.561 -0.214 0.092 -0.129 -0.031
(0.28) (-1.38) (-0.65) (0.35) (-0.50) (-0.12)
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Table 2.16: President’s Party, Party Membership, and Portfolio Performance
This table presents average monthly raw and risk-adjusted returns (alphas) in percentages on buy-
minus-sell portfolios from the transactions in NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ common stocks by the powerful
members of Congress. Transactions data is from Center for Responsive Politics, stock returns from
CRSP, and five factors and risk-free rate from WRDS. Daily portfolio returns are calculated using four
different weighting schemes under holding periods from 1 week to 12 months and compounded to monthly
returns. We report the results based on equal-weighted transactions and portfolios (EW-MEW). Newey-
West t-statistics (three lags) are in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote 10, 5, and 1 % significance levels.
Holding Period (Months): 1/4 1 2 3 6 12
Panel A: Republicans During Bush Presidency (2004-2008)
Avg. Return 2.842*** 1.377*** 0.852*** 0.991*** -0.013 -0.167
(4.77) (2.80) (2.78) (2.81) (-0.06) (-0.86)
CAPM Alpha 2.715*** 1.196*** 0.766*** 0.934** -0.027 -0.159
(5.08) (3.87) (3.38) (2.25) (-0.13) (-0.78)
FF Alpha 2.565*** 1.171*** 0.729*** 0.915** -0.005 -0.132
(4.24) (3.99) (3.23) (2.08) (-0.02) (-0.63)
Carhart Alpha 2.449*** 1.158*** 0.663*** 0.987** 0.003 -0.133
(4.77) (3.51) (3.07) (2.04) (0.02) (-0.78)
5-Factor Alpha 2.328*** 0.787*** 0.694*** 1.133** 0.079 -0.087
(4.30) (2.88) (3.52) (2.17) (0.50) (-0.52)
Panel B: Democrats During Bush Presidency (2004-2008)
Avg. Return 0.723 0.025 0.269 -0.092 0.052 0.013
(1.19) (0.05) (0.73) (-0.22) (0.16) (0.05)
CAPM Alpha 0.653 0.014 0.250 0.012 0.071 0.014
(1.24) (0.04) (0.69) (0.03) (0.22) (0.06)
FF Alpha 0.645 0.001 0.312 0.083 0.153 0.074
(1.23) (0.00) (0.95) (0.23) (0.56) (0.39)
Carhart Alpha 0.621 0.000 0.413 0.180 0.147 0.075
(1.11) (0.00) (1.32) (0.47) (0.54) (0.40)
5-Factor Alpha 0.799 0.296 0.276 0.327 0.126 -0.024
(1.43) (0.71) (0.82) (0.73) (0.43) (-0.11)
Panel C: Republicans During Obama Presidency (2009-2010)
Avg. Return 2.835** 0.999 1.024 0.871 0.574 0.007
(2.47) (0.91) (0.99) (0.93) (0.68) (0.01)
CAPM Alpha 3.406* 1.962* 2.138 1.902 1.513 0.560
(1.96) (1.73) (1.66) (1.58) (1.49) (0.62)
FF Alpha 2.252 0.740 1.053 0.960 0.504 -0.177
(1.40) (0.89) (1.15) (1.16) (0.78) (-0.32)
Carhart Alpha 2.075 0.582 0.991 0.939 0.484 -0.237
(1.33) (0.69) (1.10) (1.21) (0.78) (-0.42)
5-Factor Alpha 1.891 0.322 0.719 0.562 0.266 -0.298
(1.09) (0.32) (0.73) (0.73) (0.45) (-0.60)
Panel D: Democrats During Obama Presidency (2009-2010)
Avg. Return 0.277 -1.036 -0.649 0.053 -0.280 -0.393
(0.16) (-1.27) (-0.67) (0.08) (-0.42) (-0.75)
CAPM Alpha 0.245 -1.034 -0.944 -0.391 -0.610 -0.585
(0.15) (-1.31) (-1.12) (-0.54) (-0.92) (-1.06)
FF Alpha -0.292 -1.368 -1.261 -0.532 -0.648 -0.578
(-0.20) (-1.57) (-1.27) (-0.69) (-0.92) (-1.02)
Carhart Alpha -0.905 -1.401 -0.913 -0.354 -0.534 -0.512
(-0.68) (-1.62) (-1.00) (-0.53) (-0.83) (-0.96)
5-Factor Alpha -0.443 -1.378 -0.489 -0.116 -0.446 -0.494
(-0.27) (-1.39) (-0.66) (-0.19) (-0.71) (-0.96)
60
Table 2.17: Connected and Non-Connected Portfolios
This table presents average monthly raw and risk-adjusted returns (alphas) in percentages on buy-minus-
sell portfolios from the transactions in NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ common stocks by the unsophisticated
(not an option trader/short-seller) members of of the Republican Party who serve on the most powerful
20 committees in Congress. We sort the trades by these politicians into two portfolios on the basis of
whether politicians worked closely with a financial institution in the execution of these trades (connected
and non-connected portfolios). Transactions data is from Center for Responsive Politics, stock returns
from CRSP, and five factors and risk-free rate from WRDS. Daily portfolio returns are calculated using
four different weighting schemes under holding periods from 1 week to 12 months and compounded to
monthly returns. We report the results based on equal-weighted transactions and portfolios (EW-MEW).
Newey-West t-statistics (three lags) are in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote 10, 5, and 1 % significance
levels.
Holding Period (Months): 1/4 1 2 3 6 12
Panel A: Connected Portfolios
Avg. Return 2.830* 1.376* 0.956 0.726 -0.646 -0.202
(1.94) (1.84) (1.50) (1.41) (-1.26) (-0.45)
CAPM Alpha 2.877* 1.481*** 1.106** 0.802* -0.582 -0.190
(1.98) (2.70) (2.09) (1.75) (-1.30) (-0.45)
FF Alpha 2.723* 1.525** 1.199** 0.927** -0.534 -0.146
(1.90) (2.63) (2.42) (2.10) (-1.30) (-0.36)
Carhart Alpha 2.733* 1.508*** 1.184** 0.903* -0.591* -0.166
(1.94) (2.80) (2.34) (1.97) (-1.85) (-0.40)
5-Factor Alpha 3.005** 1.834*** 1.201** 0.917* -0.391 0.062
(2.08) (3.33) (2.23) (1.89) (-1.11) (0.14)
Panel B: Non-Connected Portfolios
Avg. Return 3.010*** 1.339** 1.080*** 0.720*** 0.052 -0.176
(3.40) (2.43) (3.33) (2.66) (0.27) (-0.97)
CAPM Alpha 3.077*** 1.432*** 1.144*** 0.800*** 0.082 -0.159
(4.16) (3.03) (3.96) (2.93) (0.43) (-1.00)
FF Alpha 2.984*** 1.334*** 1.138*** 0.813*** 0.081 -0.155
(3.74) (3.05) (4.07) (2.98) (0.42) (-0.96)
Carhart Alpha 2.991*** 1.346*** 1.138*** 0.816*** 0.077 -0.158
(3.76) (3.17) (4.06) (3.01) (0.40) (-1.00)
5-Factor Alpha 2.455** 1.037** 1.017*** 0.762** 0.110 -0.137
(2.52) (2.04) (3.23) (2.54) (0.52) (-0.84)
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Chapter 3
Informed Trading through Family
Members: Evidence from
Congressional Trading
3.1 Introduction
Say I find out some information, I tell my wife and she goes and trades on it, what’s the
difference?
Massachusetts Senator Scott Brown 1
We hear often in the media about people passing on insider information (material and
nonpublic) to friends or family members, and the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) pressing charges against them. For example, the SEC filed a lawsuit against an insider
trading ring with 10 members for exploiting inside information on mergers.2 The key person
in this insider trading ring was a Wells Fargo securities employee, and the tippees included
friends, family members, and business colleagues. Besides such ordinary people and corporate
insiders, the public also started hearing about another group of traders who allegedly exploit
1http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/19/politics/stock-act-loophole/index.html
2http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-255.htm
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and pass on their private information for personal gains: members of Congress.
The members of the U.S. House, Senate and Executive Branch (politicians hereafter)
have been under public pressure due to the allegations that they use insider information
in their stock trades. This pressure played a pivotal role in the bipartisan efforts to pass
the STOCK Act (Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act), which was signed by the
President into law on April 4, 2012. In this study, we investigate whether politicians share
private information with their family members (spouses and dependent children), and thus
enable them to trade on value-relevant information. The motivation for this quest comes
from a CNN report that revealed a loophole in the implementation of the STOCK Act.3
The House Ethics committee excluded the coverage of the act to the family members of
politicians while the Senate Ethics committee extended the coverage to both politicians and
their family members. The House immediately closed the loophole after the CNN report.
Despite the public’s interest to learn more about congressional trading, there are only a
few academic studies addressing this issue. Ziobrowski et al. (2004; 2011) document that
members of Congress’ common stock investments outperform the market using data from
the 90s and early 2000s. Karadas (2014c) presents evidence that politicians trade on macroe-
conomic information such that their aggregate trades predict future stock market returns
during the 2004-2010 period. Using the data from the same period, Karadas (2014a) shows
that firm-level congressional trading predicts future firm-level stock returns. Furthermore,
there are short-term abnormal returns on congressional stock trades. Eggers and Hainmueller
(2013b) find that politicians’ investments in companies from their district or State generate
3% abnormal returns on the annual basis over the 2004-2008 period.
We first calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) on the politicians’ and their
3http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/19/politics/stock-act-loophole/index.html
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family members’ transactions. Next, we construct transactions-based calendar-time port-
folios following Ziobrowski et al. (2004) and estimate the alphas (abnormal returns) on
portfolios that long the buy transactions and short the sell transactions (long/short or buy-
minus-sell portfolios). We carry out the estimations of alphas separately for the politicians
and their family members. The calendar-time portfolio approach is commonly applied in
measuring the trading skills of retail traders (Odean, 1999; Seasholes and Zhu, 2010), and it
allows us to measure the information content of the stock transactions in a dynamic fashion
under different holding periods.
We are inspired by Berkman et al. (2013) who show that informed guardians exploit their
private information by trading on behalf of babies and young children. We apply this idea
to politicians and investigate whether politicians take advantage of their private information
by trading through the accounts of their family members. Politicians can share information
with their family members for a variety of reasons. First, they may think that there is less
publicity associated with their families’ trades than their own trades. Second, they may
want to enhance their family members’ well-being by providing them with value-relevant
information. Third, they may lack the expertise in trading stocks and have their family
members trade on their information. This paper is the first academic study that separately
investigates the presence of informed trading by politicians and their family members. Our
analysis documents that the transactions reported in the politicians and the spouses’ accounts
both contain value-relevant information capable of generating short-term abnormal returns,
which suggests that politicians share information with their spouses.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the hypotheses. Section 3
describes the data. Section 4 and 5 outline the empirical methodology and present the results.
Section 6 provides a direct comparison between politicians and their spouses’ portfolios.
Section 7 examines the portfolios of the politicians’ spouses based on the trading behavior
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of the politicians. Section 8 concludes the paper.
3.2 Hypotheses
We formulate four hypotheses to test the presence and extent of informed trading by politi-
cians and their family members. We are interested in quantifying the extent of informed
trading by politicians. Since the presence of abnormal returns is a strong indicator of in-
formed trading, we hypothesize that politicians place value-relevant transactions generating
abnormal returns in their portfolios:
• Hypothesis 1: Politicians trade on value-relevant information such that there are ab-
normal returns on their stock portfolios.
Our primary motivation in this study is to document whether members of Congress share
their value-relevant private information with their family members. The incidence of such
information sharing implies that the transactions placed by the family members also yield
abnormal returns:
• Hypothesis 2: Politicians share some of their private information with their family
members such that there are abnormal returns on the family members’ portfolios.
Politicians and their family members trade via taxable and tax-deferred trading accounts
such as IRAs, 401(k)s, and trusts. These tax-deferred accounts are mainly used for tax
saving purposes, and they have long-term investment horizon. We hypothesize that the
transactions the taxable accounts contain much more time-sensitive information than those
in tax-deferred accounts. Therefore, we anticipate short-term (long-term) abnormal returns
on the portfolios constructed from the transactions in taxable (tax-deferred) accounts:
• Hypothesis 3: The portfolios of the transactions in tax-deferred trading accounts have
long-term abnormal returns whereas the portfolios of those in taxable trading account
have short-term abnormal returns.
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Powerful politicians are exposed to more value-relevant information than non-powerful
politicians. For example, Karadas (2014a) presents evidence that the transactions reported
by the non-powerful members of Congress (politicians and family members combined) do
not have any value-relevant information. We hypothesize that the more informed politicians
are, the more informed their family members become. As a result, we anticipate higher
abnormal returns on the portfolios of the powerful politicians’ family members (powerful
family members) compared to the portfolios of the other politicians’ family members (non-
powerful family members):
• Hypothesis 4: Family members of powerful politicians are more informed than those of
non-powerful politicians.
3.3 Data
The source of raw transactions data is the Center for Responsive Politics (www.opensecrets.org),
which extracts these records from the annual financial disclosure reports (FDRs) filed by the
members of Congress. Members of Congress are required to file these reports not only for
their transactions but also for the transactions made by their spouses and dependent chil-
dren (family members). The transactions data in this paper covers the 2004-2010 period and
comes with the following information for each transaction: transaction date, the name of
the asset involved, the name of the politician who filed the FDRs (filer), account type, and
transaction amount. There are four different account types that the filers reported: politi-
cians’ own accounts (P), their spouses (S) and dependent children’s (D) accounts, and joint
accounts (J). We follow the same procedures as in Karadas (2014a) to clean the data. At the
end of the cleaning process, we are left with 61,998 transactions from 2671 unique stocks.
These stocks are mostly split between NYSE and NASDAQ (49.76%, 46.72%, respectively)
with only 3.52% of them listed on AMEX.
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Table 3.1 presents information on the types of the filers and the number of transactions
each filer reported for each account type over the 20004-2010 sample period. We identified
three different filer types among politicians such that Type I politicians only reported the
trades for themselves, Type II politicians reported trades for themselves and their family
members, and Type III politicians reported trades only for their family members. For ex-
ample, there are 130 Type II politicians who reported 17,164 transactions for themselves.
Some of these 130 politicians also reported transactions for the remaining account types (S,
D, and J): 21 of them reported 537 transactions for their dependent children, 94 of them
reported 11, 635 transactions for their spouses, and finally 49 of them reported 3,176 joint
transactions. Overall, members of Congress reported 34,180 transactions for themselves,
19,559 for their spouses, 2,600 for their dependent children, and 5,659 for the joint accounts
that they have with their family members.
Table 3.2 shows the descriptive statistics of the transaction values for each account type.
The mean transaction value by the spouses is more than twice as much the mean transaction
value by the other account types. Furthermore, politicians and spouses both have substan-
tially large transactions up to $50 million whereas the highest transaction value is less than
one tenth of this limit for the dependent children’s and joint transactions.
3.4 Event Analysis and Results
The main tools for empirical analysis in the study are event analysis and transactions-based
calendar-time portfolio approach. Both methods enable us to measure the returns on the
common stock investments of politicians and their family members through time. We first
present the results from the event analysis.
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3.4.1 Setup
We use the market-adjusted model as in Ziobrowski et al. (2004) in the calculation of
abnormal returns by assuming a market beta of 1 for all stocks. We first calculate the
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for each transaction from trading day 0 (transaction
date) to trading day 252:
CARj,T =
T∑
t=0
(Rjt −Rmt) (3.1)
where T goes from 0 to 252, Rjt is the return on transaction j on day t, and Rmt stands for
the CRSP value-weighted market index return. Next, we average CARs across transactions
on each trading day to obtain the average cumulative abnormal returns:
CART =
J∑
j=1
wj,TCARj,T (3.2)
where J is the number of transactions in the buy or sell sample, and wj,T is the weight of
transaction j on trading day T . We calculate equal-weighted average cumulative abnormal
returns such that wj,T equals
1
JT
where JT is the number of transactions on trading day T .
We re-group the joint transactions under politicians’ transactions and combine the trans-
actions by spouses and dependent children as the family transactions. As a result, we have
39,839 transactions (18,859 buy and 20,980 sell) in the politician sample and 22,159 trans-
actions (11,926 buy and 10,233 sell) in the family sample. We use the event analysis mainly
for the graphical representation of cumulative abnormal returns. We avoid drawing any in-
ferences from the CARs because of the cross-sectional dependence issue. The standard event
study approaches assume that cumulative abnormal returns are cross-sectionally indepen-
dent. However, in our data set, we have event-clustering (transactions taking place on the
same trading day) and overlapping event windows (the same stock could have been bought
or sold within few days of each other). As a result, the standard test statistics are biased
(Kothari and Warner, 2007).
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3.4.2 Results
As part of our research question, we are interested in the return differences between the
buy and sell transactions. Thus, we calculate the difference between the CARs from the
buy and sell transactions in the politician and family sample. Figure 1 shows this difference
for the equal-weighted CARs in addition to the CARs on buy and sell transactions. The
buy transactions of the family members outperform those of the politicians. Similarly, the
sell transactions of the family members underperform those of the politicians. Nevertheless,
the difference between the families’ and politicians’ performance is much larger when it
comes to the buy transactions compared to the sell transactions. Overall, the transactions
by the family members earn significantly higher returns than those by politicians with the
difference exceeding five fold suggesting that the transaction by the family members contain
more value-relevant information than those by the politicians.
[Figure 1 About Here]
3.5 Transactions-Based Calendar-Time Portfolios
Fama (1998) recommends the use of the calendar-time portfolio methodology in event studies
because it eliminates the cross-sectional dependence between abnormal returns. Based on
this recommendation, Ziobrowski et al. (2004; 2011) construct transactions-based calendar-
time portfolios assuming a one-year holding period. The assumption of a one-year holding
period can be justified by the average holding period for retail investors (Seasholes and
Zhu, 2010). We follow the methodology in Ziobrowski et al. (2004; 2011) and construct
the calendar-time portfolios, but we allow the holding period to change from 1 week (5
trading days) to one year (252 trading days). Even though a one-year holding period could
give us a better picture about the abnormal returns captured by politicians, shorter holding
periods present us the opportunity to examine whether politicians and their family members
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are informed traders using time-sensitive information. Karadas (2013a) provides a richer
discussion on the calendar-time portfolios and the issues of informed trading.
3.5.1 Portfolio Construction
The first step towards setting up the calendar-time portfolios is to calculate the daily returns
on the portfolio on trading day t by Rport,t =
∑J
j=1
compjtRjt∑J
j=1
compjt
. The denominator sums the
compounded value of each transaction at the beginning of trading day t, and the numerator
sums the dollar returns on each transaction on trading day t.
We use four different weighting schemes in the calculation of daily returns. Figure 2
presents the chart of these weighting schemes. EW −MEW assigns equal weights to all
transactions and all traders. This weighting scheme neutralizes the importance of transaction
amounts and the portfolio size by assuming a value of $1 for all transactions and averaging
trader-level returns equally on each trading day. EW −MVW still assigns equal-weights
to all transactions, but weight returns across traders by their portfolio size. Naturally,
traders with larger portfolios get more weight. Since all transactions are assumed to be $1,
large portfolios can be acquired only by more intensive trading and better trading decisions.
TW −MEW uses the actual transaction values, but still neutralizes the importance of the
portfolio size. Finally, TW−MVW uses actual transaction amounts and weights trader-level
returns by the portfolio size.
If a trader took a very large position in a particular transaction and faced losses, the
returns based on EW −MEW and EW −MVW will not be sensitive to this particular
trade because all transactions are assumed to be the same amount. On the other hand, the
results based on TW −MEW and TW −MVW will be sensitive with the former being less
affected due to equal weights assigned to all traders. If a trader with a very large portfolio
size faces losses, only the results based on EW −MVW and TW −MVW will be sensitive.
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[Figure 2 About Here]
The second step in constructing the calendar-time portfolios is to compound the daily
returns to get the monthly returns. As a result of these steps, we have monthly stock
returns starting in January of 2004 and ending in December of 2010. We also have additional
months of stock returns up to 12 months depending on the holding period assumption. For
example, when the holding period is one year, the return series extend until December of
2011. We execute these two steps for buy and sell transactions separately. Our interest lies
in the portfolio that longs the buy transactions and shorts the sell transactions. If a group
of traders are informed, the returns on what they buy should exceed that on what they
sell (Seasholes and Zhu, 2010). We measure the extent of informed trading based on the
magnitude and statistical significance of alphas (abnormal returns) on this long/short (i.e.,
hedged, buy-minus-sell) portfolio.
3.5.2 Alphas on the Long/Short Portfolios
We measure the abnormal returns based on four different models using the CAPM as the
baseline equation. We employ Fama-French three-factor, Carhart four-factor, and five factors
models to add robustness to our results. The full model we estimate (five-factor model) is:
rp,t = αi + βi(rm,t − rf,t) + spSMBt + hpHMLt +mpUMDt + lpLIQUIDt + εp,t (3.3)
where rp,t is the return on the long/short portfolio (buy-minus-sell) on the transactions in
the politicians or family members sample. The first factor, rm,t − rf,t, is the excess returns
on the CRSP value-weighted index. SMB (small-minus-big) and HML (high-minus-low)
are the size and value factors described in Fama (1993). UMD (up-minus-down) captures
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the momentum in stock returns whereas LIQUID measures the liquidity risk (Pastor and
Stambaugh, 2003). We are primarily interest in the sign, magnitude (economic significance),
and statistical significance of the alphas in each model. A statistically and economically
significant positive alpha implies that politicians or family members are informed traders
and the extent of their informational advantage is non-negligible.
3.5.3 Portfolio Performance of Four Different Account Types
In the portfolio analysis, we separately measure the portfolio performance of each category
of accounts: politicians, spouses, dependent children, and joint. The CAR analysis suggests
that politicians share information with their family members. It then becomes interesting
to reveal how this information is shared. Mainly, we are interested in finding out whether
politicians take advantage of their value-relevant information trading through their spouses’
or dependent children’s accounts. We are also interested in revealing the information content
of the joint transactions as they offer an interesting perspective into how politicians share
information with their family members under the joint ownership of the accounts.
[Table 3.3 About Here]
[Table 3.4 About Here]
We present the results of our portfolio analysis in Tables 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6. For
politicians, the abnormal returns exceed 12% at the one-week holding period, but they
disappear within two months of the transaction date. Furthermore, when we weight the
portfolio returns across politicians by their portfolio size (panel D), the statistical significance
of the abnormal returns completely disappear. This finding suggests that there are some
politicians in the sample with large transactions and hence large portfolios who suffered
sizable losses. Overall, we have support for Hypothesis 1.
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[Table 3.5 About Here]
[Table 3.6 About Here]
The abnormal returns in the spouses’ portfolios exceed 12%, similarly to those in the
politicians’ portfolios, at the one-week holding period. Nevertheless, the abnormal returns
persist up to one year. This finding suggests that the spouses’ transactions contain less time-
sensitive information than the politicians’ transactions. On the other hand, the dependent
children’s portfolios underperform the market while there is a marginal evidence of abnormal
performance for the joint portfolios. Overall, these results suggest that politicians take
advantage of their private information only through their spouses’ accounts, and we have
partial support for Hypothesis 2.
3.5.4 Investments through Taxable versus Tax-Deferred Trading
Accounts
Members of Congress and their spouses take advantage of tax-deferred investment oppor-
tunities either through retirement accounts (IRA and 401(k)) or by setting up trusts. The
total number of retirement transactions for politicians and their spouses are 2,910 and 1,716,
respectively. On the other hand, the total number of trust transactions for politicians and
their spouses are 3,157 and 3,341, respectively. We separately investigate the information
content of the retirement and trust transactions since they serve different purposes. In par-
ticular, retirement income is for spouses and politicians themselves, but the trust income is
for intergenerational wealth transfers. As we laid out in Hypothesis 3, we anticipate long-
term abnormal returns in the trust and retirement portfolios. At this point of our analysis,
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we proxy the long-term investment horizon with one-year holding period.4
[Table 3.7 About Here]
[Table 3.8 About Here]
We show the results of the politicians’ retirement and trust portfolios’ analyses in Ta-
bles 3.7 and 3.8. Contrary to what we anticipated, there is no trace of abnormal performance
in the retirement portfolio in long-term period. On the other hand, the trust portfolios un-
derperform the market, and this underperformance persists from short-term to long-term.
Once we exclude the retirement transactions from the politicians’ portfolios, the abnormal
returns slightly deteriorate and they disappear within two months of the transaction date.5
Once the trust transactions are excluded, the abnormal returns increase in magnitude, but
still preserve their short-term nature as presented in Table 3.9.
[Table 3.9 About Here]
Similar to politicians, the spouses’ retirement portfolios do not have any abnormal returns
in the short and long-term horizons. However, their trust portfolios have abnormal returns
at the six-month holding period. Once we remove the trust and retirement transactions from
the spouses’ portfolios, the abnormal returns deteriorate and persist only until six months,
which is consistent with what we anticipated in Hypothesis 3. In the end, we have only
partial support for Hypothesis 3 due to lack of long-term abnormal returns in the trust and
retirement portfolios for both politicians and spouses.6
412-months trading window is considered to be the lower bound of long-horizon investing in Kothari and
Warner (2007).
5The results are available from the author upon request.
6We do not present the results of the spouses’ retirement and trust portfolios’ analyses to save space.
The results are available upon request.
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3.5.5 Powerful Family Members
Members of Congress widely differ with respect to how much power they have in Congress.
Following Karadas (2014a), we pool the politicians serving on the most powerful ten com-
mittees in each chamber into the powerful group and the rest of them into the non-powerful
group. We argue that the families of the powerful politicians have more value-relevant in-
formation than those of the non-powerful politicians. Since there is no evidence of informed
trading the accounts of the dependent children, we only focus on the transactions by spouses.
Out of 19,559 transactions that spouses made, 16,304 of them were made by the spouses of
the powerful politicians who we refer as the powerful spouses.
[Table 3.10 About Here]
[Table 3.11 About Here]
We present the results in Tables 3.10 and 3.11. The abnormal returns on the pow-
erful spouses’ portfolios are higher compared to the case where we evaluate the portfolio
performance of the powerful and non-powerful spouses together (see Table 3.4). On the
contrary, the non-powerful spouses do not demonstrate any evidence of informed trading.
These findings lend empirical support for Hypothesis 4.
3.6 Direct Comparison Between Politicians and Their
Spouses
Our analysis so far has grouped the transactions by all of the spouses together in comparing
the performance of the spouses’ portfolios to that of the politicians’ portfolios. Nevertheless,
according to Table 3.1, only 94 Type II politicians reported trades for themselves and for
their spouses at the same time. In this section of our study, we compare the portfolio
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performance of these 94 politicians to that of their spouses. Such a comparison presents us
with a unique opportunity to examine how politicians and their spouses differ with respect
to their trading performance when they both trade. There are 12,882 transactions in the
paired politicians’ sample and 11,635 transactions in the paired spouses’ transactions.
[Table 3.12 About Here]
[Table 3.13 About Here]
The results in Tables 3.12 and 3.13 demonstrate that when politicians and their spouses
both trade, there is no evidence of informed trading on the part of the politicians. On the
other hand, the portfolios of the spouses still have abnormal returns. Based on this evidence,
we can now say that the portfolios of the politicians underperform those of their spouses.
These results also bring up an interesting question: Do the spouses of the politicians who
themselves do not trade (Type III politicians) trade on more or less value-relevant information
compared to the spouses of the Type II politicians? We take up this question in the next
section.
3.7 Spouses of Type II Politicians versus Spouses of
Type III Politicians
The preceding section clearly shows that the spouses of the Type II politicians are informed
traders. As we remember from Table 3.1, 57 out of 98 Type III politicians also reported
trades for their spouses even though they themselves did not trade any common stocks during
our sample period. Our analysis rests on the idea that members of Congress (politicians)
share information with their family members. We are now faced with two different types of
politicians who reported trades for their spouses: ones who also trade (Type II), and ones
76
who do not trade (Type III).
Even though we do not know exactly why Type III politicians do not trade, it is reasonable
to argue that they are either intentionally distancing themselves from trading stocks so
that they do not have any conflict of interest in performing their duties or they do not
have enough expertise in trading stocks. It is also likely that Type III politicians have
the most valuable information, and they are intentionally exploiting their informational
advantage by trading through their spouses’ accounts in order to avoid any publicity. The
results in Table 3.14 indicate that the spouses of the Type III politicians trade on less value-
relevant information than those of the Type II politicians. The abnormal returns for the
Type II politicians’ spouses have much higher abnormal returns than those for the Type
III politicians’ spouses (see Table 3.13). Furthermore, the abnormal returns in Table 3.14
are not robust to different weighting schemes. It is possible that the spouses of Type III
politicians place both information-driven (for themselves) and regular (for politicians) trades,
and combing these two different types of trades may lower the overall returns on their
portfolios. On the contrary, the spouses of Type II politicians have their own trading account
separate from Type II politicians to take advantage of private information, which may explain
why the portfolios of Type II politicians’ spouses outperform those of Type III politicians’
spouses.
[Table 3.14 About Here]
3.8 Conclusion
The previous studies lump the transactions by politicians and their family members together.
In this study, we separately examine the information content of common stock transactions
by politicians and their family members. We provide evidence that politicians and their
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spouses trade on value-relevant information, but the content of information is less time-
sensitive for spouses. We also find that the transactions in tax-deferred trading accounts
such as individual retirement accounts (IRAs) contain less valuable information than those in
taxable trading accounts for both politicians and their spouses, which suggest that politicians
and their spouses use these investment tools mainly for tax saving purposes. Furthermore,
we document that the spouses of the powerful politicians do better in their investments than
those of the non-powerful politicians with annualized abnormal returns ranging from 5.6% to
8.0% under the 3-month holding period. The direct comparison between politicians and their
spouses reveals that the portfolios of politicians underperform those of their spouses. Finally,
we find that the spouses of Type II politicians (politicians who trade stocks) invest in stocks
based on much more value-relevant information than the spouses of Type III politicians
(politicians who do not trade stocks). Overall, these results suggest that politicians exploit
some of their value-relevant information trading through the accounts of their spouses. There
is a possibility that some spouses may obtain private information on their own due to their
influential positions in the lobbying industry or similar places. We hope that future research
takes on this interesting issue.
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Table 3.1: Politician Types and Number of Transactions
This table presents information on the types of the politicians (filer types) based on
their trading patterns and the number of transactions these filers report. Members of
Congress report common stock transactions for themselves (politicians, P), their spouses
(S), dependent children (D), and finally for the joint accounts that they have with their
family members (J). These four groups represent all of the account types in our dataset,
which we construct based on the raw data from Center of Responsive Politics. Type I
politicians are the ones who report transactions only for themselves. Type II politicians
report trades for themselves and for their family members. Type III politicians report
trades only for their family members. Panel A provides information on the breakdown
of how many account types each filer type reports. For example, there are 98 Type III
politicians, and 17 of them reported trades for their dependent children’ accounts. Panel
B presents information on the number of transaction for each account type. For example,
Type II politicians reported 17,164 transactions for themselves and 537 transactions for
their dependent children.
Panel A: Filer and Account Types
Account Type Type I Type II Type III Total
P 175 130 98 403
D 0 21 17 38
S 0 94 57 151
J 0 49 52 101
Total 175 294 224 693
Panel B: Number of Transactions
Account Type Type I Type II Type III Total
P 17,016 17,164 0 34,180
D 0 537 2,063 2,600
S 0 11,635 7,924 19,559
J 0 3,176 2,483 5,659
Total 17,016 32,512 12,470 61,998
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the transaction values for each account
type. We have four different account types in our dataset: politicians (P), spouses (S),
dependent children (D), and joint transactions (J). We obtain the raw transactions data
over the 2004-2010 period from Center for Responsive Politics. We only keep transactions
referring to US common stocks trading on major US exchanges.
Account Type N Mean StdDev Minimum Maximum
P 34,180 21,162 454,129 100 50,000,001
D 2,600 18,824 90,061 102 3,000,001
S 19,559 49,535 506,198 103 50,000,001
J 5,659 19,791 66,986 100 3,000,001
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Figure 3.1: CARs on the Long/Short (Buy-Minus-Sell) Transactions
This table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) on the transactions in the politician (trans-
actions by politicians), and the family samples (transactions by the family members of politicians) for
the 252 trading days following the event day (transaction date). We first separately calculate the
CARs for both buy and sell samples and then subtract the CARs on the sell transactions from those
on the buy transactions. We obtain the transactions data from Center for Responsive Politics, the
stock returns from CRSP, and the risk-free rate from WRDS. We only keep the U.S. domestic stocks
(CRSP share code 10 or 11) listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. All returns are in percentages.
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Figure 3.2: Calendar Time Portfolio Chart
This chart presents the four different weighting schemes used to calculate the calendar-
time portfolio returns. The word member is interchangeably used for trader.
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Table 3.3: Politicians Only
This table presents average monthly raw and risk-adjusted returns (alphas) in percentages over 2004M01-
2011M12 on the buy-minus-sell portfolios from the transactions in NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ common
stocks by the politicians only. Transactions data is from Center for Responsive Politics, stock returns
from CRSP, and five factors and risk-free rate from WRDS. Daily portfolio returns are calculated using
four different weighting schemes under holding periods from 1 week to 12 months and compounded to
monthly returns. Newey-West robust t-statistics (three lags) are in parenthesis.*, **, *** denote 10, 5,
and 1 % significance levels.
Holding Period (Months): 1/4 1 2 3 6 12
Panel A: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MEW)
Avg. Return 1.991*** 0.531** 0.376 0.235 -0.039 -0.034
(3.38) (2.05) (1.58) (1.09) (-0.23) (-0.27)
CAPM Alpha 2.112*** 0.577** 0.399* 0.252 -0.037 -0.037
(4.15) (2.53) (1.87) (1.13) (-0.24) (-0.31)
FF Alpha 2.038*** 0.602** 0.437** 0.304 -0.009 -0.033
(4.14) (2.52) (2.16) (1.46) (-0.06) (-0.29)
Carhart Alpha 2.038*** 0.596** 0.426** 0.294 -0.021 -0.035
(4.13) (2.47) (2.07) (1.37) (-0.15) (-0.30)
5-Factor Alpha 2.012*** 0.572** 0.409* 0.284 -0.009 -0.022
(3.61) (2.22) (1.98) (1.27) (-0.06) (-0.17)
Panel B: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MVW)
Avg. Return 1.155*** 0.198 0.119 0.091 0.000 -0.074
(2.80) (0.94) (0.72) (0.57) (0.00) (-0.83)
CAPM Alpha 1.202*** 0.232 0.166 0.135 0.035 -0.058
(3.20) (1.20) (1.33) (1.13) (0.40) (-0.74)
FF Alpha 1.174*** 0.241 0.171 0.146 0.043 -0.058
(3.19) (1.31) (1.45) (1.32) (0.53) (-0.78)
Carhart Alpha 1.179*** 0.241 0.161 0.133 0.031 -0.065
(3.26) (1.29) (1.22) (0.99) (0.39) (-0.94)
5-Factor Alpha 1.006** 0.160 0.091 0.095 -0.003 -0.107
(2.48) (0.77) (0.62) (0.63) (-0.04) (-1.65)
Panel C: Value-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MEW)
Avg. Return 1.929*** 0.526** 0.339 0.190 -0.066 -0.038
(3.09) (2.03) (1.38) (0.87) (-0.38) (-0.28)
CAPM Alpha 2.068*** 0.564** 0.351 0.195 -0.075 -0.049
(3.98) (2.40) (1.57) (0.82) (-0.46) (-0.38)
FF Alpha 1.989*** 0.584** 0.393* 0.246 -0.051 -0.044
(3.95) (2.31) (1.83) (1.10) (-0.31) (-0.34)
Carhart Alpha 1.988*** 0.579** 0.383* 0.237 -0.061 -0.043
(3.92) (2.28) (1.75) (1.05) (-0.39) (-0.34)
5-Factor Alpha 1.951*** 0.581** 0.374* 0.231 -0.038 -0.018
(3.38) (2.17) (1.74) (0.99) (-0.24) (-0.13)
Panel D: Value-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MVW)
Avg. Return 0.544 -0.238 -0.343 -0.334 -0.305 -0.152
(0.95) (-0.57) (-0.99) (-1.07) (-1.22) (-0.94)
CAPM Alpha 0.600 -0.242 -0.351 -0.345 -0.292 -0.146
(1.15) (-0.76) (-1.02) (-1.07) (-1.18) (-0.98)
FF Alpha 0.667 -0.168 -0.307 -0.312 -0.289 -0.142
(1.24) (-0.54) (-0.93) (-0.98) (-1.15) (-0.95)
Carhart Alpha 0.648 -0.191 -0.335 -0.334 -0.305 -0.145
(1.17) (-0.56) (-0.98) (-1.04) (-1.24) (-0.99)
5-Factor Alpha 0.571 -0.175 -0.444 -0.485 -0.399 -0.210
(0.93) (-0.44) (-1.20) (-1.38) (-1.53) (-1.36)
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Table 3.4: Spouses Only
This table presents average monthly raw and risk-adjusted returns (alphas) in percentages over 2004M01-
2011M12 on the buy-minus-sell portfolios from the transactions in NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ common
stocks by the politicians’ spouses only. Transactions data is from Center for Responsive Politics, stock
returns from CRSP, and five factors and risk-free rate from WRDS. Daily portfolio returns are calculated
using four different weighting schemes under holding periods from 1 week to 12 months and compounded
to monthly returns. Newey-West robust t-statistics (three lags) are in parenthesis.*, **, *** denote 10,
5, and 1 % significance levels.
Holding Period (Months): 1/4 1 2 3 6 12
Panel A: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MEW)
Avg. Return 0.977 0.244 0.491 0.484* 0.163 0.039
(1.54) (0.61) (1.64) (1.96) (0.61) (0.18)
CAPM Alpha 1.038* 0.300 0.562** 0.552** 0.237 0.080
(1.88) (0.88) (2.43) (2.43) (1.03) (0.39)
FF Alpha 1.079** 0.239 0.552** 0.528** 0.254 0.096
(1.99) (0.77) (2.50) (2.45) (1.13) (0.50)
Carhart Alpha 1.090** 0.245 0.546** 0.519** 0.246 0.091
(2.08) (0.75) (2.49) (2.39) (1.13) (0.49)
5-Factor Alpha 1.108* 0.164 0.519** 0.558** 0.307 0.114
(1.88) (0.47) (2.25) (2.43) (1.34) (0.55)
Panel B: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MVW)
Avg. Return 0.908 0.521** 0.590*** 0.451*** 0.369** 0.216*
(1.60) (2.01) (2.94) (2.64) (2.41) (1.75)
CAPM Alpha 0.934 0.526** 0.589*** 0.451*** 0.375** 0.223*
(1.63) (2.51) (3.52) (2.92) (2.40) (1.76)
FF Alpha 0.902 0.485** 0.584*** 0.430*** 0.357** 0.215*
(1.61) (2.37) (3.60) (2.89) (2.38) (1.84)
Carhart Alpha 0.908 0.486** 0.581*** 0.421*** 0.345** 0.208*
(1.64) (2.35) (3.59) (2.95) (2.49) (1.86)
5-Factor Alpha 0.987 0.562*** 0.668*** 0.524*** 0.368** 0.231*
(1.63) (2.77) (3.67) (3.05) (2.28) (1.75)
Panel C: Value-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MEW)
Avg. Return 1.012 0.146 0.445 0.494** 0.135 0.037
(1.57) (0.37) (1.53) (2.00) (0.51) (0.18)
CAPM Alpha 1.063* 0.197 0.497** 0.549** 0.198 0.064
(1.79) (0.58) (2.15) (2.28) (0.91) (0.33)
FF Alpha 1.103* 0.139 0.479** 0.518** 0.208 0.077
(1.88) (0.45) (2.21) (2.36) (0.97) (0.41)
Carhart Alpha 1.115* 0.144 0.472** 0.508** 0.203 0.075
(1.98) (0.45) (2.22) (2.31) (0.97) (0.40)
5-Factor Alpha 1.154* 0.072 0.481** 0.573** 0.298 0.111
(1.84) (0.21) (2.23) (2.54) (1.39) (0.56)
Panel D: Value-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MVW)
Avg. Return 1.414** 0.526 0.502 0.532** 0.274* 0.080
(2.08) (1.47) (1.60) (2.25) (1.74) (0.59)
CAPM Alpha 1.404* 0.522 0.496** 0.531** 0.281* 0.079
(1.84) (1.65) (2.02) (2.60) (1.76) (0.61)
FF Alpha 1.452* 0.528* 0.509** 0.520*** 0.284* 0.086
(1.93) (1.70) (2.19) (2.67) (1.74) (0.72)
Carhart Alpha 1.470** 0.532* 0.516** 0.523*** 0.287* 0.085
(2.05) (1.69) (2.18) (2.64) (1.75) (0.71)
5-Factor Alpha 1.599** 0.507 0.534** 0.593** 0.324* 0.098
(2.11) (1.61) (2.06) (2.64) (1.86) (0.77)
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Table 3.5: Dependent Children Only
This table presents average monthly raw and risk-adjusted returns (alphas) in percentages over 2004M01-
2011M12 on the buy-minus-sell portfolios from the transactions in NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ common
stocks by the politicians’ dependent children only. Transactions data is from Center for Responsive
Politics, stock returns from CRSP, and five factors and risk-free rate from WRDS. Daily portfolio returns
are calculated using four different weighting schemes under holding periods from 1 week to 12 months
and compounded to monthly returns. Newey-West robust t-statistics (three lags) are in parenthesis.*,
**, *** denote 10, 5, and 1 % significance levels.
Holding Period (Months): 1/4 1 2 3 6 12
Panel A: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MEW)
Avg. Return -2.685** -0.724 0.171 0.281 -0.081 -0.313
(-2.30) (-0.86) (0.22) (0.38) (-0.12) (-0.49)
CAPM Alpha -3.217** -0.460 0.193 0.308 -0.050 -0.213
(-2.40) (-0.57) (0.28) (0.50) (-0.07) (-0.41)
FF Alpha -3.212** -0.429 0.441 0.524 0.079 -0.125
(-2.39) (-0.57) (0.66) (0.81) (0.16) (-0.29)
Carhart Alpha -3.270** -0.430 0.386 0.458 0.044 -0.154
(-2.55) (-0.57) (0.57) (0.70) (0.09) (-0.35)
5-Factor Alpha -1.980 0.202 0.716 0.897 0.044 -0.164
(-1.47) (0.25) (1.07) (1.32) (0.08) (-0.34)
Panel B: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MVW)
Avg. Return -2.626** -0.273 0.403 0.490 0.142 0.242
(-2.17) (-0.34) (0.58) (0.84) (0.28) (0.69)
CAPM Alpha -3.310** -0.052 0.374 0.469 0.054 0.181
(-2.42) (-0.06) (0.54) (0.86) (0.10) (0.62)
FF Alpha -3.313** -0.057 0.531 0.610 0.137 0.226
(-2.38) (-0.07) (0.79) (1.10) (0.30) (0.86)
Carhart Alpha -3.408*** -0.060 0.512 0.591 0.133 0.223
(-2.68) (-0.08) (0.77) (1.08) (0.30) (0.84)
5-Factor Alpha -2.212 0.451 0.677 0.756 0.137 0.129
(-1.65) (0.50) (1.02) (1.28) (0.27) (0.45)
Panel C: Value-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MEW)
Avg. Return -2.778** -0.874 0.041 0.179 0.066 -0.406
(-2.38) (-1.04) (0.05) (0.24) (0.10) (-0.64)
CAPM Alpha -3.254** -0.592 0.072 0.215 0.135 -0.315
(-2.34) (-0.73) (0.10) (0.33) (0.21) (-0.65)
FF Alpha -3.254** -0.566 0.319 0.448 0.249 -0.224
(-2.32) (-0.74) (0.48) (0.70) (0.50) (-0.54)
Carhart Alpha -3.321** -0.567 0.272 0.391 0.222 -0.247
(-2.50) (-0.75) (0.40) (0.59) (0.43) (-0.60)
5-Factor Alpha -2.161 0.069 0.580 0.778 0.248 -0.253
(-1.54) (0.09) (0.87) (1.12) (0.47) (-0.56)
Panel D: Value-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MVW)
Avg. Return -2.473** -0.166 0.353 0.492 0.883 0.366
(-2.07) (-0.21) (0.49) (0.79) (1.61) (0.96)
CAPM Alpha -3.112** 0.062 0.325 0.476 0.865 0.334
(-2.32) (0.07) (0.43) (0.73) (1.24) (0.83)
FF Alpha -3.126** 0.072 0.507 0.622 0.892 0.329
(-2.29) (0.09) (0.71) (0.96) (1.52) (0.93)
Carhart Alpha -3.222** 0.068 0.500 0.620 0.906 0.332
(-2.60) (0.08) (0.71) (0.96) (1.58) (0.94)
5-Factor Alpha -2.199 0.531 0.610 0.699 0.808 0.258
(-1.64) (0.57) (0.84) (1.01) (1.33) (0.74)
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Table 3.6: Joint Portfolios Only
This table presents average monthly raw and risk-adjusted returns (alphas) in percentages over 2004M01-
2011M12 on the buy-minus-sell portfolios from the joint transactions in NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ com-
mon stocks by the politicians and their family members only. Transactions data is from Center for
Responsive Politics, stock returns from CRSP, and five factors and risk-free rate from WRDS. Daily
portfolio returns are calculated using four different weighting schemes under holding periods from 1
week to 12 months and compounded to monthly returns. Newey-West robust t-statistics (three lags) are
in parenthesis.*, **, *** denote 10, 5, and 1 % significance levels.
Holding Period (Months): 1/4 1 2 3 6 12
Panel A: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MEW)
Avg. Return 0.412 0.411 0.420 0.203 0.272 0.154
(0.39) (0.81) (0.87) (0.57) (1.00) (0.54)
CAPM Alpha 0.418 0.448 0.433 0.191 0.265 0.197
(0.46) (1.15) (1.13) (0.57) (0.91) (0.84)
FF Alpha 0.462 0.371 0.406 0.271 0.295 0.198
(0.51) (1.00) (1.11) (0.87) (1.11) (0.90)
Carhart Alpha 0.448 0.360 0.403 0.270 0.302 0.203
(0.49) (0.96) (1.11) (0.87) (1.17) (0.94)
5-Factor Alpha 0.670 0.435 0.430 0.276 0.205 0.222
(0.64) (0.98) (1.00) (0.80) (0.80) (1.03)
Panel B: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MVW)
Avg. Return 0.276 0.312 -0.180 -0.093 0.196 0.020
(0.27) (0.68) (-0.44) (-0.34) (1.25) (0.11)
CAPM Alpha 0.206 0.352 -0.174 -0.144 0.174 0.012
(0.23) (0.87) (-0.54) (-0.60) (1.13) (0.09)
FF Alpha 0.234 0.295 -0.160 -0.100 0.169 0.002
(0.26) (0.82) (-0.53) (-0.45) (1.11) (0.01)
Carhart Alpha 0.230 0.286 -0.164 -0.101 0.175 0.007
(0.25) (0.82) (-0.56) (-0.46) (1.15) (0.05)
5-Factor Alpha 0.484 0.416 -0.107 -0.086 0.186 0.056
(0.47) (1.08) (-0.34) (-0.38) (1.19) (0.45)
Panel C: Value-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MEW)
Avg. Return 1.000 0.539 0.357 0.115 0.157 0.068
(0.96) (1.04) (0.70) (0.31) (0.58) (0.24)
CAPM Alpha 1.037 0.563 0.381 0.103 0.147 0.108
(1.18) (1.38) (0.94) (0.29) (0.50) (0.47)
FF Alpha 1.062 0.483 0.354 0.182 0.186 0.111
(1.22) (1.21) (0.89) (0.55) (0.69) (0.51)
Carhart Alpha 1.062 0.475 0.348 0.181 0.197 0.117
(1.22) (1.16) (0.89) (0.55) (0.77) (0.55)
5-Factor Alpha 1.214 0.557 0.401 0.222 0.139 0.147
(1.28) (1.22) (0.86) (0.60) (0.54) (0.69)
Panel D: Value-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MVW)
Avg. Return 0.970 0.365 -0.248 -0.166 0.405* 0.260
(0.96) (0.77) (-0.56) (-0.49) (1.78) (1.25)
CAPM Alpha 0.932 0.379 -0.234 -0.232 0.386 0.247
(0.99) (1.03) (-0.57) (-0.68) (1.59) (1.47)
FF Alpha 0.939 0.337 -0.185 -0.208 0.382 0.228
(0.98) (0.89) (-0.46) (-0.60) (1.51) (1.37)
Carhart Alpha 0.957 0.334 -0.187 -0.205 0.387 0.232
(1.05) (0.89) (-0.47) (-0.58) (1.53) (1.38)
5-Factor Alpha 1.323 0.511 -0.090 -0.105 0.527** 0.352**
(1.32) (1.31) (-0.23) (-0.31) (2.18) (2.32)
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Table 3.7: Politicians’ Retirement Portfolios
This table presents average monthly raw and risk-adjusted returns (alphas) in percentages over 2004M01-
2011M12 on the buy-minus-sell portfolios from the transactions in NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ common
stocks that the politicians made in their retirement accounts (IRAs and 401(k)s). Transactions data
is from Center for Responsive Politics, stock returns from CRSP, and five factors and risk-free rate
from WRDS. Daily portfolio returns are calculated using four different weighting schemes under holding
periods from 1 week to 12 months and compounded to monthly returns. Newey-West robust t-statistics
(three lags) are in parenthesis.*, **, *** denote 10, 5, and 1 % significance levels.
Holding Period (Months): 1/4 1 2 3 6 12
Panel A: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MEW)
Avg. Return 1.949 0.305 -0.008 0.056 0.138 -0.038
(1.17) (0.39) (-0.01) (0.12) (0.30) (-0.11)
CAPM Alpha 2.001 0.334 0.167 0.159 0.180 -0.039
(1.56) (0.39) (0.25) (0.33) (0.37) (-0.11)
FF Alpha 1.829 0.383 0.194 0.118 0.185 -0.039
(1.51) (0.49) (0.32) (0.25) (0.41) (-0.11)
Carhart Alpha 1.533 0.381 0.212 0.114 0.175 -0.035
(1.30) (0.49) (0.35) (0.24) (0.39) (-0.10)
5-Factor Alpha 1.387 0.359 -0.044 0.017 0.192 -0.013
(1.10) (0.45) (-0.07) (0.04) (0.43) (-0.04)
Panel B: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MVW)
Avg. Return 1.245 0.150 -0.398 -0.040 0.177 -0.071
(0.86) (0.23) (-0.74) (-0.10) (0.66) (-0.34)
CAPM Alpha 1.272 0.164 -0.329 0.007 0.224 -0.028
(1.13) (0.25) (-0.58) (0.02) (0.89) (-0.14)
FF Alpha 1.098 0.153 -0.298 0.007 0.198 -0.051
(1.05) (0.26) (-0.60) (0.02) (0.81) (-0.27)
Carhart Alpha 0.799 0.149 -0.281 0.018 0.188 -0.058
(0.76) (0.25) (-0.57) (0.05) (0.78) (-0.31)
5-Factor Alpha 0.653 0.251 -0.344 0.058 0.234 -0.024
(0.60) (0.44) (-0.66) (0.15) (0.86) (-0.12)
Panel C: Value-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MEW)
Avg. Return 1.910 0.134 0.008 0.088 0.084 -0.086
(1.14) (0.17) (0.01) (0.19) (0.18) (-0.24)
CAPM Alpha 1.957 0.145 0.172 0.178 0.126 -0.089
(1.48) (0.17) (0.26) (0.37) (0.26) (-0.23)
FF Alpha 1.772 0.176 0.198 0.142 0.128 -0.084
(1.44) (0.22) (0.33) (0.30) (0.28) (-0.23)
Carhart Alpha 1.458 0.169 0.215 0.136 0.114 -0.082
(1.22) (0.21) (0.36) (0.30) (0.25) (-0.23)
5-Factor Alpha 1.319 0.267 -0.060 0.015 0.120 -0.069
(1.03) (0.33) (-0.09) (0.03) (0.27) (-0.19)
Panel D: Value-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MVW)
Avg. Return 2.005 0.074 0.171 0.460 0.349 0.084
(1.17) (0.08) (0.23) (0.96) (1.08) (0.35)
CAPM Alpha 2.066 0.133 0.335 0.524 0.374 0.108
(1.52) (0.16) (0.51) (1.15) (1.16) (0.47)
FF Alpha 1.873 0.092 0.287 0.521 0.349 0.086
(1.45) (0.12) (0.48) (1.21) (1.12) (0.38)
Carhart Alpha 1.515 0.083 0.311 0.534 0.342 0.077
(1.20) (0.11) (0.53) (1.26) (1.13) (0.35)
5-Factor Alpha 1.462 0.216 0.262 0.590 0.391 0.109
(1.09) (0.28) (0.41) (1.29) (1.24) (0.47)
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Table 3.8: Politicians’ Trust Portfolios
This table presents average monthly raw and risk-adjusted returns (alphas) in percentages over 2004M01-
2011M12 on the buy-minus-sell portfolios from the transactions in NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ common
stocks that the politicians made via their trusts. Transactions data is from Center for Responsive Politics,
stock returns from CRSP, and five factors and risk-free rate from WRDS. Daily portfolio returns are
calculated using four different weighting schemes under holding periods from 1 week to 12 months and
compounded to monthly returns. Newey-West robust t-statistics (three lags) are in parenthesis.*, **,
*** denote 10, 5, and 1 % significance levels.
Holding Period (Months): 1/4 1 2 3 6 12
Panel A: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MEW)
Avg. Return -1.588* -1.476** -0.388 -0.277 -0.145 -0.306
(-1.74) (-2.09) (-0.84) (-0.53) (-0.37) (-0.80)
CAPM Alpha -1.582 -1.468** -0.342 -0.199 -0.089 -0.225
(-1.63) (-2.07) (-0.69) (-0.34) (-0.24) (-0.76)
FF Alpha -1.491 -1.348** -0.311 -0.183 -0.064 -0.241
(-1.58) (-1.99) (-0.61) (-0.32) (-0.17) (-0.85)
Carhart Alpha -1.398 -1.435** -0.321 -0.199 -0.094 -0.256
(-1.54) (-2.30) (-0.66) (-0.35) (-0.27) (-0.92)
5-Factor Alpha -1.960* -1.515** -0.559 -0.568 -0.304 -0.507*
(-1.92) (-2.42) (-1.07) (-1.03) (-0.88) (-1.89)
Panel B: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MVW)
Avg. Return -1.963* -1.209* -0.852* -0.907* -0.684** -0.304
(-1.82) (-1.77) (-1.98) (-1.77) (-2.18) (-1.53)
CAPM Alpha -1.970 -1.193 -0.786 -0.834 -0.614* -0.259
(-1.57) (-1.46) (-1.45) (-1.19) (-1.71) (-1.39)
FF Alpha -1.771 -1.016 -0.722 -0.840 -0.597 -0.251
(-1.51) (-1.35) (-1.36) (-1.20) (-1.66) (-1.37)
Carhart Alpha -1.636 -1.086 -0.742 -0.859 -0.620* -0.259
(-1.42) (-1.54) (-1.59) (-1.25) (-1.87) (-1.48)
5-Factor Alpha -2.306* -1.407* -0.952* -1.115* -0.779** -0.385**
(-1.78) (-1.93) (-1.93) (-1.68) (-2.47) (-2.20)
Panel C: Value-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MEW)
Avg. Return -2.200** -1.649** -0.348 -0.243 -0.119 -0.321
(-2.33) (-2.28) (-0.74) (-0.48) (-0.31) (-0.88)
CAPM Alpha -2.198** -1.672** -0.348 -0.202 -0.094 -0.259
(-2.23) (-2.33) (-0.70) (-0.37) (-0.26) (-0.91)
FF Alpha -2.119** -1.564** -0.326 -0.176 -0.059 -0.271
(-2.16) (-2.31) (-0.64) (-0.34) (-0.16) (-0.96)
Carhart Alpha -2.039** -1.642** -0.328 -0.180 -0.081 -0.279
(-2.12) (-2.54) (-0.65) (-0.35) (-0.23) (-0.98)
5-Factor Alpha -2.598** -1.631** -0.544 -0.572 -0.260 -0.514*
(-2.31) (-2.44) (-1.02) (-1.16) (-0.73) (-1.92)
Panel D: Value-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MVW)
Avg. Return -2.782** -1.989** -1.051* -1.026 -1.241** -0.531
(-2.35) (-2.37) (-1.68) (-1.59) (-2.41) (-1.29)
CAPM Alpha -2.793** -2.025** -1.049 -1.019 -1.149** -0.458
(-2.10) (-2.09) (-1.44) (-1.31) (-2.10) (-1.37)
FF Alpha -2.638** -1.765** -0.931 -0.951 -1.123** -0.488
(-2.04) (-2.12) (-1.39) (-1.29) (-2.09) (-1.46)
Carhart Alpha -2.585* -1.827** -0.949 -0.985 -1.171** -0.497
(-1.96) (-2.29) (-1.48) (-1.35) (-2.42) (-1.50)
5-Factor Alpha -3.180** -2.237*** -1.318* -1.409** -1.463*** -0.661*
(-2.14) (-2.68) (-1.93) (-2.07) (-3.10) (-1.89)
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Table 3.9: Politicians’ Portfolios (Excluding Trust Transactions)
This table presents average monthly raw and risk-adjusted returns (alphas) in percentages over 2004M01-
2011M12 on the buy-minus-sell portfolios from the transactions in NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ common
stocks that the politicians made except for the ones in their trusts. Transactions data is from Center
for Responsive Politics, stock returns from CRSP, and five factors and risk-free rate from WRDS. Daily
portfolio returns are calculated using four different weighting schemes under holding periods from 1 week
to 12 months and compounded to monthly returns. Newey-West robust t-statistics (three lags) are in
parenthesis.*, **, *** denote 10, 5, and 1 % significance levels.
Holding Period (Months): 1/4 1 2 3 6 12
Panel A: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MEW)
Avg. Return 2.310*** 0.693** 0.432* 0.249 -0.013 -0.002
(3.66) (2.52) (1.76) (1.11) (-0.07) (-0.02)
CAPM Alpha 2.452*** 0.743*** 0.451** 0.262 -0.016 -0.007
(4.44) (3.24) (2.14) (1.25) (-0.11) (-0.06)
FF Alpha 2.355*** 0.756*** 0.488** 0.314 0.013 -0.002
(4.64) (3.18) (2.42) (1.56) (0.09) (-0.02)
Carhart Alpha 2.353*** 0.753*** 0.479** 0.304 0.002 -0.002
(4.59) (3.14) (2.32) (1.47) (0.02) (-0.02)
5-Factor Alpha 2.384*** 0.764*** 0.485** 0.318 0.023 0.016
(4.22) (3.01) (2.39) (1.49) (0.16) (0.13)
Panel B: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MVW)
Avg. Return 1.369*** 0.320 0.186 0.148 0.047 -0.048
(3.17) (1.42) (1.13) (0.93) (0.40) (-0.53)
CAPM Alpha 1.431*** 0.365 0.237* 0.193* 0.078 -0.036
(3.59) (1.64) (1.78) (1.70) (0.86) (-0.43)
FF Alpha 1.365*** 0.362* 0.236* 0.203* 0.086 -0.036
(3.79) (1.76) (1.92) (1.88) (1.00) (-0.46)
Carhart Alpha 1.372*** 0.362* 0.229 0.190 0.076 -0.042
(3.94) (1.78) (1.66) (1.47) (0.86) (-0.57)
5-Factor Alpha 1.263*** 0.326 0.185 0.183 0.068 -0.072
(3.33) (1.46) (1.17) (1.21) (0.71) (-0.94)
Panel C: Value-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MEW)
Avg. Return 2.291*** 0.688** 0.385 0.197 -0.045 -0.008
(3.48) (2.52) (1.51) (0.86) (-0.25) (-0.06)
CAPM Alpha 2.454*** 0.731*** 0.397* 0.201 -0.057 -0.019
(4.39) (3.14) (1.80) (0.90) (-0.35) (-0.15)
FF Alpha 2.351*** 0.739*** 0.437** 0.249 -0.032 -0.014
(4.56) (2.98) (2.05) (1.14) (-0.20) (-0.11)
Carhart Alpha 2.348*** 0.735*** 0.427* 0.240 -0.042 -0.012
(4.49) (2.96) (1.97) (1.10) (-0.27) (-0.10)
5-Factor Alpha 2.377*** 0.772*** 0.444** 0.259 -0.011 0.018
(4.14) (3.00) (2.14) (1.17) (-0.07) (0.13)
Panel D: Value-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MVW)
Avg. Return 0.777 0.011 -0.187 -0.271 -0.207 -0.096
(1.29) (0.03) (-0.55) (-0.85) (-0.82) (-0.58)
CAPM Alpha 0.814 0.015 -0.195 -0.287 -0.203 -0.098
(1.49) (0.05) (-0.59) (-0.93) (-0.83) (-0.63)
FF Alpha 0.857 0.068 -0.172 -0.259 -0.195 -0.088
(1.52) (0.21) (-0.51) (-0.81) (-0.78) (-0.58)
Carhart Alpha 0.841 0.051 -0.194 -0.277 -0.205 -0.091
(1.43) (0.15) (-0.56) (-0.86) (-0.83) (-0.60)
5-Factor Alpha 0.787 0.164 -0.209 -0.336 -0.251 -0.140
(1.23) (0.42) (-0.59) (-0.99) (-0.98) (-0.86)
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Table 3.10: Powerful Spouses
This table presents average monthly raw and risk-adjusted returns (alphas) in percentages over 2004M01-
2011M12 on the buy-minus-sell portfolios from the transactions in NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ common
stocks by the spouses of powerful politicians (i.e., powerful spouses). Transactions data is from Center
for Responsive Politics, stock returns from CRSP, and five factors and risk-free rate from WRDS. Daily
portfolio returns are calculated using four different weighting schemes under holding periods from 1 week
to 12 months and compounded to monthly returns. Newey-West robust t-statistics (three lags) are in
parenthesis.*, **, *** denote 10, 5, and 1 % significance levels.
Holding Period (Months): 1/4 1 2 3 6 12
Panel A: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MEW)
Avg. Return 1.264* 0.489 0.492 0.591** 0.254 0.039
(1.96) (1.08) (1.50) (2.20) (0.98) (0.16)
CAPM Alpha 1.327** 0.593* 0.581** 0.670*** 0.308 0.067
(2.05) (1.84) (2.53) (2.83) (1.42) (0.28)
FF Alpha 1.358** 0.569* 0.583** 0.651*** 0.324 0.084
(2.15) (1.77) (2.51) (2.68) (1.49) (0.37)
Carhart Alpha 1.372** 0.580* 0.584** 0.651*** 0.329 0.088
(2.28) (1.76) (2.52) (2.68) (1.51) (0.39)
5-Factor Alpha 1.203* 0.338 0.513** 0.646** 0.371 0.065
(1.89) (0.95) (2.13) (2.56) (1.66) (0.26)
Panel B: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MVW)
Avg. Return 1.045* 0.746*** 0.713*** 0.485*** 0.430*** 0.171
(1.72) (2.84) (3.36) (2.67) (2.72) (1.05)
CAPM Alpha 1.079 0.777*** 0.717*** 0.487*** 0.435*** 0.180
(1.66) (3.09) (3.94) (2.88) (2.72) (1.09)
FF Alpha 1.027 0.754*** 0.723*** 0.474*** 0.422*** 0.172
(1.59) (3.17) (4.12) (2.89) (2.73) (1.08)
Carhart Alpha 1.035 0.760*** 0.724*** 0.469*** 0.414*** 0.168
(1.64) (3.26) (4.13) (2.88) (2.73) (1.06)
5-Factor Alpha 1.030 0.701*** 0.792*** 0.562*** 0.431** 0.153
(1.54) (2.86) (3.87) (2.88) (2.45) (0.79)
Panel C: Value-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MEW)
Avg. Return 1.186* 0.422 0.501 0.619** 0.213 0.003
(1.76) (0.92) (1.60) (2.29) (0.79) (0.01)
CAPM Alpha 1.240* 0.526 0.580*** 0.696*** 0.261 0.018
(1.79) (1.65) (2.68) (2.73) (1.19) (0.08)
FF Alpha 1.273* 0.511 0.572** 0.667*** 0.272 0.032
(1.88) (1.62) (2.63) (2.66) (1.24) (0.14)
Carhart Alpha 1.289** 0.523 0.573** 0.666*** 0.279 0.037
(2.00) (1.61) (2.63) (2.65) (1.29) (0.16)
5-Factor Alpha 1.103 0.254 0.516** 0.660** 0.336 0.025
(1.62) (0.74) (2.29) (2.56) (1.56) (0.10)
Panel D: Value-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MVW)
Avg. Return 1.641** 0.713** 0.614* 0.480** 0.281 0.013
(2.49) (2.11) (1.96) (2.02) (1.60) (0.08)
CAPM Alpha 1.669** 0.723** 0.607** 0.477** 0.288 0.012
(2.23) (2.21) (2.38) (2.31) (1.53) (0.08)
FF Alpha 1.711** 0.746** 0.619** 0.467** 0.289 0.016
(2.32) (2.46) (2.60) (2.33) (1.52) (0.12)
Carhart Alpha 1.733** 0.752** 0.623** 0.469** 0.294 0.017
(2.53) (2.47) (2.61) (2.32) (1.54) (0.12)
5-Factor Alpha 1.838** 0.661** 0.653** 0.554** 0.338 0.011
(2.44) (2.05) (2.43) (2.33) (1.63) (0.07)
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Table 3.11: Nonpowerful Spouses
This table presents average monthly raw and risk-adjusted returns (alphas) in percentages over 2004M01-
2011M12 on the buy-minus-sell portfolios from the transactions in NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ common
stocks by the spouses of non-powerful politicians (i.e., non-powerful spouses). Transactions data is from
Center for Responsive Politics, stock returns from CRSP, and five factors and risk-free rate from WRDS.
Daily portfolio returns are calculated using four different weighting schemes under holding periods from
1 week to 12 months and compounded to monthly returns. Newey-West robust t-statistics (three lags)
are in parenthesis.*, **, *** denote 10, 5, and 1 % significance levels.
Holding Period (Months): 1/4 1 2 3 6 12
Panel A: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MEW)
Avg. Return -0.659 -0.386 0.094 -0.118 -0.402 0.035
(-0.56) (-0.43) (0.13) (-0.18) (-0.76) (0.10)
CAPM Alpha -0.549 -0.426 0.199 -0.057 -0.293 0.124
(-0.59) (-0.53) (0.26) (-0.09) (-0.60) (0.39)
FF Alpha -0.412 -0.530 0.189 -0.062 -0.269 0.147
(-0.46) (-0.72) (0.25) (-0.10) (-0.55) (0.53)
Carhart Alpha -0.438 -0.538 0.113 -0.118 -0.306 0.125
(-0.51) (-0.74) (0.18) (-0.21) (-0.65) (0.51)
5-Factor Alpha -0.080 -0.548 -0.149 -0.152 -0.297 0.139
(-0.08) (-0.75) (-0.23) (-0.24) (-0.55) (0.54)
Panel B: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MVW)
Avg. Return -0.899 -0.644 -0.599 -0.261 -0.375 -0.121
(-0.81) (-0.85) (-1.03) (-0.53) (-1.45) (-0.64)
CAPM Alpha -0.816 -0.701 -0.574 -0.265 -0.376 -0.105
(-0.92) (-1.15) (-0.97) (-0.54) (-1.33) (-0.51)
FF Alpha -0.673 -0.679 -0.530 -0.231 -0.364 -0.076
(-0.79) (-1.16) (-0.92) (-0.49) (-1.31) (-0.39)
Carhart Alpha -0.701 -0.698 -0.608 -0.303 -0.392* -0.092
(-0.87) (-1.26) (-1.44) (-0.85) (-1.75) (-0.62)
5-Factor Alpha -0.417 -0.651 -0.700 -0.325 -0.406* -0.045
(-0.47) (-1.17) (-1.57) (-0.91) (-1.69) (-0.28)
Panel C: Value-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MEW)
Avg. Return -0.483 -0.500 -0.076 0.014 -0.333 0.123
(-0.40) (-0.54) (-0.10) (0.02) (-0.60) (0.34)
CAPM Alpha -0.363 -0.535 -0.010 0.025 -0.249 0.195
(-0.37) (-0.66) (-0.01) (0.04) (-0.51) (0.58)
FF Alpha -0.261 -0.628 -0.005 0.034 -0.218 0.216
(-0.28) (-0.85) (-0.01) (0.05) (-0.45) (0.76)
Carhart Alpha -0.290 -0.639 -0.089 -0.029 -0.253 0.198
(-0.32) (-0.88) (-0.14) (-0.05) (-0.54) (0.75)
5-Factor Alpha 0.101 -0.564 -0.283 -0.006 -0.154 0.232
(0.10) (-0.76) (-0.42) (-0.01) (-0.30) (0.86)
Panel D: Value-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MVW)
Avg. Return -0.469 -0.243 -0.090 0.194 -0.043 0.039
(-0.35) (-0.25) (-0.09) (0.24) (-0.07) (0.11)
CAPM Alpha -0.336 -0.277 -0.028 0.243 -0.005 0.063
(-0.30) (-0.36) (-0.03) (0.36) (-0.01) (0.18)
FF Alpha -0.180 -0.391 0.017 0.247 0.038 0.083
(-0.17) (-0.51) (0.02) (0.36) (0.07) (0.24)
Carhart Alpha -0.215 -0.387 -0.051 0.217 0.028 0.079
(-0.21) (-0.50) (-0.07) (0.33) (0.05) (0.24)
5-Factor Alpha 0.178 -0.354 -0.169 0.305 0.185 0.146
(0.16) (-0.43) (-0.22) (0.42) (0.34) (0.40)
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Table 3.12: Politicians’ Paired Portfolios
This table presents average monthly raw and risk-adjusted returns (alphas) in percentages over 2004M01-
2011M12 on the buy-minus-sell portfolios from the transactions in NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ common
stocks by the politicians who also reported transactions for their spouses. Transactions data is from
Center for Responsive Politics, stock returns from CRSP, and five factors and risk-free rate from WRDS.
Daily portfolio returns are calculated using four different weighting schemes under holding periods from
1 week to 12 months and compounded to monthly returns. Newey-West robust t-statistics (three lags)
are in parenthesis.*, **, *** denote 10, 5, and 1 % significance levels.
Holding Period (Months): 1/4 1 2 3 6 12
Panel A: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MEW)
Avg. Return 1.283 0.384 0.318 0.247 0.012 -0.073
(1.38) (0.85) (0.90) (0.88) (0.05) (-0.42)
CAPM Alpha 1.402 0.429 0.392 0.339 0.049 -0.079
(1.50) (1.09) (1.18) (1.42) (0.23) (-0.46)
FF Alpha 1.328 0.501 0.448 0.374 0.077 -0.073
(1.45) (1.32) (1.33) (1.50) (0.36) (-0.41)
Carhart Alpha 1.357 0.504 0.437 0.349 0.054 -0.076
(1.58) (1.34) (1.24) (1.40) (0.26) (-0.41)
5-Factor Alpha 1.513 0.605 0.426 0.339 0.103 -0.074
(1.62) (1.52) (1.17) (1.32) (0.48) (-0.38)
Panel B: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MVW)
Avg. Return 0.253 0.036 0.040 -0.048 -0.060 -0.077
(0.38) (0.11) (0.16) (-0.20) (-0.34) (-0.54)
CAPM Alpha 0.281 0.053 0.088 0.019 -0.016 -0.055
(0.40) (0.14) (0.38) (0.10) (-0.09) (-0.36)
FF Alpha 0.259 0.093 0.137 0.064 0.013 -0.047
(0.37) (0.25) (0.58) (0.33) (0.08) (-0.32)
Carhart Alpha 0.293 0.106 0.133 0.042 -0.004 -0.056
(0.46) (0.32) (0.56) (0.21) (-0.02) (-0.41)
5-Factor Alpha 0.358 0.126 0.055 -0.048 -0.052 -0.119
(0.54) (0.35) (0.21) (-0.22) (-0.31) (-0.84)
Panel C: Value-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MEW)
Avg. Return 1.083 0.290 0.251 0.142 -0.014 -0.051
(1.13) (0.63) (0.69) (0.51) (-0.06) (-0.28)
CAPM Alpha 1.200 0.311 0.298 0.213 0.005 -0.068
(1.27) (0.79) (0.84) (0.86) (0.02) (-0.36)
FF Alpha 1.111 0.372 0.357 0.248 0.028 -0.063
(1.19) (0.95) (1.02) (0.97) (0.13) (-0.33)
Carhart Alpha 1.136 0.376 0.348 0.223 0.007 -0.062
(1.28) (0.98) (0.95) (0.88) (0.03) (-0.32)
5-Factor Alpha 1.352 0.516 0.330 0.198 0.057 -0.050
(1.40) (1.25) (0.89) (0.76) (0.25) (-0.24)
Panel D: Value-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MVW)
Avg. Return 1.193 0.186 -0.079 0.168 -0.078 -0.008
(1.41) (0.39) (-0.22) (0.56) (-0.31) (-0.04)
CAPM Alpha 1.325 0.112 -0.159 0.133 -0.088 -0.022
(1.48) (0.23) (-0.41) (0.44) (-0.34) (-0.13)
FF Alpha 1.295 0.149 -0.105 0.176 -0.079 -0.034
(1.44) (0.31) (-0.28) (0.60) (-0.31) (-0.20)
Carhart Alpha 1.321 0.163 -0.094 0.170 -0.096 -0.036
(1.50) (0.37) (-0.26) (0.57) (-0.39) (-0.22)
5-Factor Alpha 1.651* 0.216 -0.273 -0.054 -0.247 -0.138
(1.75) (0.43) (-0.68) (-0.16) (-0.87) (-0.75)
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Table 3.13: Spouses’ Paired Portfolios (Spouses of Type II Politicians)
This table presents average monthly raw and risk-adjusted returns (alphas) in percentages over 2004M01-
2011M12 on the buy-minus-sell portfolios from the transactions in NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ common
stocks by the spouses of politicians who also reported transactions for themselves (Type II politicians).
Transactions data is from Center for Responsive Politics, stock returns from CRSP, and five factors and
risk-free rate from WRDS. Daily portfolio returns are calculated using four different weighting schemes
under holding periods from 1 week to 12 months and compounded to monthly returns. Newey-West
robust t-statistics (three lags) are in parenthesis.*, **, *** denote 10, 5, and 1 % significance levels.
Holding Period (Months): 1/4 1 2 3 6 12
Panel A: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MEW)
Avg. Return 0.543 0.610 0.723** 0.594** 0.068 0.070
(0.78) (1.18) (2.11) (2.10) (0.22) (0.28)
CAPM Alpha 0.578 0.636 0.755*** 0.625** 0.117 0.108
(0.93) (1.38) (2.91) (2.44) (0.45) (0.45)
FF Alpha 0.640 0.589 0.713*** 0.593** 0.141 0.122
(1.09) (1.44) (2.81) (2.28) (0.54) (0.51)
Carhart Alpha 0.648 0.587 0.711*** 0.596** 0.137 0.125
(1.11) (1.44) (2.80) (2.34) (0.53) (0.53)
5-Factor Alpha 0.335 0.547 0.666** 0.601** 0.176 0.118
(0.61) (1.21) (2.29) (2.07) (0.65) (0.45)
Panel B: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MVW)
Avg. Return 1.245* 0.778** 0.594** 0.527** 0.507*** 0.282*
(1.73) (2.56) (2.22) (2.51) (2.99) (1.96)
CAPM Alpha 1.268 0.809*** 0.609*** 0.536*** 0.517*** 0.293*
(1.63) (3.03) (2.71) (2.76) (2.98) (1.94)
FF Alpha 1.285* 0.793*** 0.613*** 0.509*** 0.504*** 0.292**
(1.84) (3.03) (2.69) (2.73) (3.00) (2.03)
Carhart Alpha 1.308** 0.794*** 0.609*** 0.505*** 0.498*** 0.288**
(2.01) (3.03) (2.69) (2.72) (3.03) (2.03)
5-Factor Alpha 1.056* 0.703** 0.595** 0.544** 0.541*** 0.328**
(1.87) (2.50) (2.22) (2.42) (2.87) (2.03)
Panel C: Value-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MEW)
Avg. Return 0.518 0.495 0.681** 0.603** 0.045 0.066
(0.72) (0.95) (2.05) (2.10) (0.14) (0.27)
CAPM Alpha 0.540 0.520 0.691*** 0.615** 0.074 0.087
(0.86) (1.13) (2.76) (2.29) (0.29) (0.37)
FF Alpha 0.605 0.483 0.644*** 0.576** 0.096 0.098
(1.01) (1.17) (2.75) (2.27) (0.37) (0.42)
Carhart Alpha 0.616 0.481 0.638*** 0.576** 0.096 0.105
(1.03) (1.18) (2.74) (2.27) (0.37) (0.45)
5-Factor Alpha 0.344 0.452 0.643** 0.600** 0.163 0.114
(0.59) (1.01) (2.41) (2.08) (0.61) (0.46)
Panel D: Value-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MVW)
Avg. Return 1.851** 0.672 0.452 0.558** 0.460** 0.102
(2.15) (1.60) (1.21) (2.00) (2.38) (0.61)
CAPM Alpha 1.814* 0.656* 0.432 0.556** 0.470*** 0.103
(1.90) (1.75) (1.51) (2.29) (2.71) (0.67)
FF Alpha 1.887** 0.661* 0.443 0.525** 0.469*** 0.113
(2.13) (1.81) (1.63) (2.34) (2.70) (0.75)
Carhart Alpha 1.925** 0.665* 0.450 0.534** 0.479*** 0.117
(2.44) (1.81) (1.61) (2.34) (2.79) (0.76)
5-Factor Alpha 1.831** 0.552 0.433 0.585** 0.567*** 0.163
(2.41) (1.42) (1.37) (2.18) (3.28) (1.01)
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Table 3.14: Spouses of Type III Politicians
This table presents average monthly raw and risk-adjusted returns (alphas) in percentages over 2004M01-
2011M12 on the buy-minus-sell portfolios from the transactions in NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ common
stocks by the spouses of politicians who did not report transactions for themselves (Type III politicians).
Transactions data is from Center for Responsive Politics, stock returns from CRSP, and five factors and
risk-free rate from WRDS. Daily portfolio returns are calculated using four different weighting schemes
under holding periods from 1 week to 12 months and compounded to monthly returns. Newey-West
robust t-statistics (three lags) are in parenthesis.*, **, *** denote 10, 5, and 1 % significance levels.
Holding Period (Months): 1/4 1 2 3 6 12
Panel A: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MEW)
Avg. Return 0.854 0.091 0.244 0.299 0.177 -0.005
(0.92) (0.14) (0.48) (0.69) (0.51) (-0.02)
CAPM Alpha 0.955 0.174 0.401 0.419 0.288 0.045
(1.07) (0.34) (1.02) (0.94) (1.00) (0.15)
FF Alpha 0.878 0.094 0.449 0.405 0.299 0.073
(1.00) (0.19) (1.22) (0.93) (1.05) (0.24)
Carhart Alpha 0.890 0.119 0.446 0.373 0.281 0.055
(1.04) (0.23) (1.22) (0.97) (1.13) (0.22)
5-Factor Alpha 1.272 0.006 0.436 0.483 0.358 0.122
(1.44) (0.01) (1.18) (1.14) (1.46) (0.48)
Panel B: Equal-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (EW-MVW)
Avg. Return 0.649 0.297 0.348 0.363** 0.199 0.174
(0.81) (0.73) (1.44) (2.01) (1.38) (1.50)
CAPM Alpha 0.554 0.257 0.336 0.352** 0.199 0.165
(0.73) (0.70) (1.50) (2.24) (1.33) (1.41)
FF Alpha 0.511 0.206 0.340 0.353** 0.186 0.154
(0.66) (0.54) (1.51) (2.26) (1.23) (1.33)
Carhart Alpha 0.530 0.209 0.345 0.345** 0.169 0.143
(0.72) (0.54) (1.54) (2.29) (1.28) (1.46)
5-Factor Alpha 0.808 0.424 0.505** 0.508*** 0.186 0.150
(1.04) (1.15) (2.37) (3.64) (1.45) (1.54)
Panel C: Value-Weighted Transactions and Equal-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MEW)
Avg. Return 0.847 0.023 0.206 0.260 0.110 -0.015
(0.87) (0.03) (0.42) (0.61) (0.33) (-0.05)
CAPM Alpha 0.942 0.093 0.351 0.380 0.221 0.025
(0.98) (0.18) (0.93) (0.86) (0.84) (0.08)
FF Alpha 0.853 -0.008 0.382 0.359 0.220 0.048
(0.90) (-0.02) (1.06) (0.83) (0.84) (0.15)
Carhart Alpha 0.864 0.021 0.382 0.329 0.204 0.031
(0.92) (0.04) (1.06) (0.84) (0.87) (0.12)
5-Factor Alpha 1.208 -0.100 0.384 0.477 0.322 0.102
(1.27) (-0.17) (1.04) (1.16) (1.38) (0.37)
Panel D: Value-Weighted Transactions and Value-Weighted Portfolios (TW-MVW)
Avg. Return 0.108 -0.166 0.262 0.254 -0.028 0.249
(0.11) (-0.30) (0.66) (0.80) (-0.11) (1.19)
CAPM Alpha 0.022 -0.162 0.281 0.270 -0.027 0.233
(0.02) (-0.29) (0.69) (0.87) (-0.10) (1.03)
FF Alpha 0.002 -0.201 0.322 0.300 -0.018 0.234
(0.00) (-0.37) (0.81) (0.98) (-0.07) (1.06)
Carhart Alpha 0.023 -0.186 0.325 0.292 -0.027 0.222
(0.03) (-0.34) (0.82) (0.98) (-0.10) (1.10)
5-Factor Alpha 0.292 -0.135 0.456 0.478* 0.018 0.221
(0.32) (-0.24) (1.23) (1.75) (0.07) (1.09)
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Chapter 4
Aggregate Congressional Trading and
Stock Market Returns
4.1 Introduction
The STOCK Act makes it clear that if members of Congress use nonpublic information
to gain an unfair advantage in the market, then they are breaking the law. It creates new
disclosure requirements and new measures of accountability and transparency for thousands
of federal employees. That is a good and necessary thing. We were sent here to serve the
American people and look out for their interests – not to look out for our own interests.
President Barack Obama, April 4, 2012.1
Allegations of congressional insider trading have held public attention for a long time. The
American public became aware of the extent to which politicians reaped personal benefits
using information gained from their official positions thanks to an influential academic study
undertaken by Ziobrowski et al. (2004). They demonstrated that members of the U.S.
Senate beat the market for the 1993-1998 period. The frustration with Congress over insider
1http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/04/04/president-obama-signs-stock-act
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trading spiked after Schweizer (2011) provided anecdotal evidence that politicians traded on
nonpublic information and sometimes used their power to influence legislation that could
favorably affect their personal finances. Public pressure on Congress reached its climax after
a highly influential episode of 60 Minutes exposed congressional trading in great detail.2
Capitol Hill was not completely silent about the insider trading allegations. Represen-
tatives Brian Baird and Louise M. Slaughter introduced the Stop Trading on Congressional
Knowledge (STOCK) Act to prevent politicians from trading on material nonpublic informa-
tion in 2006. It would take six years to see the STOCK Act officially signed by the President
on April 4, 2012. Public pressure played an important role in forcing Congress to enact the
STOCK Act, which was seen as an opportunity to rebuild public trust for Congress by the
bill’s main sponsors (See Slaughter, 2011).
Even though there is now evidence to suggest that members of Congress may have been
trading on material nonpublic information, we do not know enough about the information
content of congressional stock trades. This paper sheds light on this issue by attempting
to answer the following question: Does aggregate congressional trading predict future stock
market returns over the 2004M01-2010M12 period? The term aggregate congressional trading
refers to the transactions by the members of the U.S. House, Senate and Executive Branch
(i.e. politicians).
We find that aggregate congressional trading predicts excess market returns two to three
months in advance. This finding suggests that politicians, similar to corporate insiders,
trade on information that has macroeconomic components and their stock trades contain
economy-wide information regarding the future states of the economy. Our results still
hold when we aggregate congressional stock trades at twelve different industry levels. We
2http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7388130n
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provide evidence that the members of the U.S. Senate do not trade on macroeconomic
information, while the members of the U.S. House do. Transactions (trades) by the members
of the Democratic and Republican parties both predict market returns, but the evidence for
possessing macroeconomic information is stronger for Democrats.
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, to the best of our knowledge, this
paper is the first empirical study examining the relationship between aggregate congressional
trading and stock market returns. Second, we help bridge the gap between the insider trading
literature and political investment (or congressional trading) literature. Corporate insiders
have two distinctive properties: they earn abnormal returns on their transactions, and their
aggregate transactions predict stock market returns (Seyhun, 1988; Cohen et al., 2012).
The previous literature shows that politicians earn abnormal returns on their stock trades
(Ziobrowski et al., 2004), and our study documents that their transactions predict market
returns. For example, Seyhun (1988) finds that one standard deviation in aggregate insider
trading activity predicts a 1.7% increase in future excess market returns. Similarly, we
document that one standard deviation change in congressional trading activity is associated
with a 1.18% to 1.57% increase in future excess market returns. Thus, we add to this
existing knowledge by showing that politicians resemble corporate insiders in that they beat
the market and their transactions have predictive ability. This conclusion also helps to
support the argument that politicians are not just politicians, they are also informed traders.
Finally, we recommend policy changes on the disclosure requirements of the congressional
stock trades in the STOCK Act.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly provides the legal framework
and motivation behind the STOCK Act. Section 3 reviews the literature and introduces the
hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data cleaning process, the data and how we construct
our aggregate congressional trading measure. Section 5 outlines the empirical analysis and
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presents the results. Section 6 provides the subgroup analysis at the chamber and party
levels. Section 7 introduces an alternative measure of aggregate congressional trading as a
robustness check, and Section 8 concludes the paper and provides policy recommendations.
4.2 Legal Framework and the STOCK Act
In this section, we review expert opinions on the legal status of congressional trading from
witnesses at congressional testimonies preceding the enactment of the STOCK Act. This
act was first introduced by Representatives Brian Baird and Louise M. Slaughter in 2006.
Slaughter (2011) argues that passing the STOCK Act can help Congress reverse its extremely
low approval rate (6%) and send a strong signal to the public that Congress is interested in
addressing their concerns.
Khuzami (2011), as the Director of Enforcement at the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC), clarifies that members of Congress and their staffers are not exempt from
insider trading laws whose legal framework is based on the Section 10(b) and Rule of 10b-5
of the SEC Act of 1934. However, he emphasizes that the enforcement of insider trading
violations on members of Congress may be challenging due to the lack of any precedent. He
argues that “Congressional staff, as employees, owe a duty of trust and confidence to their
employer” based on the case law and they are subject to the insider trading laws in case
they breach this duty by using material nonpublic information gleaned from their work for
personal gains. On the other hand, such a duty is ambiguous for members of Congress since
“there does not appear to be any case law that addresses the duty of a Member with respect
to trading on the basis of information he or she learns in an official capacity.” Therefore, he
suggests that any law or amendment to existing laws should clearly state that members of
Congress have a duty of trust and confidence that prohibits them from trading on material
nonpublic information.
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Nagy (2011) firmly states that insider trading by members of Congress is not legal since
“congressional insider trading in securities violates the broad anti-fraud provisions in federal
securities law as well as the federal mail and wire fraud statutes.” She proposes an amendment
to the existing law such that members of Congress and federal employees owe a duty of
trust and confidence when they obtain material nonpublic information at their job. Similar
to Khuzami (2011), she argues that Congress does not have to pass a new law explicitly
banning congressional insider trading. There seems to be a consensus among the enforcement
authorities and legal scholars of insider trading laws that the STOCK Act was not really
necessary and the same goal could be accomplished by amending the existing laws.
The STOCK Act brings sweeping changes to the way members of Congress, the Executive
Branch, and their staff trade and report their transactions. Section 3 of the STOCK Act bans
members and employees of Congress from using nonpublic information that they obtain in
the process of performing their official duties. Section 4 of the STOCK Act explicitly states
that members and employees of Congress are subject to the insider trading laws. Prior
to the STOCK Act, politicians were required to report their transactions by May 15th of
each year for the previous calendar year and these transactions would become public in the
paper (not online) with a further one month delay. Sections 6 and 8 of the STOCK Act
require these transactions to be reported no later than 30 days after members of Congress
are notified of such transactions, but definitely no later than 45 days after they take place.
Some politicians state that they do not actually follow which stocks are bought or sold in
their accounts because their brokers handle their investments. By emphasizing the word
“notified”, these sections of the law ensure that politicians keep track of their transactions
irrespective of who executes them. There are also similar restrictions and regulations for
employees and members of the Executive Branch.3
3The 2013 amendment of the STOCK Act abolished the online posting requirement due to national
security and identity theft concerns, and instead it allowed members of Congress to post their transactions
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The STOCK Act does not take any action against so-called political intelligence firms
except for requiring an official study examining the extent and influence of political intel-
ligence activities. Furthermore, Section 14 of the STOCK Act provides an exception to
“widely held investment fund (whether such fund is a mutual fund, regulated investment
company, pension or deferred compensation plan, or other investment fund), if (1)(A) the
fund is publicly traded; or (B) the assets of the fund are widely diversified; and (2) the
reporting individual neither exercises control over nor has the ability to exercise control over
the financial interests held by the fund.”4 The STOCK Act also requires the transactions
by politicians to be available online for the public to easily search. The Clerk of the House
has been publishing the financial disclosure reports of the members of the U.S. House on-
line since 2008 as a requirement under the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act
of 2007 (Section 304). Nevertheless, the information content of these publications is very
shallow since they only report the filing date of these reports, but not the content of them.
Therefore, this act is not comparable to the STOCK Act in its scope.
4.3 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
4.3.1 Politicians and Stock Returns: Political Investment
Ziobrowski et al. (2004) provide evidence that members of the U.S. Senate earn abnormal
returns in their common stock investments (85 basis points a month) for the 1993-1998
period. Their empirical setup uses transaction-based calendar-time portfolios and assumes a
fixed one-year holding period. In a separate study, Ziobrowski et al. (2011) document that
members of the U.S. House outperform the market by a significant margin (55 basis points
in electronically locked files (inaccessible to public) at their own discretion. It also restricted the coverage
of the STOCK Act to the members of Congress by exempting the federal workers from complying with the
requirements of this act.
4http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c112:S.2038:
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a month) for the 1985-2001 period. Their research has generated a great deal of interest and
has stimulated campaigns to stop politicians from trading on material nonpublic information.
Eggers and Hainmueller (2013a, 2013b) investigate the abnormal returns for the U.S.
House and Senate for the 2004-2008 period in two different studies. They do not find evidence
in favor of abnormal returns on the common stock portfolios of politicians. However, they
document a local bias in politicians’ investments such that the share of local companies (i.e.
companies headquartered in their district or state) in politicians’ portfolios is thirteen times
more than that of other companies. By using pooled OLS with clustered standard errors by
month, they show that a portfolio of these local investments indeed outperforms the market
by approximately 3.00% on annual basis. Overall, their results suggest that politicians have
an informational advantage at the local scale, not at the market scale. The recent studies
by Karadas (2014a) and Karadas (2014b) present evidence that members of Congress are
informed traders trading on time-sensitive information, and they share some of their private
information with their spouses. Nevertheless, the scope of these studies is limited to the
investigation of the firm-specific information in congressional stock trades.
There are also studies investigating the influence of politicians on stock returns. Gao and
Huang (2011) find that politically connected hedge funds beat the market by 1.5% to 1.6%
on a monthly basis, which indicates the pervasiveness of information-gathering efforts by
hedge funds. Political connections may not only provide private information but may also
help companies influence a legislation process in their favor. Cooper et al. (2010) document
a strong relationship between a firm’s contribution to political campaigns and abnormal
returns on its stock prices in the subsequent periods. Goldman et al. (2009) show that
the appointment of someone who has strong connections with politicians to the board of
directors in a firm has a positive impact on stock prices. Faccio and Parsley (2009) provide
evidence that firms headquartered in a politician’s hometown experience abnormal positive
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returns when he or she takes office and suffer a negative shock when he or she dies.
4.3.2 Corporate Insiders and Market Returns
Seyhun (1988) documents a positive correlation between aggregate insider trading in a given
month and two consecutive periods of market returns. Seyhun (1992) investigates why ag-
gregate insider trading predicts future market returns by comparing two competing explana-
tions, the cash-flows and fads hypotheses. According to the cash-flows hypothesis, corporate
insiders are better positioned to predict their firms’ future cash-flows and they trade on this
unique advantage before anyone else. Their prediction can be based on firm-specific news or
macroeconomic conditions. To the extent that their prediction of future cash-flows is based
on the future macroeconomic conditions, aggregate insider trading predicts future market
returns. Seyhun (1992) lends support to the cash-flow hypothesis by showing that current
aggregate insider trading is highly correlated with the growth rates of industrial production,
gross national product and after-tax corporate profits.
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) also document that aggregate insider trading is positively
related to future stock market returns, but find smaller results after controlling for contrarian
trading by insiders. Jiang and Zaman (2010) provide more rigorous evidence to the cash-
flows hypothesis by disentangling the unexpected cash-flow and unexpected discount rate
news from the realized market returns via a VAR decomposition process that uses (1) excess
market returns, (2) term yield, (3) S&P 500 earnings growth, and (4) small value spread as
the state variables. They document that the ability of corporate insiders to predict future
market returns is strongly related to their ability to predict future cash-flow news.
4.3.3 Hypothesis Development
Our theoretical framework rests on the synthesis between the insider trading literature and
the political investment literature. Such a synthesis requires us to address three key issues:
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(i) the relationship between aggregate insider trading by corporate insiders and stock market
returns; (ii) the comparison of politicians and corporate insiders; and (iii) the relationship
between aggregate congressional trading and stock market returns.
There is strong empirical support from the insider trading literature that corporate in-
siders can recognize the deviations of their companies’ stock prices from fundamentals (i.e.
mispricing) and trade profitably by exploiting them (see Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). There
are two main reasons for such mispricing to occur (see Seyhun, 1988; Chowdhury et al., 1993;
Jiang and Zaman, 2010). The first reason is that noise traders push stock prices away from
their fundamental values and cause mispricing. If there is an economy-wide noise divert-
ing stock prices from fundamentals and corporate insiders react to it, we expect a negative
relation between future aggregate insider trading and past stock market returns.
The mispricing of stocks can also occur due to changes in cash-flows that are not observed
yet by outsiders (ordinary investors and analysts). Corporate insiders have an advantage
over outsiders in predicting their firms’ cash-flows due to their day-to-day involvement with
firms’ operations. As a result, they can assess whether the current stock price reflects their
own valuation based on the fundamentals that are not completely captured by outsiders
and trade on any mispricing they observe. When corporate insiders recognize changes in
their future cash flows, they may not necessarily know whether these changes are motivated
by firm-specific or macroeconomic information (see Seyhun, 1988). The following example
illustrates how insider trading can be related to stock returns under these two different
information types.
Suppose that the CEO of a construction materials company recognizes that there is a
growing demand for their products in the market and thus anticipates higher future cash-
flows. At the same time, he observes that the stock price of the company does not reflect the
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trend in the market and decides to purchase shares. If the growing demand for the company’s
products and higher future cash-flows are caused only by firm-specific factors such as better
product design or marketing, then we do not expect any relationship between insider trading
and stock market returns. On the other hand, if the change in future cash-flows is motivated
(at least partially) by economy-wide factors such as an increase in the demand for housing,
we then expect a relationship between insider trading and stock market returns. To the
extent that cash-flow changes take place as a result of economy-wide factors, we expect a
positive relationship between past aggregate insider trading and future stock market returns
(see Seyhun, 1988; 1992).
The second issue we need to address is how politicians compare to corporate insiders.
Politicians are not insiders in a sense that they do not have the information possessed by
corporate insiders to do an accurate cash-flow analysis that could enable them to spot any
mispricing of stocks. Nevertheless, politicians are likely to have information that has the
potential to affect a company’s stock price and cash-flows. Furthermore, it is quite unlikely
for politicians to recognize economy-wide noise in stock prices, which arises in the absence
of new information. Therefore, we argue that politicians are overall more likely to trade on
new information than past stock returns.
The third issue to address is the relationship between aggregate congressional trading
and market returns. As Eggers and Hainmueller (2013b) point out, politicians are in close
contact with the firms headquartered in their districts or states and they can collect useful
information about the state of the economy from these firms. We argue that firms headquar-
tered elsewhere can also provide a politician with an outlook on the state of the economy
as long as they operate in a politician’s district or state. Furthermore, politicians are aware
of upcoming or pending legislation that is not public yet. Some of this legislation may
contain either only firm-specific information such as regulations targeting specific firms or
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information with economy-wide components such as bail-outs.
Politicians also exchange information with their lobbyists and campaign contributors
that in the past has led to the growth of the political intelligence industry at Capitol Hill.
Politicians are likely to take some cues about the economy from these exchanges. It is
also likely that politicians may interpret publicly available data differently based on what
they already know. For example, a reported increase in the growth rate of GDP in a post-
recession period is clearly good news and ordinary investors are likely to react positively.
However, a politician attuned to economic affairs may interpret this piece of news as a
temporary improvement based on how he or she thinks the economy will do in the long-run.
In conclusion, we argue that some congressional trades are driven (at least partially) by
macroeconomic information, and most of this information comes from firms that politicians
routinely interact with. Therefore, we expect that as an aggregate opinion of politicians,
aggregate congressional trading is positively related to stock market returns with aggregate
congressional trading predicting stock market returns.
4.3.4 Research Question and Hypotheses
Our research question is whether aggregate congressional trading predicts future excess stock
market returns over the 2004M01-2010M12 period. Based on the synthesis between the
insider trading and political investment literatures, we test the following hypotheses:
Null Hypothesis : There is no relationship between past aggregate congressional trading
and future excess market returns.
Alternative Hypothesis : There is a statistically significant positive relationship between
past aggregate congressional trading and future excess market returns.
Politicians have information regarding the future state of the economy (i.e. macroeco-
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nomic information). They are also likely to have knowledge concerning how the firms they
are in close contact with will be affected by particular macroeconomic events. We hypoth-
esize that politicians identify and trade on such macroeconomic information ahead of other
market participants. Therefore, similar to Seyhun (1988), we anticipate that lagged values of
aggregate congressional trading are positively related to future excess market returns. Due
to this anticipation, we employ one-tailed t-test in testing our hypotheses. We hope to reject
the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis.
4.4 Data and Aggregate Congressional Trading
4.4.1 Raw Data
The transactions data used in this study cover the 2004-2010 period and come from the
Center for Responsive Politics (CRP). CRP extracts these data from the Financial Disclosure
Reports (FDR) filed by politicians. All members of the U.S. House of the Representatives
and their employees with the pay grade above GS-15 need to file a FDR. When they file,
they must include transactions made by their spouse and dependent children. Their financial
transactions need to be declared in the FDR if the transaction exceeds $1,000. Members of
the U.S. Senate and the Executive Branch are also subject to similar disclosure requirements.
The data cover all of the FDRs by incumbent members of the U.S. House, Senate, and
Executive Branch, their spouses and dependent children over the 2004-2010 period.5 Trans-
actions in the FDRs are specified as buy, or sell, or exchange with the dates (day/month/year)
that they take place. The FDRs (hence the raw dataset) do not provide security identifiers,
which could enable users to collect more information on individual securities such as secu-
5Freshman politicians file their first FDRs in their first year in the office for the previous calendar year
during which they were not in Congress. These pre-election transactions account for only 6% of the ob-
servations in the “clean” (final) dataset. These transactions actually bias our results towards finding an
insignificant relationship between aggregate congressional trading and future stock returns. Therefore, we
keep them in the final sample to add more robustness to our estimations.
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rity types, prices and returns. Therefore, we match asset names in the transactions with
company names from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The matching pro-
cess takes a significant amount of time and effort due to the inconsistencies in the way that
asset names are written in the FDRs (e.g. General Motors, Genrl Motors, etc.). However,
we painstakingly check the accuracy of each match and ensure that every asset in the final
sample has a permanent security identifier PERMNO.
Another critical issue with the FDRs is that they do not specify the number of shares
bought or sold on a transaction or the share price at which a transaction is executed. Instead,
they provide a dollar amount of a transaction within intervals. Some of these intervals are
$0-$1,000, $1001-$15,000, and $15,001-$50,000 with the upper limit going up to $50,000,001.
However, there are some transactions reported with the exact dollar amount. We use the
exact dollar amount whenever it is available. When it is unavailable, we take the midpoint of
a given interval and assume that this point represents the dollar amount of the transaction
(see Ziobrowski et al., 2004).
Due to the matching process and filters that we impose, transactions falling under one
or more of the following categories are dropped: (1) missing transaction date or amount, (2)
transaction amounts less than $100, (3) duplicates, (4) exchanges of shares (e.g. mergers
and acquisitions), (5) transactions specified as both purchase and sell, (6) real assets (e.g.
land), (7) options, treasury securities, corporate bonds and certificate of deposits, (8) neither
ordinary common shares nor American Depository Receipts, and (9) asset names that are
not listed in CRSP. As a result of these filters, the number of transactions drops from 166,916
to 77,663 with 38,383 buy and 39,280 sell transactions.
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4.4.2 Data Description
Table 4.1 summarizes security types involved in the 77,663 transactions in our final dataset.
All of the transactions in Table 4.1 represent either ordinary common shares or American
Depository Receipts (ADRs). The largest category (81.21%) is the transactions involving
the U.S. common stocks (share code 10 and 11). The second (10.99%) and third (5.73%)
largest categories are ADRs and ordinary common shares of companies incorporated outside
the U.S., respectively. Ziobrowski et al. (2004) only keep the observations with share code
10 and 11 in their study. Excluding the rest of the share codes would cost us 14,597 trans-
actions. Therefore, we keep all of the share codes in Table 4.1. There are 3,503 stocks (i.e.
PERMNOs) in our final sample, 78.05% of which are U.S. common stocks.
[Table 4.1 About Here]
Table 4.2 summarizes the characteristics of transactions. Most of the transactions in
both buy and sell samples are less than or equal to $15,000. The highest number of buy
transactions took place in 2010 and the highest number of sell transactions occurred in 2006.
Furthermore, the number of sell transactions was greater than that of buy transactions for
2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007. In 2008, 2009 and 2010, there were more buy transactions than
sell transactions. These numbers suggest that politicians were more engaged in selling stocks
than buying stocks in the run-up to the Great Recession of 2008-2009. Table 4.3 lists all-time
top ten traders in the buy and sell samples. The top nine traders in both samples are the
same people but their ranks change. Transactions in the sell sample seem to be more evenly
distributed than those in the buy sample, in which Michael McCaul carried out 14.82 % of
the transactions.
[Table 4.2 About Here]
[Table 4.3 About Here]
In the beginning, we had 723 politicians in our data set. However, the filters we imposed
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on the raw data reduced this number to 433 with the following distribution: 88 senators,
321 representatives, and 24 executive branch members and 183 democrats, 247 republicans,
and 3 independents.
Table 4.4 shows the breakdown of the transactions in the final dataset by the chamber
and party affiliations. Over the sample period, Senators and Representatives have 19,645
(223.24) and 57,813 (180.10) transactions in total (on average), respectively. Democrats and
Republicans have 28,376 (155.06) and 49,120 (198.87) transactions in total (on average) over
the same period, respectively.
[Table 4.4 About Here]
4.4.3 Measure of Aggregate Congressional Trading
Following Jiang and Zaman (2010), we create a person-based trading index (PTI) to capture
aggregate congressional trading in three steps. First, for every firm-month (e.g. June 2010
for IBM, July 2010 for IBM, etc.), we calculate the total number of politicians buying and
selling (hereafter total buyers and total sellers, respectively) a company’s shares. Next, we
subtract the total sellers from the total buyers and divide this difference by the sum of the
total buyers and the total sellers for every firm-month. In the last step, we average the
firm-month level series from the earlier step over the number of companies in a given month.
The formula for PTI:
PTIt =
∑N
k=1
TBuyert,k−TSellert,k
TBuyert,k+TSellert,k
N
(4.1)
where TBuyert,k and TSellert,k are the total number of buyers and sellers, respectively, in
firm k and month t, which starts at January 2004 and ends at December 2010, spanning a
total of 84 months. N is the number of firms in month t. This method does not take into
consideration the frequency of trades by a politician in a firm in a given month. For example,
a politician may have bought General Motors shares ten times in March of 2010, but PTI
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will only assign a value of 1 for all of these transactions since they are carried out by the
same person. By focusing on the number of people trading a company’s shares instead of
the number of times the shares of a company is bought or sold, PTI prevents more active
traders from skewing the results.6
4.5 Empirical Analysis and Results
We now investigate the ability of our person-based trading index (PTI) to predict future
excess market returns on the equal-weighted market index (EREW ) and on the value-
weighted market index (ERVW ). We obtain the equal- and value-weighted market returns
and one-month T-bill rate from CRSP. We compute excess returns as 100 times the difference
between the raw market returns and one-month T-bill rate. One key difference between equal
and value-weighted returns is that CRSP excludes American Depository Receipts (ADRs) in
the construction of the value-weighted market index while it keeps them in the construction
of the equal-weighted market index. Due to this methodical difference, we define a full sample
and a limited sample. The full (limited) sample includes all transactions (all transactions
except for ADRs) in the entire sample or in a given subgroup such as the Senate. As a
result, when the dependent variable is EREW (ERVW ), we use the transactions in the full
(limited) sample to construct PTI.
Our empirical strategy involves three steps. First, we estimate a baseline model by
using only the past values of PTI as our independent variables. Second, we control for
macroeconomic variables that the past literature documented to be related to market returns.
We use default spread, term spread and earnings price ratio as the set of macroeconomic
variables and explain how they are constructed in Section 5.3. Third, we compute PTI
at the 12 Fama-French industry levels and use the past values of PTI along with the past
6 We also calculate PTI based on the number of transactions instead of number of politicians. Our results
are robust to the way we calculate PTI, which are available from the author upon request.
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industry returns as the independent variables. Such a specification also allows us to control
for the correlation between future and past stock returns.
4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics of Variables
We report the descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the regression analysis in
Table 4.5 over the 2004-2010 period. The average excess return on the equal-weighted market
index (EREW ) is 0.64% a month and 7.68% a year while the average excess return on the
value-weighted market index (ERVW ) is 0.37% a month and 4.44% a year. The average
default spread, term spread and earnings price ratio are 1.19%, 1.84% and -0.66, respectively.
[Table 4.5 About Here]
PTI has a mean value of -0.012 and a standard deviation of 0.157. There is no statisti-
cally significant contemporaneous correlation between PTI and the excess market returns.
Figure 1 depicts the values of PTI based on the full and limited sample over the 2004-2010
period. PTI reaches its lowest value (-0.51) in August of 2007 and its highest value (0.36) in
December of 2010. PTI also appears to be a stationary series. The autocorrelation between
PTI and its first 5 lags is 0.094, -0.038, 0.132, 0.037, and 0.077, respectively, all of which
are statistically insignificant.
4.5.2 Baseline Regression
We estimate a functional form following Seyhun (1988) with the heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation (HAC) robust t-statistics over the 2004-2010 period7:
EREWt(ERVWt) = β0 + β1PTIt−1 + β2PTIt−2 + β3PTIt−3 + εt (4.2)
7We also estimate Eq. (2) without correcting for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. We obtain very
similar results, which are available from the authors upon request.
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where EREWt(ERVWt) = rmt − rft. rmt is the return either on the CRSP equal-weighted
market index or on the CRSP value-weighted market index in month t, and rft is the risk-free
rate in month t proxied by the one-month T-bill rate.
Panel A and B in Table 4.6 provide the estimation results based on the transactions from
all politicians in Congress and the Executive Branch for the baseline model. Panel A (B)
summarizes the regression results when the dependent variable is the excess returns on the
CRSP equal (value)-weighted market index, EREW (ERVW ). In order to construct PTI,
we use 38,383 (34,302) buy and 39,280 (34,823) sell transactions in Panel A (B). We use
one-tailed t-test for the coefficients of PTIt−1, PTIt−2, and PTIt−3 due to their anticipated
positive signs. On the other hand, we use two-tailed t-test for the rest of the variables.
[Table 4.6 About Here]
In Panel A, the intercept and coefficient of PTIt−1 are statistically insignificant. On
the other hand, the coefficients of PTIt−2 and PTIt−3 are statistically significant at the
conventional levels even when they are both included in the same regression in Model IV.
Furthermore, their signs are positive as we expected. The statistical significance of PTIt−2
and PTIt−3 is also accompanied by economic significance. For example, in Model IV in
Panel A, one standard deviation increase in PTIt−2 is associated with a 1.18% increase in
the monthly excess returns at time t. Similarly, one standard deviation increase in PTIt−3 is
associated with a 1.57% increase in the monthly excess returns at time t. Panel B provides
very similar results to those in Panel A. In both panels, the adjusted R2 stays below 8%.
The positive coefficients of PTIt−2 and PTIt−3 in Panel A and B are consistent with
the idea that politicians correctly anticipate macroeconomic changes that will affect stock
returns two to three months in advance. When other market participants become aware of
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these macroeconomic changes, they push stock prices to levels anticipated by politicians. As
a result, similar to what Seyhun (1988) documents for corporate insiders, the past aggregate
trades by politicians predict future excess market returns. The statistically and economically
insignificant coefficient of PTIt−1 suggests that politicians invest in the stocks that are
affected earliest by the anticipated macroeconomic changes, and the relationship between
their past trading activity and future excess market returns takes longer than a month to
emerge.
4.5.3 Macroeconomic Variables
We now investigate whether PTI still predicts excess market returns after controlling for
macroeconomic variables known to be related to the market returns. We keep PTIt−2 and
PTIt−3 in our model, but exclude PTIt−1 since it does not predict excess market returns.
We also experiment with other lags and find that only the second and/or third lag predicts
excess market returns. As a result, we estimate the following equation with the HAC robust
t-statistics:
EREWt(ERVWt) = β0+β1PTIt−2+β2PTIt−3+β3DSpreadt+β4TSpreadt+β5EP Ratiot+εt
(4.3)
where DSpread, TSpread, and EP Ratio are default spread, term spread and earnings
price ratio. We subtract the rate on 3-month T-bill from the yield on 10-year Treasury bond
in order to calculate TSpread. We follow Welch and Goyal (2007) to compute DSpread
and EP Ratio. We construct DSpread as the difference between the yield on BAA rated
corporate debt and the yield on AAA rated corporate debt. For EP Ratio, we first calculate
the 12 month moving sum of the S&P 500 earnings. Next, we subtract log price from log
earnings. We obtain the necessary data for DSpread and TSpread from the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis and for EP Ratio from Robert Shiller’s website.
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Panel C and D in Table 4.6 summarize the regression results when the dependent variable
is EREW and ERVW , respectively. We construct PTI in Panel C (D) the same way as
we do in Panel A (B). In both panels, the coefficients of the default and term premiums
are always statistically insignificant at the conventional levels. However, the earnings price
ratio is statistically significant even when we estimate the model with all of the independent
variables in Model V. The coefficients of PTIt−2 and PTIt−3 are statistically significant at
the 5% level in all of the models except in Model IV in Panel D where PTIt−3 is statistically
significant only at the 10% level.8
4.5.4 Industry-Level Returns
In this section, we investigate whether our person-based trading index (PTI) predicts excess
returns at the industry-level by following the methodology in Howe et al. (2009). They
present evidence that aggregate recommendations by analysts predict excess returns at the
market and industry level. Based on a sample size exceeding 350,000 observations, they
aggregate analyst recommendations at the 48 industries following the Fama-French (1997)
classification and estimate pooled and Fama-MacBeth (1973) type regressions. We use all
of the 77,663 transactions in our sample. Since our sample size is about one-fifth of that in
Howe et al. (2009), we aggregate congressional trading at the 12 industry groups instead of
48 groups.
In the pooled regression, we control for 12 industry fixed-effects and calculate t-statistics
robust to correlation within industries (clusters). In the Fama-MacBeth (1973) type regres-
sion, we first estimate time series regression for each industry and then test whether the
8We also check whether PTI takes away the significance that the macroeconomic variables would other-
wise have. We first estimate a model with only macroeconomic variables and then add PTIt−2 and PTIt−3.
We repeat this procedure for equal- and value-weighted returns. The default and term premium do not
predict excess market returns with and without PTI. On the other hand, the statistical significance of
earnings price ratio slightly improves after including PTIt−2 and PTIt−3 in the regression. For both equal-
and value-weighted returns, the adjusted R2 more than doubles after including PTIt−2 and PTIt−3. These
findings suggest that PTI adds independent information to our models. The results are available from the
author upon request.
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average coefficients from these time series regressions are statistically significantly different
from zero. Since the second step in the Fama-MacBeth regression uses two-tailed t-test, we
also use two-tailed t-test in the pooled regression in order to maintain consistency. For both
types of regressions, we estimate the following equation:
EREWIPi,t(ERVWIPi,t) = β0+
3∑
j=1
βjPTIi,t−j +
3∑
j=1
θjEREWIPi,t−j(ERVWIPi,t−j) + εi,t
(4.4)
where EREWIPi,t(ERVWIPi,t) is the excess returns at time t on the equal (value)-weighted
industry portfolio i. We add industry dummies to this equation in the pooled regression.
The econometric specification in Eq. (4) also helps us control for the ability of the past stock
returns to predict the future stock returns.
[Table 4.7 About Here]
We summarize the results of the industry-level analysis in Table 4.7. Panel A reports the
estimation results from the pooled regression with the industry-clustered t-statistics. When
the dependent variable is EREWIP , the coefficients of PTIt−2 and PTIt−3 are statistically
significant at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. When the dependent variable is ERVWIP ,
PTIt−3 loses its predictive ability, but PTIt−2 gains additional predictive power with its
coefficient statistically significant at the 1% level. Irrespective of the choice for dependent
variables, the past values of the dependent variable and all of the industry-dummies have
statistically significant coefficients. Overall, the model with EREWIP as the dependent
variable performs better with higher R2.
Panel B summarizes the estimation results from the second step of the Fama-MacBeth
(1973) type regression. In the first step, the past values of PTI predict excess returns in
eight (four) out of twelve industries when the dependent variable is EREWIP (ERVWIP ).
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Irrespective of the dependent variable, there is not a statistically significant relationship
between industry-level PTI and excess returns for the following industries: Durable Goods,
Manufacturing, and Chemicals. In Panel B, the coefficients of PTIt−2 and PTIt−3 are
statistically significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively when the dependent variable
is EREWIP . However, when the dependent variable is ERVWIP , only PTIt−2 predicts
excess returns. Similar to the results in Panel A, the past values of PTI performs better
when the dependent variable is the excess returns on the equal-weighted portfolios.
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) document that “aggregate insider trading activity is more
informative in predicting returns of smaller companies relative to large companies.” Given
that small companies have a larger impact on equal-weighted returns than on value-weighted
returns, we argue that the better performance of PTI in explaining excess returns on equal-
weighted portfolios compared to value-weighted portfolios can be explained by the firm size
factor documented by Lakonishok and Lee (2001).
4.6 Subgroup Analysis: Chambers and Parties
Ziobrowski et al. (2004) conduct subgroup analysis among senators by separately investigat-
ing the performance of common stock investments of members of the Democratic Party and
Republican Party in the U.S. Senate. They find that Democrats have superior performance
to Republicans in terms of market-adjusted returns, but the difference is not statistically
significant. Ziobrowski et al. (2011) examine the abnormal returns from the transactions of
the U.S. House and report lower but still statistically significant abnormal returns compared
to the U.S. Senate. They also present evidence that the portfolios of Democrats seem to out-
perform those of Republicans. Based on these studies, we carry out a subgroup analysis by
estimating Eq. (3) at the U.S. House, U.S. Senate, Democratic Party and Republican Party
level, respectively. Since the first lag of PTI does not explain the excess market returns, we
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exclude it in the subgroup analysis. We do not carry out a separate analysis on aggregate
trading by members of the Executive Branch because there are only 205 transactions from
this group over the 2004-2010 period.
House versus Senate
Table 4.8 reports the regression results when the subgroup is the U.S. House (Panel A and B)
and the U.S. Senate (Panel C and D), respectively. The coefficients of PTIt−2 and PTIt−3
are still statistically significant even when we restrict our sample to the transactions from
the U.S. House. However, the statistical significance gets weaker in Panel B where PTIt−3
is statistically significant only at the 10% level. On the other hand, there is not a significant
relationship between the future excess market returns and the past values of PTI when the
sample is only composed of transactions from the U.S. Senate as reported in Panel C and D.
Furthermore, the coefficients of PTIt−2 and PTIt−3 in Panel C and D are in magnitude less
than one third of those in Panel A and B. These results suggest that only Representatives
trade on information with macroeconomic components. We remind readers that the number
of transactions from the House is about three times the number of transactions from the
Senate (see Table 4.4). Therefore, it is possible that the results in Panel C and D may have
been driven by the smaller sample size.
[Table 4.8 About Here]
Democrats versus Republicans
Table 4.9 presents the regression results when the subgroup is Democrats (Panel A and B)
and Republicans (Panel C and D), respectively. In Panel A and B, PTIt−2 consistently
predicts the future excess market returns. However, PTIt−3 has the persistent predictive
ability only in Model V. In Panel C and D, PTIt−3 predicts the excess market returns in
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all but one model, but PTIt−2 does not have any predictive ability. Overall, these results
suggest that aggregate trading by Democrats and Republicans still predict excess market
returns, but the evidence is stronger for Democrats than Republicans and for EREW than
ERVW.
[Table 4.9 About Here]
4.7 Robustness Check
We use an alternative measure to capture aggregate congressional trading and test whether
previous results hold under a different index. Seyhun (1988) develops a standardized measure
to capture both the firm-level and economy-wide insider trading. We slightly modify his
methodology to construct a transaction-based trading index (TTI) from congressional stock
trades. We construct TTI in two steps. First, we find the total number of buy and sell
transactions (hereafter total buys and total sells, respectively) in every month. Next, we
subtract the total sells from the total buys and divide this difference by the sum of the total
buys and the total sells on a monthly basis such that:
TTIt =
Pt − St
Pt + St
(4.5)
where Pt and St are the total buys and the total sells in month t, respectively. t starts at
January 2004 and ends at December 2010 spanning a total of 84 months. TTI has a mean
of -0.012 and standard deviation of 0.169. The minimum and maximum values it takes are
-0.448 and 0.427. Compared to PTI, TTI has the same mean but slightly higher standard
deviation. These two indexes move in the same direction most of the time with a correlation
coefficient of 0.84.
[Table 4.10 About Here]
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Table 4.10 reports the coefficient estimates when we replace PTI with TTI. In Panel A
and B, we present the results from estimating the baseline model in Eq. (2) while Panel C
and D show the coefficient estimates after controlling for macroeconomic variables. TTIt−2
consistently predicts the future excess market returns. TTIt−3 also has the predictive ability,
but not as much as TTIt−2. The results in Table 4.10 are very similar to those in Table 4.6
except that t-statistics associated with PTI are higher than those associated with TTI.
Furthermore, the coefficients of TTIt−2 and TTIt−3 are also economically significant. One
standard deviation increase in TTIt−2 and TTIt−3 is associated with 1.27% and 1.52% in-
crease in the future monthly excess returns based on Model IV in Panel A. Overall, these
results suggest that our findings are robust to different measures of aggregate congressional
trading.
4.8 Conclusion and Policy Implications
This study investigates the ability of congressional stock trades to predict market returns.
We provide evidence that aggregate congressional trading predicts excess market returns
two to three months in advance using 77,663 stock transactions over the 2004-2010 period.
This finding implies that politicians, similar to corporate insiders, trade on information con-
taining macroeconomic components. Our subsample analysis reveals that the transactions
by the members of the House and the Democratic Party seem to have more economy-wide
information than those by the members of the Senate and the Republican Party.
Under the current provisions of the STOCK Act of 2012 and its 2013 amendment, it
takes 60 to 75 days for congressional stock trades to be publicly available in paper. We
suggest that Congress amend the STOCK Act to reduce this reporting lag and reinstate
the online posting requirement so that investors can potentially use aggregate congressional
trading as a leading indicator of economic performance and a market timing tool. Further-
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more, ordinary investors can mitigate the harmful effects of political uncertainty by following
aggregate congressional trading since they are not likely to have access to political intelli-
gence firms, which provide their clients with insider information from Capitol Hill. We argue
that Congress can alleviate identity theft and national security concerns by assigning anony-
mous identifications to members of Congress. Investigating the source of predictive ability
of aggregate congressional trading is an area that we hope that future research sheds light
on.
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Table 4.1: Types of Securities in the Final Sample
This table presents the security types involved in all transactions by politicians (members
of the U.S. House, Senate and Executive Branch) over the 2004-2010 period. We obtain
share codes from CRSP that designate the type of a security. When the share code’s first
digit equals 1, it denotes ordinary common shares. When its first digit equals 3, then it
denotes American Depository Receipts. Accordingly, 10 and 11 represent the domestic
common stocks. 12 represents the ordinary common shares of companies incorporated
outside the U.S. 14, 15, and 18 represent ordinary common shares of closed-end funds,
closed-end funds incorporated outside the U.S. and the real investment trusts (REIT),
respectively.
Raw Data Source: Center for Responsive Politics (CRP)
Share Code No. of Transactions Percent (%) No. of Stocks Percent (%)
10 21 0.03 8 0.23
11 63,045 81.18 2,734 78.05
12 4,448 5.73 228 6.51
14 604 0.78 113 3.23
15 21 0.03 1 0.03
18 986 1.27 112 3.20
30 428 0.55 12 0.34
31 8,110 10.44 295 8.42
Total 77,663 100 3,503 100
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Figure 4.1: Person-Based Trading Index (PTI)
Figure 1: This figure illustrates the time series movement of person-based trading Index (PTI), which we
construct by Eq. (1) using congressional stock transactions (trades) that took place over the 2004-2010
period. PTI1 takes into account all trades (full sample) while PTI2 excludes trades representing American
Depository Receipts (limited sample). We obtain the transactions data from Center for Responsive Politics
(CRP), available at http://www.opensecrets.org/index.php.
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Table 4.2: Dollar Amounts of Transactions by Politicians
This table provides information on the dollar amounts of transactions by politicians
(members of the U.S. House, Senate and Executive Branch) over the 2004-2010 period.
Panel A presents the number of buy transactions at different intervals as well as the total
number of buy transactions for each year in the sample period. Similarly, Panel B shows
the number of sell transactions at different intervals as well as the total number of sell
transactions for each year in the sample period.
Raw Data Source: Center for Responsive Politics (CRP)
Panel A: Buy Transactions 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Amount ≤ 15,000 3,639 3,593 4,915 3,883 4,592 3,824 6,359 30,805
15,000 < Amount ≤ 50,000 778 715 558 767 620 427 820 4,685
50,000 < Amount ≤ 100,000 296 187 239 244 228 113 289 1,596
Amount > 100,000 313 112 316 164 156 63 173 1,297
Total 5,026 4,607 6,028 5,058 5,596 4,427 7,641 38,383
Panel B: Sell Transactions 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Amount ≤ 15,000 4,348 3,905 5,970 5,441 3,781 2,747 4,621 30,813
15,000 < Amount ≤ 50,000 883 819 650 658 693 656 768 5,127
50,000 < Amount ≤ 100,000 291 215 191 227 323 187 278 1,712
Amount > 100,000 366 152 230 226 290 167 197 1,628
Total 5,888 5,091 7,041 6,552 5,087 3,757 5,864 39,280
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Table 4.3: Top Ten Traders During the 2004-2010 Period
This table presents the politicians (members of the U.S. House, Senate and Executive
Branch) who trade the most frequently (top traders) during the 2004-2010 period. Panel
A presents the top 10 traders on the buy side along with their number of transactions
and the percentage of the transactions they carry out in the buy sample. Similarly, Panel
B presents the top 10 traders on the sell side along with their number of transactions
and the percentage of the transactions they carry out in the sell sample.
Raw Data Source: Center for Responsive Politics (CRP)
Panel A: Top Buyers Rank Name Number Percent (%)
1 Michael McCaul 5,572 14.82
2 Lamar Smith 2,235 5.95
3 John Kerry 2,185 5.81
4 Vernon Buchanan 1,854 4.93
5 Kenny E. Marchant 1,805 4.80
6 Kay R. Hagan 1,539 4.09
7 Tom Osborne 1,470 3.91
8 Jane Harman 1,313 3.49
9 Jeff Bingaman 1,264 3.36
10 Carolyn McCarthy 1,080 2.87
Panel B: Top Sellers Rank Name Number Percent (%)
1 Michael McCaul 3,147 8.22
2 Kenny E. Marchant 2,108 5.51
3 John Kerry 2,022 5.28
4 Lamar Smith 1,825 4.77
5 Jane Harman 1,751 4.58
6 Vernon Buchanan 1,713 4.48
7 Carolyn McCarthy 1,709 4.47
8 Jeff Bingaman 1,533 4.01
9 Tom Osborne 1,166 3.05
10 Jim Moran 1,089 2.85
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Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression analysis
over the 2004M01-2010M12 period. PTI is the person-based trading index constructed
by Eq. (1) from the transactions data provided by Center for Responsive Politics. EREW
(ERVW) is the excess returns, 100*[raw market returns minus one-month T-bill rate], on
the CRSP equal (value)-weighted market index. DSpread is the default spread (rate on
BAA-corporate debt minus rate on AAA-corporate debt), TSpread is the term spread
(10 year T-bond rate minus 3 month T-bill rate), and EP Ratio is the earnings price
ratio (log of 12 month moving sum of S&P 500 earnings minus log of price). *, **, ***
denote the 10, 5, and 1 % significance level, respectively.
Univariate Analysis
Variables Mean Median St Dev Min Max
PTI -0.0119 0.0007 0.1568 -0.5092 0.3562
EREW (%) 0.6395 1.1308 5.7789 -20.6022 19.2660
ERVW (%) 0.3734 0.9363 4.7432 -18.5403 10.9259
DSpread(%) 1.1864 0.9500 0.6231 0.6200 3.3800
TSpread(%) 1.8389 2.2050 1.3189 -0.3800 3.7000
EP Ratio -0.6613 -0.5128 0.3847 -1.9724 -0.3531
Correlation Analysis
Variables PTI EREW (%) ERVW (%) DSpread(%) TSpread(%) EP Ratio
PTI 1.0000
EREW (%) 0.02 1.0000
(0.16)
ERVW (%) -0.03 0.95*** 1.0000
(-0.26) (26.41)
DSpread(%) 0.16 -0.05 -0.16 1.0000
(1.43) (-0.43) (-1.46)
TSpread(%) 0.22** 0.04 -0.01 0.33*** 1.0000
(2.06) (0.40) (-0.11) (3.14)
EP Ratio -0.03 -0.26** -0.21* -0.04 -0.61*** 1.0000
(-0.30) (-2.41) (-1.99) (-0.34) (-7.04)
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Table 4.6: Aggregate Congressional Trading and Excess Market Returns
This table reports the regression results on the predictive ability of aggregate congressional trading over
the 2004M01-2010M12 period with all transactions included. The key explanatory variable, PTI, is the
person-based trading index constructed by Eq. (1) from the transactions data provided by Center for
Responsive Politics. The dependent variable, EREW (ERVW ), is the excess returns, 100*[raw returns
minus one-month T-bill rate], on the CRSP equal (value)-weighted market index. DSpread is the default
spread (rate on BAA-corporate debt minus rate on AAA-corporate debt), TSpread is the term spread (10
year T-bond rate minus 3 month T-bill rate), and EP Ratio is the earnings price ratio (log of 12 month
moving sum of S&P 500 earnings minus log of price). Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC)
robust t-statistics are provided in the parenthesis. *, **, *** denote the 10, 5, and 1 % significance levels
of one-tailed (two-tailed) t-test for PTI (the others). Intercepts are not presented to save space.
Panel A: EREW Model I Model II Model III Model IV
PTIt−1 0.62 0.59
(0.13) (0.14)
PTIt−2 8.18** 7.51**
(2.28) (1.95)
PTIt−3 10.45*** 10.00**
(2.63) (2.34)
AdjR2(%) -1.21 3.37 6.27 7.88
Panel B: ERVW Model I Model II Model III Model IV
PTIt−1 -0.90 -1.67
(-0.26) (-0.55)
PTIt−2 9.01** 8.29**
(2.23) (2.07)
PTIt−3 8.49** 7.34**
(2.06) (1.75)
AdjR2(%) -1.17 5.43 4.66 7.80
Panel C: EREW Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
PTIt−2 7.55** 8.17** 7.83** 6.95** 8.28**
(1.97) (1.93) (1.90) (2.06) (2.24)
PTIt−3 9.97** 10.36** 10.19** 8.95** 9.61**
(2.34) (2.30) (2.28) (2.12) (2.24)
DSpread -0.97 -0.31
(-0.45) (-0.15)
TSpread -0.19 -1.08
(-0.33) (-1.48)
EP Ratio -3.07** -5.24**
(-2.27) (-1.94)
AdjR2(%) 9.04 8.96 8.05 12.09 14.28
Panel D: ERVW Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
PTIt−2 8.04** 9.14** 8.93** 7.43** 9.39**
(1.99) (2.03) (2.03) (1.90) (2.17)
PTIt−3 7.45** 8.01** 8.15** 6.56* 7.48**
(1.77) (1.85) (1.87) (1.55) (1.78)
DSpread -1.68 -1.11
(-1.10) (-0.81)
TSpread -0.44 -0.90
(-0.89) (-1.55)
EP Ratio -1.83** -3.62**
(-2.28) (-2.07)
AdjR2(%) 8.74 12.42 8.95 9.73 15.72
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Table 4.7: Industry Level Congressional Trading and Excess Market Returns
This table provides the estimation results over the 2004M01-2010M12 period from the
pooled and Fama-MacBeth (1973) type regressions with the aggregate congressional trad-
ing measured at 12 different industry levels. The key explanatory variable, PTI, is the
person-based trading index constructed by Eq. (1) from the transactions data provided by
Center for Responsive Politics. The dependent variable, EREWIP (ERVWIP ), is the
excess returns, 100*[raw industry returns minus one-month T-bill rate], on equal (value)-
weighted industry portfolio. DV stands for the dependent variable. The t-statistics (in
parenthesis) are robust to within-industry correlations in Panel A. *, **, *** denote the
10, 5, and 1 % significance levels, respectively. We do two-tailed t-test for all coefficients.
Industry fixed effects and intercepts are not presented to save space.
Panel A: Pooled Regression with Industry-Fixed Effects
Variables EREWIP ERVWIP
PTIt−1 0.76 0.30
(1.35) (0.61)
PTIt−2 3.27** 2.39***
(2.98) (3.25)
PTIt−3 2.30* 0.24
(2.09) (0.39)
DVt−1 0.32*** 0.19***
(9.78) (5.11)
DVt−2 -0.10** -0.09*
(-2.35) (-2.19)
DVt−3 0.15*** 0.14***
(4.43) (3.32)
AdjR2(%) 14.68 7.08
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth Regression
Variables EREWIP ERVWIP
PTIt−1 0.53 -0.49
(0.93) (-0.90)
PTIt−2 4.44*** 3.20***
(4.32) (4.23)
PTIt−3 3.78** 0.96
(3.09) (1.10)
DVt−1 0.32*** 0.18***
(13.50) (6.09)
DVt−2 -0.13*** -0.09**
(-4.02) (-2.49)
DVt−3 0.16*** 0.13***
(6.83) (3.58)
AdjR2(%) 12.05 3.96
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Table 4.8: U.S. House and U.S. Senate
This table summarizes the regression analysis for U.S. House and Senate over the 2004M01-2010M12
period. PTI is person-based trading index (Equation 1). EREW (ERVW ) is excess returns on CRSP
equal (value)-weighted market index. DSpread is default spread (BAA-corporate debt yield minus AAA-
corporate debt yield), TSpread is term spread (10 year T-bond yield minus 3 month T-bill rate), and
EP Ratio is earnings price ratio (log of 12 month moving sum of S&P 500 earnings minus log of price).
HAC robust t-statistics are in the parenthesis. *, **, *** denote the 10, 5, and 1 % significance levels of
one-tailed (two-tailed) t-test for PTI (the rest). Intercepts are not presented to save space.
Panel/Chamber/Dep.Var. Variable Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
A/House/ EREW PTIt−2 7.16** 7.93** 7.15** 7.07*** 7.87***
(2.06) (1.98) (2.00) (2.52) (2.45)
PTIt−3 8.29** 8.90** 8.28** 7.62** 7.94**
(1.87) (1.86) (1.84) (1.80) (1.82)
DSpread -1.17 -0.71
(-0.54) (-0.37)
TSpread 0.02 -0.77
(0.03) (-1.07)
EP Ratio -3.42** -5.06*
(-2.41) (-1.86)
AdjR2(%) 8.81 9.19 7.63 12.99 14.19
B/House/ ERVW PTIt−2 6.95** 8.14** 7.10** 6.75** 8.04**
(2.15) (2.12) (2.07) (2.27) (2.31)
PTIt−3 5.26* 6.13* 5.37* 4.66* 5.32*
(1.47) (1.52) (1.46) (1.31) (1.39)
DSpread -1.78 -1.40
(-1.18) (-1.04)
TSpread -0.19 -0.62
(-0.42) (-1.05)
EP Ratio -2.31** -3.65*
(-2.55) (-1.92)
AdjR2(%) 6.39 10.53 5.45 8.75 13.68
C/Senate/ EREW PTIt−2 2.78 2.78 2.77 2.02 2.36
(0.95) (0.95) (0.92) (0.73) (0.87)
PTIt−3 -0.25 -0.33 -0.27 -0.66 -0.16
(-0.07) (-0.09) (-0.07) (-0.17) (-0.04)
DSpread -0.34 0.24
(-0.14) (0.11)
TSpread 0.02 -3.58** -1.00
(0.03) (-2.04) (-1.45)
EP Ratio -5.52*
(-1.85)
AdjR2(%) -1.02 -2.20 -2.33 3.33 3.72
D/Senate/ ERVW PTIt−2 2.00 2.00 2.18 1.49 1.78
(0.77) (0.79) (0.81) (0.59) (0.74)
PTIt−3 0.85 0.61 1.00 0.51 0.68
(0.31) (0.21) (0.36) (0.18) (0.22)
DSpread -1.15 -0.70
(-0.67) (-0.45)
TSpread -0.21 -0.77
(-0.46) (-1.53)
EP Ratio -2.37** -3.95*
(-2.02) (-1.93)
AdjR2(%) -0.51 0.51 -1.49 1.80 4.36
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Table 4.9: Democrats (Dems) and Republicans (Reps)
This table summarizes the estimation results for Democrats and Republicans over 2004M01-2010M12
period. PTI is person-based trading index (Equation 1). EREW (ERVW ) is excess returns on CRSP
equal (value)-weighted market index. DSpread is default spread (BAA-corporate debt yield minus AAA-
corporate debt yield), TSpread is term spread (10 year T-bond yield minus 3 month T-bill rate), and
EP Ratio is earnings price ratio (log of 12 month moving sum of S&P 500 earnings minus log of price).
HAC robust t-statistics are in the parenthesis. *, **, *** denote the 10, 5, and 1 % significance levels of
one-tailed (two-tailed) t-test for PTI (the rest). Intercepts are not presented to save space.
Panel/Party/Dep.Var. Variable Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
A/Dems/ EREW PTIt−2 5.33** 5.34** 5.40** 5.26** 6.71***
(1.80) (1.83) (1.72) (1.89) (2.40)
PTIt−3 2.28 2.31* 2.37 2.23 4.17**
(1.15) (1.45) (1.04) (1.07) (2.24)
DSpread 0.06 1.34
(0.03) (0.69)
TSpread -0.10 -1.72**
(-0.17) (-2.18)
EP Ratio -3.71** -7.12**
(-2.59) (-2.49)
AdjR2(%) 4.48 3.24 3.30 9.59 14.24
B/Dems/ ERVW PTIt−2 5.04** 4.81** 5.36** 4.88** 6.06**
(1.84) (1.85) (1.87) (1.81) (2.28)
PTIt−3 1.64 1.21 1.98 1.50 2.82*
(0.86) (0.83) (0.90) (0.77) (1.49)
DSpread -0.83 0.26
(-0.52) (0.19)
TSpread -0.35 -1.39**
(-0.65) (-2.24)
EP Ratio -2.44** -5.21***
(-2.59) (-2.65)
AdjR2(%) 5.47 5.39 5.12 8.27 13.73
C/Reps/ EREW PTIt−2 1.80 3.98 1.89 0.89 2.83
(0.45) (1.11) (0.51) (0.24) (0.89)
PTIt−3 8.38** 10.53** 8.44** 6.99** 8.40**
(1.85) (2.13) (1.88) (1.51) (1.77)
DSpread -1.76 -1.07
(-0.71) (-0.48)
TSpread -0.06 -0.69
(-0.12) (-0.93)
EP Ratio -3.09* -4.35
(-1.82) (-1.49)
AdjR2(%) 3.90 5.52 2.67 6.82 8.07
D/Reps/ ERVW PTIt−2 1.90 5.13 2.21 1.19 4.26
(0.57) (1.33) (0.68) (0.37) (1.17)
PTIt−3 4.95* 8.02** 5.15* 3.84 6.41*
(1.42) (1.92) (1.48) (1.06) (1.56)
DSpread -2.38 -1.90
(1.32) (-1.14)
TSpread -0.20 -0.48
(-0.47) (-0.80)
EP Ratio -2.24* -2.98
(-1.91) (-1.48)
AdjR2(%) 0.63 7.05 -0.36 2.54 8.04
130
Table 4.10: Aggregate Congressional Trading and Excess Market Returns
This table reports the regression results on the predictive ability of aggregate congressional trading over
the 2004M01-2010M12 period with all transactions included. The key explanatory variable, TTI, is the
transaction-based trading index constructed by Eq. (5) from the transactions data provided by Center
for Responsive Politics. The dependent variable, EREW (ERVW ), is the excess returns, 100*[raw
returns minus one-month T-bill rate], on the CRSP equal (value)-weighted market index. DSpread
is the default spread (rate on BAA-corporate debt minus rate on AAA-corporate debt), TSpread is
the term spread (10 year T-bond rate minus 3 month T-bill rate), and EP Ratio is the earnings price
ratio (log of 12 month moving sum of S&P 500 earnings minus log of price). Heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation (HAC) robust t-statistics are provided in the parenthesis. *, **, *** denote the 10, 5,
and 1 % significance levels of one-tailed (two-tailed) t-test for PTI (the others). Intercepts are not
presented to save space.
Panel A: EREW Model I Model II Model III Model IV
TTIt−1 1.57 -1.64
(0.29) (-0.34)
TTIt−2 8.96** 7.49**
(2.23) (2.15)
TTIt−3 10.21** 9.01**
(2.09) (1.89)
AdjR2(%) -1.03 5.48 7.45 9.54
Panel B: ERVW Model I Model II Model III Model IV
TTIt−1 -0.27 -3.15
(-0.07) (-0.77)
TTIt−2 7.20** 6.49**
(2.04) (1.91)
TTIt−3 6.89** 6.00*
(1.80) (1.62)
AdjR2(%) -1.22 4.57 4.07 6.33
Panel C: EREW Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
TTIt−2 7.21** 10.32** 8.89** 6.24** 10.26**
(2.15) (2.12) (2.16) (1.87) (2.11)
TTIt−3 8.75** 11.15** 10.31** 7.42** 10.46**
(1.92) (2.02) (1.96) (1.54) (1.84)
DSpread -2.45 -1.62
(-1.13) (-0.82)
TSpread -0.71 -1.16
(-1.03) (-1.56)
EP Ratio -2.00 -3.62
(-1.37) (-1.47)
AdjR2(%) 10.48 14.96 11.48 10.89 17.25
Panel D: ERVW Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
TTIt−2 5.84** 9.65** 8.07** 5.11* 10.26**
(1.89) (2.03) (2.06) (1.60) (2.04)
TTIt−3 5.46* 8.18** 7.53** 4.48 8.40**
(1.55) (1.89) (1.80) (1.14) (1.76)
DSpread -2.87* -2.30
(-1.93) (-1.64)
TSpread -0.82 -0.95*
(-1.36) (-1.72)
EP Ratio -1.25 -2.09
(-1.14) (-1.23)
AdjR2(%) 6.49 16.76 9.16 6.11 18.29
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This dissertation documents that members of Congress (politicians) are informed traders
in that the stocks that they buy go up in value and the stocks that they sell decline in
value. They trade on such private information that their portfolios earn short-term abnor-
mal returns. Party membership, committee membership (a proxy for power), and trading
experience are important determinants of abnormal returns on congressional stock portfolios.
In particular, the unsophisticated powerful members of the Republican Party have the best
performing portfolios with short-term annualized abnormal returns exceeding 34%.
Informed trading extends beyond members of Congress. We present evidence that spouses
of politicians also trade on private information generating short-term abnormal returns.
These short-term abnormal returns are higher for the spouses of powerful politicians. Also,
trading behavior of politicians explains a big part of abnormal returns on spousal portfolios.
When politicians have their own trading accounts, their spouses’ portfolios outperform the
market. On the other hand, when politicians do not have their own trading accounts (i.e.,
politicians who do not trade themselves) their spouses’ portfolios mostly have mediocre
performance.
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We find that the nature of congressional trading is not limited to firm-specific infor-
mation. We present evidence that politicians, similar to corporate insiders, also trade on
macroeconomic information. In other words, their trades are driven by economy-wide in-
formation to a certain extent. Aggregate analysis of congressional stock trades reveals that
both Republicans and Democrats trade on economy-wide information. Interestingly, the first
essay clearly shows that it is only Republicans who trade on value-relevant firm-specific in-
formation, and there are no abnormal returns on the portfolios of Democrats. Combining the
results of portfolio analysis and aggregate analysis helps us conclude that Republicans are
informed traders with respect to both firm-specific and macroeconomic information whereas
Democrats are informed traders only with respect to macroeconomic information. Overall,
the results in this dissertation essays suggest that members of Congress are better than
average investors when it comes to investing in common stocks.
We hope that future research sheds light on the channels through which members of
Congress receive firm-specific and macroeconomic information. It will be interesting to
examine if politicians are more likely to have private political information on firms that
they directly regulate. Investigating whether politicians from states with large economies
are more likely to trade on macroeconomic information than those from states with small
economies is another interesting question for future research.
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